U.S. sailor's killer possessed ID from Homeland Security Department

U.S. sailor's killer possessed ID from Homeland Security Department

March 28, 2014

The truck driver who shot and killed an American sailor aboard a Navy destroyer was an ex-convict who had a criminal record that included convictions and incarceration for offenses such as manslaughter and distribution of illegal drugs, yet he possessed an ID card issued by a Homeland Security Department directorate, according to a Thursday news story in Navy Times.
Pentagon officials identified the shooter on Thursday as Jeffrey Tyrone Savage, who resided in Chesapeake, Va., and that the Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) were continuing to dig for more information on the suspect and the killing.
The 35-year-old Savage was killed by Navy security officers last Monday night aboard the U.S.S. Mahan after he jumped a petty officer who was on watch for the ship, took his sidearm and used it to kill Petty Officer 2nd Class Mark Mayo, who also was providing security at the Norfolk Naval Base.
NCIS agents claim they have found nothing indicating the killing was planned that there's nothing in Savage's background linking him to a terrorist group. The NCIS investigators also stated that there's no evidence linking Savage to the Mahan or to any of the destroyer's crew serving on that ship at the time and date of occurrence.
But a disturbing detail about the case surfaced on Thursday: The credential Savage used to gain access to the Navy base was a Transportation Worker Identity Credential (TWIC), which is issued by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) which is part of the Homeland Security Department. The card's year of issuance was listed as 2014 and it was valid for five years, according to TSA's website.
According to the TSA, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security, applicants for a TWIC may be turned down due to:

Conviction for one of the following felonies is disqualifying regardless of when it occurred, and the applicant is not eligible for a waiver.

1. Espionage or conspiracy to commit espionage.
2. Sedition, or conspiracy to commit sedition.
3. Treason, or conspiracy to commit treason.
4. A federal crime of terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g), or comparable State law, or conspiracy to commit such crime.

Conviction for one of the following felonies is disqualifying regardless of when it occurred, and the applicant may apply for a waiver.

1. A crime involving a transportation security incident. A transportation security incident is a security incident resulting in a significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption in a particular area, as defined in 46 U.S.C. 70101. The term "economic disruption" does not include a work stoppage or other employee-related action not related to terrorism and resulting from an employer-employee dispute.
2. Improper transportation of a hazardous material under 49 U.S.C. 5124, or a State law that is comparable.
3. Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, manufacture, purchase, receipt, transfer, shipping, transporting, import, export, storage of, or dealing in an explosive or explosive device. An explosive or explosive device includes an explosive or explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. 232(5), 841(c) through 841(f), and 844(j); and a destructive device, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(4) and 26 U.S.C. 5845(f).
4. Murder.
5. Making any threat, or maliciously conveying false information knowing the same to be false, concerning the deliverance, placement, or detonation of an explosive or other lethal device in or against a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportations system, or an infrastructure facility.
6. Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961,et seq., or a comparable State law, where one of the predicate acts found by a jury or admitted by the defendant, consists of one of the crimes listed in Column A.
7. Attempt to commit the crimes in Part A, items 1 - 4.
8. Conspiracy or attempt to commit the crimes in Part A, items 5 – 10.

Savage was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in Mecklenburg County, N.C., and released from prison Dec. 30, 2009, records showed. Most jurisdictions define voluntary manslaughter the killing of a human being in which the offender had no prior intent to kill and acted during "the heat of passion."

http://www.examiner.com/article/u-s-...ity-department

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Transportation Worker Identification Credential(TWIC)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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A sample Transportation Worker Identification Credential.

The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (or TWIC) program is aTransportation Security Administration and U.S. Coast Guard initiative in the United States. The TWIC program provides a tamper-resistant biometric credential to maritime workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of port facilities, outer continental shelf facilities, and vessels regulated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, or MTSA, and all U.S. Coast Guard credentialed merchant mariners .

An estimated 750,000 individuals require TWICs. Those seeking unescorted access to secure areas aboard affected vessels, and all Coast Guard credentialed merchant mariners, must obtain a TWIC. The new measures were fully implemented on April 15, 2009.^[1] To obtain a TWIC, an individual must provide biographic and biometric information such as fingerprints, sit for a digital photograph and successfully pass a security threat assessment conducted by TSA.

The issued card (pictured right) contains computer chip, known as an Integrated Circuit Chip (ICC), which stores the holders information and biometric data. The chip can be read by inserting it into a reader or holding it near a "contactless" reader. There are also a magnetic strip (similar to a credit card) and a linear barcode on the back as alternative reading methods.^[2]

Security a concern after Norfolk Naval Station shooting
By Dianna Cahn
Mike Hixenbaugh

The Virginian-Pilot
© March 26, 2014NORFOLK

The assailant rolled his 18-wheeler onto Norfolk Naval Station Monday night, waved through Gate 5 after showing his credentials.

He parked near the piers and, using the same card, walked through a second manned checkpoint. He was not armed and again, was not stopped.

It was only when he approached the guided missile destroyer Mahan, moored at Pier 1, that the man - a civilian - garnered any suspicion.

The next moments turned violent. He wrested a weapon from the petty officer of the watch, who was standing guard and tried to stop him. He then fatally shot a sailor who came to help before the attacker was shot and killed, the commander of Norfolk Naval Station said.

The deadly breach at 11:20 p.m. on the waterfront of the Navy's largest base demonstrated once again how vulnerable military installations are to attacks - not only from external terrorist threats but from insiders who've been entrusted with access in the normal course of business. A civilian contractor opened fire at the Washington Navy Yard in September, killing 12 people.

At Norfolk Naval Station, there are tens of thousands of trusted insiders. More than 120,000 people in Hampton Roads are authorized to access the region's bases for work. Tens of thousands of vehicles come and go daily.

"To fully secure a base of this size, you would have to shut it down," said Joe Bouchard, a retired Navy captain who was commanding officer of Norfolk Naval Station from 2000 to 2003.

"It would not be able to carry out its mission."

The Navy did not release the names of the sailor who died or his attacker. An investigation was under way Tuesday, but few details were released.

At an afternoon news conference Tuesday, Capt. Robert Clark, the base commander, gave a short statement and briefly answered questions.

Clark said the assailant entered the base with a government-issued Transportation Worker Identification Credential, or TWIC card, which allows civilians to access certain secure port areas without an escort. The TWIC program was created a decade ago, primarily to ensure security at civilian marine terminals.

But the government ID cards are also sometimes used to access military bases.

Asked whether he thought Monday's shooting showed strengths or weaknesses in the Navy's security procedures, Clark said, "I would say force protection is working."

He added, "I wouldn't say it affects the way that we necessarily screen people, but it's going to make us look at our procedures and make sure that we tighten up, to make sure we are doing everything we are supposed to."

To get a TWIC card, a worker must provide personal information, including fingerprints, and pass a background check conducted by the civilian Transportation Security Administration. Workers pay approximately $130 for a card and must reapply every five years.

Some of that information, including the fingerprints, is embedded in the card. But since the TWIC program was created, it has faced questions about its cost and usefulness, especially because some installations don't have devices to read the cards. Norfolk Naval Station is among them.

Instead, guards at gates and security checkpoints make sure the people presenting TWIC cards match the photos on the cards.

A civilian who presents a TWIC card at Norfolk Naval Station or other installations should have a specific reason to be there, Bouchard said. Guards typically would not allow a TWIC card holder onto a pier if they hadn't been told ahead of time, he said. It's unclear whether that was the case Monday.

Norfolk Naval Station implemented sweeping security upgrades after Sept. 11, 2001. Back then, guards would allow a car to pass through the gate simply if it had a Department of Defense decal on the windshield. After the terrorist attacks, the Navy went to 100 percent ID checks, which slowed traffic but boosted security.

"We had to strike a balance between security and operational requirements," said Bouchard, who oversaw many of those changes. "With each decision, you have to weigh security versus smooth operation of the base."

Navy Secretary Ray Mabus and Adm. Jonathan Greenert, the chief of naval operations, offered their condolences during a morning budget hearing before the House Appropriations Committee's defense subcommittee. "The sailors, particularly those of the USS Mahan, are in our thoughts and prayers today, as well as the entire Norfolk Naval Station family," Greenert said.

"We will find out what happened and prevent that from occurring again," said Adm. Bill Gortney, the head of Fleet Forces Command, speaking at a forum on energy use Tuesday. Gortney asked for a moment of silence "for a shipmate we lost last night and his family."

The base went on lockdown for about 45 minutes after the shooting. It was operating normally Tuesday except for Pier 1, where the Naval Criminal Investigative Service was working, the Navy said.

An official with knowledge of the investigation said the assailant's truck had been towed to an impound lot where it was being examined. Investigators believe the driver entered the base shortly before the incident, said the official, who was not authorized to discuss details and asked not to be identified.

Officers, chiefs and duty section personnel were ordered to report to the Mahan on Tuesday, but others were told to stay home. Counselors were called in to meet with grieving sailors.
Monday night's shooting came about a month after the Navy held anti-terrorism and force protection exercises around the world, including an active-shooter drill at Norfolk Naval Station.
A week ago, the Pentagon released a series of
recommendations to improve base security after last year's shooting at the Washington Navy Yard. A civilian contractor, Aaron Alexis, killed 12 people before shooting himself. Gortney helped lead the review. Among the recommendations was a continuous evaluation system to routinely update background checks of people who hold security clearances to access military installations.

The Mahan returned to Norfolk in September after an 8-1/2-month deployment that included time in the Mediterranean Sea because of the civil war in Syria. The ship was commissioned in 1998 and has a crew of about 250 sailors and officers, according to a Navy website.

http://hamptonroads.com/2014/03/sail...-naval-station

Suspect in Naval Station Norfolk shooting was not authorized to access base
by Nick Ochsner, 13News Now
WVEC.com

VIDEO REPORT AT LINK
Thursday, Mar 27 at 5:42 AM

NORFOLK -- The suspect in Monday night's shooting at Naval Station Norfolk was not authorized to access the base.

The suspect used a TWIC Card (Transportation Worker Identification Credential) to access the base, which is an acceptable form of identification. However, Naval Station Norfolk commanding officer Capt. Robert Clark says the suspect "did not have authorization to be on my base."

The suspect accessed the base in a 2002 Freightliner truck, drove close to Pier 1 where USS Mahan was docked, parked the vehicle and walked the rest of the way.

Clark says an investigation is underway to determine if any security procedures were violated in letting the suspect on the base. Clark says he will take immediate and appropriate action if he finds that procedures were violated.

A 2009 directive issued by the Under Secretary of Defense authorized the use of TWIC cards to access base as long as they're accompanied by a documents proving the cardhold has a reason to be on base.

The suspect in Monday's shooting had a valid TWIC card but was not authorized to be on base.

A 2011 investigation by the Government Accountability Office found major flaws in the internal controls used to ensure TWIC cards are secure.

The report came after an investigation where two undercover GAO workers were able to access sensitive areas of ports using fake TWIC cards.

The report also found that "[the Department of Homeland Security] has not adequately addressed the effectiveness of the TWIC program, nor has DHS demonstrated that the current TWIC program enhances port and facility security better than what we've had in the past."

That report and subsequent findings has led members of Congress to question the program's effectiveness and, in some cases, call for its end.

More recently, Congress has criticized the program because the US Coast Guard has not been able to establish rules governing devices used to scan TWIC cards.

The only way to access the biometric data on the card--used to verify its authenticity, among other things--is to scan it.

Despite the problems and criticism, the Pentagon has continued to allow TWIC cards to be used to access military bases.

A defense official defended the TWIC card in a statement Wednesday afternoon.

"DOD has a huge transportation requirement and the TWIC provides us with a secure identification card for those persons in the transportation industry who aren't considered a Federal/DOD Government employee," the official said.

The official also said the TWIC card is secure because a worker's biometric data allows for a positive link between the card and the individual.

That link can only be checked, though, if it is scanned; a technology the DOD is currently not able to do.

The Department of the Army issued a directive in December 2012 ordering that TWIC cards could no longer be used to access the Electronic Transportation Acquisition.

In the order, the Army said the TWIC card didn't meet DOD security requirements.

http://www.wvec.com/my-city/norfolk/...252492321.html