From: Federation for American Immigration Reform <info@fairus.org> Add to Address Book
Date: 2006/08/02 Wed PM 05:43:46 EDT
Subject: Senate Finance Committee Hearing - Fake IDs Foil the First Line of Defense

Senate Finance Committee Hearing - Fake IDs Foil the First Line of Defense
On August 1, 2006, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing entitled "Border Insecurity, Take Two: Fake IDs Foil the First Line of Defense." Chairman Grassley opened the hearing by stating the purpose of the hearing was to get a progress report on document integrity and to find out what could be and is currently being done to improve our security. He stated that if document verification works for the private sector, state governments and foreign governments, there is no reason not to use it on a federal level. The Chairman concluded that until someone does something to address this problem, criminals and terrorists will know they can cross our border.

The first panel consisted of Gregory Kutz, Director of Office of Forensic Audits and Special Investigations (FSI) at the Government Accountability Office (GAO); Jayson Ahren of Customs and Border Protection (CBP); and Michael Everitt of the Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL), an agency within Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Mr. Kutz began by describing various undercover operations GAO conducted in order to test whether CBP could identify fraudulent documents. The agents who performed these operations were able to successfully enter the U.S. from both the northern and southern border into various states, some by foot and some by car. The agents obtained entry simply by using software and information available to the public to create bogus documents. In each case, CBP inspectors either did not question the documents, or did not ask for identification at all. In one incident, an agent was caught and detained using fraudulent documents in New York, but used the same documents effectively in later attempts, showing that the information had not been shared between ports of entry. Mr. Kutz concluded his testimony by saying that CBP inspectors clearly do not have tools available to identify counterfeit documents.

To read today's AP article on the GAO study discussed in the Senate Finance hearing, click here.

In response to Mr. Kutz's testimony, Mr. Ahern testified that CBP is well aware of these problems, particularly with detecting fraudulent birth certificates and driver's licenses. He stated that these are not acceptable documents for border crossing. Mr. Ahern stressed that there is a need for standardized documentation, and the sooner this occurs, the better. He emphasized that this is a critical step in securing borders, and would also eliminate the time it takes for verification. He clarified that although the GAO agents were able to cross the borders without being intercepted, last year CBP agents did intercept many fraudulent documents, and denied admission to many.

Mr. Everitt testified that although many people think fraudulent documents are just counterfeit, they also include altered and improperly obtained documents. He stated that over the years, FDL has seen many stolen passports, which have been customized for its user. Mr. Everitt stated that not only does FDL directly support ICE investigations; it also supports ICE document benefit and fraud task forces. He continued to emphasize that as long as identification is required, criminals will attempt to produce fraudulent documents. Mr. Everitt recommended electronic verification systems and biometric links on IDs to prevent these problems. He stated that although the development of such a system would be expensive, he believes that an "investment in this system would pay healthy benefits."

During the question and answer session, Mr. Ahern stated that CBP's focus has been on other documents such as visas, which is why documents such as licenses have gone undetected. He stated that CBP has been looking into bringing in additional equipment and training CBP on driver's license identification. Mr. Ahern concluded that until there are standardized documents, there will be vulnerability at ports of entry.

The second panel was comprised of Janice Kephart of 9/11 Security Solutions (formerly counsel to the 9/11 Commission); David Shepherd, Director of Security for the Venetian Resort Hotel (formerly with the FBI); Bruce Reeves of AssureTec Systems; and Scott Carr of DigiMarc. Ms. Kephart began by expressing that terrorists will exploit any hole in a border apparatus they can. She stated that on the Canadian border, there is often absolutely no ID necessary to enter the U.S. Ms. Kephart continued to explain that the 9/11 Commission recommended incorporating biometric data into passports because they can note citizenship, and have particular security features which are usually more difficult to forge. She concluded that with support from the private sector, such systems are highly doable.

In his testimony, Mr. Shepherd stressed the risk fraudulent documents posed, specifically for terrorism. He said, "speed and accuracy in recognizing false identification are important elements in the system of protecting a business." He added that technology should be employed to keep ahead of those who attempt to circumvent the system. Mr. Reeves emphasized that technology needs to be made available in real time. He described how AssureTec Systems operated, and explained that technology such as Transportation Workers Identity Credential (TWIC) is commercially viable and available for deployment to U.S. borders. Mr. Carr described the security mechanisms of his company, DigiMarc. He discussed technologies such as digital watermarking, which could be used to authenticate documents, and mentioned that 18 states in the U.S. have already adopted this technology.

During the question and answer portion, Ms. Kephart reiterated that terrorists thrive on forgery, and when systems such as those described by the panel are available and are efficient and effective, they should be utilized. The panelists noted that since this technology has been deployed, some states have used it to capture those on terrorist watch lists. Ms. Kephart added that Interpol's database has over 100 countries entered into it, and that the problem with the U.S. information database is that it is only available in secondary inspections, while they are needed in primary form. Mr. Reeves commented that well-defined standards are necessary in order to implement the Real ID Act in a timely fashion.

Chairman Grassley closed the hearing by stating he is disappointed with the results of the GAO study, because he was hoping that the investigation would show that such easy access into the U.S. was not possible. The Chairman said that based on the testimony of the second panel, it looks like there are some workable solutions, and he expressed his hope that the Department of Homeland Security will take time to look at the tools available.

Stay tuned for more updates as the Congressional hearings on immigration reform continue . . .