Cooking the Books on ISIS: The Military Intelligence Controversy

By Wesley Smith yesterday



The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) is under investigation by the “U.S. House of Representatives Joint Task Force on U.S. Central Command Intelligence Analysis” due to reports that, on more than one occasion, critical military intelligence regarding our fight with ISIS (the Islamic State) was changed by senior officials at CENTCOM after being submitted by analysts working for that organization.

After a whistle-blower at CENTCOM reported that intelligence analysts were being pressured to show a false and more positive view of our fight against ISIS and to downplay the threat of ISIS in military reports, Congress interviewed over 50 analysts working for CENTCOM. The findings were troubling to say the least.

In their 15-page report to Congress, the Task Force confirmed that intelligence analysts were asked to change their reports to conform with the Obama Administration’s contention that we were making gains against ISIS. When the analysts did not tweak their reports to conform to this narrative, the reports were changed anyway before being forwarded up the chain of command. In a survey administered by the task force, 40% of analysts responding said they had experienced an attempt to distort or suppress intelligence during the previous year. Over 50% of those responding said “CENTCOM procedures, practices, processes and organizational structures hampered objective analysis.”

Additionally, according to the report, “Intelligence Directorate leadership consistently “softened” intelligence assessments to provide more certainty regarding possible outcomes. Analysts described the leadership as risk-averse and unwilling to accept uncertainty in intelligence analysis---which by its very nature deals in probabilities and contingencies rather than certainties.”

All of the altered reports consistently gave the impression that the situation on the ground in the Middle East was better than it was; not one altered report implied that the situation was worse, even if the facts said otherwise. The analysts, complaining to the Pentagon’s Inspector General, said senior officials had created a “Stalinist” work environment where they felt “bullied” into drawing conclusions not substantiated by facts.

Of note in the report, the pressure to change the analysis began when General Lloyd Austin became CENTCOM Commander, bringing with him Major General Steven Grove as Director of Intelligence. During the term of his predecessor, General James Mattis, there was no such pressure to alter reports. After General Austin relinquished command and his successor, General Joseph Votel, took command (bringing with him a new director of intelligence) the pressure to change reports ceased. Additionally, the task force found that during Austin’s command, senior intelligence officials barred the CENTCOM analysts from coordinating with other government intelligence agencies, something considered “analytic best practices,” to assess their findings with other agencies.

The intelligence community produces a product. That product is analysis of raw intelligence data from signals, imagery, human and other intelligence sources. In this case, the “product” was tweaked in order to meet the “customer’s” desires and needs. In this case, while there is no direct evidence that senior Obama Administration officials requested the changes, the customer for this product was, in fact, the Obama Administration.

How and why this happened is not clear. Part of the blame rests with the CENTCOM intelligence community. American safety and lives depend on this information. To make unwarranted changes to an intelligence report is a serious act. At some point, heads will roll in that agency.

On the other hand, part of the fault is that of the Administration. There is a culture of distrust between the military and the Obama Administration. I witnessed this during my time at the Pentagon. It was not safe in the senior leader ranks to openly question the Administration or to offer opinions that did not mirror those of the White House. In that culture—where candor was not only unrewarded, but often punished—it had an impact on the military. I saw this at work with senior leaders. It is one of the reasons the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, did not get his fourth star and was asked to retire.

Another general, whom I knew personally, was also asked to retire.

In this type of unhealthy environment, there was most likely some “anticipation” of what the “customer” wanted and an attempt was made to deliver that product. While not excusing this behavior, humanly speaking, it is not difficult to see how, in an effort to please the powers that be, even the military can fall victim to the desire to give the “right” answers to those in authority over them, especially if that authority implicitly (or perhaps even at times explicitly) demands it.

In addition to providing information to the Combatant Commands (COCOMS), CENTCOM provides military intelligence to the Pentagon and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Those two entities are key players in briefing the White House on the ongoing conflict in Iraq and Syria.

Congressional inquiry into this doctoring of intelligence for political purposes will continue. As well it should.

http://aclj.org/national-security/co...ce-controversy