For George W. Bush it is IMPEACHMENT TIME: "FACTS WERE
Please forward this to EVERYONE you know and tell
them
to pass it on. Please cc: me on the initial send
out.
This needs to go around the nation this week.
Listen
to the Alan Combs show on KLIF 570 Monday night
at
9:00 p.m. Greg Palast will be the guest and he is
no
kook. If you read this and are as mad as I am,
YOU can
DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT!!! Send to your U.S.
Congressman
and get this smirking chimp out of office before
he
gets us all killed and bankrupts this nation.
Check
out gregpalst.com
IMPEACHMENT TIME: "FACTS WERE FIXED."
Special to BuzzFlash
Thursday, May 5, 2005
By Greg Palast
Here it is. The smoking gun. The memo that has
"IMPEACH HIM" written all over it.
The top-level government memo marked "SECRET AND
STRICTLY PERSONAL," dated eight months before
Bush
sent us into Iraq, following a closed meeting
with the
President, reads, "Military action was now seen
as
inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam through
military action justified by the conjunction of
terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts
were
being fixed around the policy."
Read that again: "The intelligence and facts were
being fixed...."
For years, after each damning report on BBC TV,
viewers inevitably ask me, "Isn't this grounds
for
impeachment?" -- vote rigging, a blind eye to
terror
and the bin Ladens before 9-11, and so on. Evil,
stupidity and self-dealing are shameful but not
impeachable. What's needed is a "high crime or
misdemeanor."
And if this ain't it, nothing is.
The memo uncovered this week by the Times, goes
on to
describe an elaborate plan by George Bush and
British
Prime Minister Tony Blair to hoodwink the planet
into
supporting an attack on Iraq knowing full well
the
evidence for war was a phony.
A conspiracy to commit serial fraud is, under
federal
law, racketeering. However, the Mob's schemes
never
cost so many lives.
Here's more. "Bush had made up his mind to take
military action. But the case was thin. Saddam
was not
threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability
was
less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran."
Really? But Mr. Bush told us, "Intelligence
gathered
by this and other governments leaves no doubt
that the
Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some
of
the most lethal weapons ever devised."
A month ago, the Silberman-Robb Commission issued
its
report on WMD intelligence before the war,
dismissing
claims that Bush fixed the facts with this
snooty,
condescending conclusion written directly to the
President, "After a thorough review, the
Commission
found no indication that the Intelligence
Community
distorted the evidence regarding Iraq's weapons."
We now know the report was a bogus 618 pages of
thick
whitewash aimed to let Bush off the hook for his
murderous mendacity.
Read on: The invasion build-up was then set, says
the
memo, "beginning 30 days before the US
Congressional
elections." Mission accomplished.
You should parse the entire memo -- reprinted
below --
and see if you can make it through its three
pages
without losing your lunch.
Now sharp readers may note they didn't see this
memo,
in fact, printed in the New York Times. It
wasn't.
Rather, it was splashed across the front pages of
the
Times of LONDON on Monday.
It has effectively finished the last, sorry
remnants
of Tony Blair's political career. (While his
Labor
Party will most assuredly win the elections
Thursday,
Prime Minister Blair is expected, possibly within
months, to be shoved overboard in favor of his
Chancellor of the Exchequer, a political
execution
which requires only a vote of the Labour party's
members in Parliament.)
But in the US, barely a word. The New York Times
covers this hard evidence of Bush's fabrication
of a
casus belli as some "British" elections story.
Apparently, our President's fraud isn't "news fit
to
print."
My colleagues in the UK press have skewered
Blair,
digging out more incriminating memos, challenging
the
official government factoids and fibs. But in the
US
press … nada, bubkes, zilch. Bush fixed the facts
and
somehow that's a story for "over there."
The Republicans impeached Bill Clinton over his
cigar
and Monica's affections. And the US media could
print
nothing else.
Now, we have the stone, cold evidence of bending
intelligence to sell us on death by the
thousands, and
neither a Republican Congress nor what is
laughably
called US journalism thought it worth a second
look.
My friend Daniel Ellsberg once said that what's
good
about the American people is that you have to lie
to
them. What's bad about Americans is that it's so
easy
to do.
Greg Palast, former columnist for Britain's
Guardian
papers, is the author of the New York Times
bestseller, The Best Democracy Money Can Buy.
Subscribe to his columns at www.GregPalast.com
Media
requests to contact(at)gregpalast.com Permission
to
reprint with attribution granted.
[Here it is - the secret smoking gun memo -
discovered
by the Times of London. - GP]
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary,
Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John
Scarlett,
Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally
Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on
23
July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further
copies
should be made. It should be shown only to those
with
a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and
latest
JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and
based on
extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was
likely
to be by massive military action. Saddam was
worried
and expected an attack, probably by air and land,
but
he was not convinced that it would be immediate
or
overwhelming. His regime expected their
neighbours to
line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular
army
morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among
the
public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington.
There
was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military
action
was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove
Saddam, through military action, justified by the
conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the
intelligence
and facts were being fixed around the policy. The
NSC
had no patience with the UN route, and no
enthusiasm
for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's
record.
There was little discussion in Washington of the
aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief
CENTCOM on
1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4
August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000
US
troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a
move up
to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days
(30
days preparation plus 60 days deployment to
Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre
(3 x
6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an
Iraqi
casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the
air
campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous
option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with
basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for
either
option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also
important, but less vital. The three main options
for
UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three
SF
squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in
addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to
40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern
Iraq
entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi
divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had
already
begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the
regime. No decisions had been taken, but he
thought
the most likely timing in US minds for military
action
to begin was January, with the timeline beginning
30
days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this
with
Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush
had
made up his mind to take military action, even if
the
timing was not yet decided. But the case was
thin.
Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and
his WMD
capability was less than that of Libya, North
Korea or
Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum
to
Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons
inspectors.
This would also help with the legal justification
for
the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for
regime
change was not a legal base for military action.
There
were three possible legal bases: self-defence,
humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation.
The
first and second could not be the base in this
case.
Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be
difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big
difference politically and legally if Saddam
refused
to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and
WMD
were linked in the sense that it was the regime
that
was producing the WMD. There were different
strategies
for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political
context were right, people would support regime
change. The two key issues were whether the
military
plan worked and whether we had the political
strategy
to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet
if the
US battleplan was workable. The military were
continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if
Saddam
used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not
collapse
and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam
could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel,
added
the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go
ahead with a military plan unless convinced that
it
was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK
interests
converged. But on the political strategy, there
could
be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we
should
explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would
continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow
the
inspectors back in only when he thought the
threat of
military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime
Minister
wanted UK military involvement, he would need to
decide this early. He cautioned that many in the
US
did not think it worth going down the ultimatum
route.
It would be important for the Prime Minister to
set
out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK
would
take part in any military action. But we needed a
fuller picture of US planning before we could
take any
firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military
that
we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the
question of
whether funds could be spent in preparation for
this
operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full
details of
the proposed military campaign and possible UK
contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime
Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and
discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on
the
positions of countries in the region especially
Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a
full
intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the
Attorney-General would consider legal advice with
FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this
follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy
aide)
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