July 17, 2013 by William Lafferty
Harry Reid and Luis Gutierrez Resurrect Hate Crime Fiasco


Read more: http://freedomoutpost.com/2013/07/ha...#ixzz2ZQCmotsH

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid has announced that the Zimmerman case “isn’t over with yet,” and one of his colleagues, the mentally-challenged legislator Luis Gutierrez went even further when he wrote,
“When any child is gunned down and no one goes to jail, it is incumbent on lawmakers at the highest level of government to investigate whether justice has been done, whether the underlying law is just, and whether federal legislation could help avoid another tragic death like the death of Trayvon Martin.”
Apparently Messrs. Reid and Gutierrez view justice as someone going to jail, and are anxious to write more federal laws when that doesn’t happen. Apart from the fact that one fears for the survival of the republic with geniuses like this at the helm, it may be instructive to examine problems inherent in what they are calling for, hate crime prosecutions.
Read more at The Hill and The Washington Times
This is what the federal “hate crime” statute says:
18 USC § 249 – Hate crime acts
(a) In General.—
(1) Offenses involving actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin. — Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person—
(A) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title, or both; and
(B) shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, fined in accordance with this title, or both, if—
(i)death results from the offense; or
(ii)the offense includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill.
In short, under this statute, if the federal government is able to show that Zimmerman killed Martin because of his race, Zimmerman may be imprisoned for life. (Because the Zimmerman case concerns race, the following discussion will deal only with race, although the statute itself contains other protected categories as well.)
This statute exists for only one reason: its federal authors were concerned that the states cannot be counted upon to prosecute and punish someone who performed a racially motivated attack. Because the elements of the crime in the federal hate crimes act are different from the elements of the typical state murder or assault or aggravated assault statutes, the feds are free to bring a second prosecution for the same crime and possibly secure a federal conviction where the state either had not charged the person or had acquitted him.
Leaving aside the fact that this case should not have been brought at all, that it was motivated by shameless political pressuring of race-baiting malefactors and equally shameless caving-in by Florida officials, there are two things wrong with a prosecution under this statute.
The first is that the federal government has no legal basis for second-guessing the states. The notion underlying state sovereignty is that the people of the states have the interest, the ability and the right to determine their own lives. Turning this over to the federal government would be like rolling over for King George. This is more of the same stuff that brought us Obamacare, the civil rights act of 1968 (based on the commerce clause), and the intrusion of federal agencies and bureaucrats in every aspect of our lives.
The second thing wrong with prosecuting anyone under this statute is that it attempts to do what may not be done in a free society: it attempts to dictate what a person may think and what he may say. Suppose a white self-defense shooter believes in white supremacy or says one of the prohibited words. Does that make him guilty under the “hate crimes” statute?
In other words, how does the government show that a person who says “******” or admits he believes in white racial superiority is guilty of shooting someone in self-defense because of race? What a person thinks in general, what he says at times other than the shooting itself has no probative value in determining why he shot a black aggressor. Short of an admission or words from the actor demeaning the victim’s race at the time of the shooting, there is no logical connection between honestly held beliefs or freely spoken words and the motive for the shooting, and no inference may be drawn from these beliefs or words.
But of course, the prosecution will say otherwise, and will attempt to use beliefs and politically incorrect words to establish guilt. But doing this is the essence of tyranny, for it punishes thought and speech. You may not have certain ideas and you may not say certain words. If you do, should you be involved in a self-defense shooting of a person of a different race, we will use those beliefs or words to argue you are guilty of race-motivated killing, regardless of the facts.
The general rule is that evidence which is probative of guilt will be admitted at trial. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. If the evidence is so prejudicial that it may unduly influence the jury and is not determinative of guilt, such evidence may not be admitted. An example is prior convictions of crime (with exceptions) or prior arrests. Such evidence may be logically relevant to the state of mind and the guilt of the defendant, but it is unduly prejudicial and is not probative, i.e., it does not necessarily establish guilt.
Accordingly, prior bad acts, the identity of one’s circle of friends, the section of the city where one lives, the car one drives, the school one’s child attends would not come into evidence, for although each of these things might be relevant to guilt, (the shooter has no black friends, lives in a white suburb and sends his kid to a private school) they are extremely prejudicial and they are not probative.
That is also true of Trayvon Martin’s possession of items stolen from a neighborhood house, his misconduct at school, his broken home, and blood tests showing traces of marijuana. These matters were properly excluded from evidence because they were extremely prejudicial and not probative of the issue of whether Martin was an aggressor.
The problem is that all of these exclusions are analytically identical with racially charged beliefs or words, which hate crime prosecutors seek to introduce into evidence. Even if such beliefs were regarded as logically relevant, they too are extremely prejudicial and not probative of guilt.
Having politically incorrect beliefs or speaking prohibited words does not raise any inference beyond the possibility of a racial motive, just as living in a white suburban neighborhood or having only white friends or sending one’s kid to a private school raises only the possibility one is a racist. But possibilities are insufficient to prove anything ”beyond a reasonable doubt,” the standard of proof required for prosecution under this or any criminal statute. Therefore, the use of these matters to justify an inference of racial motivation is impermissible as a matter of law, for such evidence is extremely prejudicial and it raises nothing but speculation where certainty is required.
Nonetheless, you can count on prosecutors insisting on the admissibility of beliefs and speech remote from the incident itself to prove racial motivation, and you can count on many courts allowing them to introduce such evidence. Instead of a sustained cry for a “hate crime” prosecution against Zimmerman, there should be widespread public demand for the repeal of all hate crime statutes.