The Geopolitics of the US-North Korea Standoff


by Tim Beal
Global Research, June 29, 2009


The nuclear test by North Korea (DPRK) on 25 May unleashed a predictable torrent of pronouncements, mostly hypocritical and few suggesting anything approaching a meaningful analysis of the geopolitical struggle of which it was one event among many. There are many important, yet unanswered, questions of which the principle one is perhaps why, and how, did the Obama administration seemingly drift into confrontation with North Korea, with unpredictable but ominous consequences? How did Obama, who was elected on a platform of change and hope so quickly get enmeshed in the worst legacy of his predecessor? That, of course, stretches beyond the Korean peninsula to the Middle East; it is unfortunately not inconceivable that he will be remembered in history as having turned Bush’s two wars into four, by adding Pakistan and Korea. Obama had inherited a negotiation process which, although it had been stalled and derailed by hardliners in Washington, could with relative ease, had there been firm and unified leadership, been brought to a swift conclusion - "It could be worked out, in my opinion, in half a day" said Jimmy Carter.[1]

The situation on the Korea peninsula is quite unlike the intractable problems the US faces, for instance, in the Middle East. In Kim Jong Il, Obama has a counterpart who is strategic and in control of policy. In other words, a man who can deliver a deal if the price is right. And the price? Peaceful coexistence between the two sovereign states, the lifting of American sanctions against the DPRK, aid (or compensation for the 60 years of embargo). The DPRK wants an environment in which foreign trade and investment can be developed, since this is essential for its economic growth. The deal? The DPRK will denuclearise on a step-by step basis as the US fulfils its obligations. This is not an interpretation that will be familiar in the mainstream media, and it is contested by many, but there is plenty of evidence for it, though there is no space to elaborate here. Two voices from South Korea must suffice.

Firstly, Jeong Se-hyun, former Unification Minister:

North Korea’s real aim is not to become a fully-fledged nuclear-armed state. Its real aim is to gain more economic support for itself and to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S. quickly in order to achieve its greater goal of becoming a “strong and prosperous countryâ€