Iran in the Caucasus: Keeping balance in volatility


"What Vietnam was to the 1960s and 1970s, what Lebanon and Afghanistan were to the 1980s, and what the Balkans were to the 1990s, the Caspian region might be to the first decade of the new century: an explosive region that draws in the Great Powers."

Robert D. Kaplan: Eastward to Tartary. Travels in the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. New York 2000.


By Tigran Martirosyan
Danish Association for research on the Caucasus


When Iran embarked on its bid to build bridges in the south Caucasus, the regional states worried given the Islamic Republic’s reputation of propagating radical Islam, attempting to export revolution, and supporting radical political groups. In retrospect, Iran has acted as a moderate and balanced player in the region by placing the geopolitical, economic, and security aspects of its national interests over ideological or religious motives. In an environment where the degree of volatility had dramatically increased due to the emergence of three post-Soviet states, Iran has become preoccupied with securing stability along its borders through pursuing a complex set of economic, national security, and foreign policy interests.

What are the interests that formulate Iran’s largely cautious and pragmatic policy in the south Caucasus?

First, advancement of economic interests and regional cooperation. Iran’s economic problems and its desire to promote non-hydrocarbon exports have driven it to search for new markets. Newly independent neighbors in the south Caucasus, detached from the world trade and economy, offered new opportunities for Iranian exports. For them, Iran is a feasible transit route that offers access to the Persian Gulf and hence to world markets. In addition, access to Iran’s pipeline and transportation network offers oil-rich Caspian states an opportunity to reap profits from transporting energy resources. In an attempt to gain new markets, Iran began to expand its influence in the region by providing technical assistance, promoting economic projects, especially in oil and gas exploration, and by supporting regional economic integration. Iran’s incentives for regional cooperation involve not only improving overall economic performance but, perhaps to a greater degree, safeguarding common security interests, preventing unilateral external domination in the region, and preserving regional stability to minimize the risk of ethnic separatism at home.

Second, preservation of domestic stability. Separatist tendencies of Iran’s ethnic Azeris heavily affect its behavior towards the region. The Azeris in Iran are generally considered a well-integrated component of Iran’s multiethnic society, have a comparatively weak Azeri identity, and consider themselves at least as much Iranians as Azeris. However, the oppression of their nationalist claims by the authorities in Tehran suggests that they constitute a far more pressing problem for Iran than is observed from the outside. In this context, the emergence of an independent Azerbaijani republic adjoining the Azeri-populated regions of Iran has considerably increased the threat to Iran’s security and internal stability. The fact that the Azeri unification movements exist -- albeit behind closed doors -- in both the Azerbaijani republic and the Iranian Azerbaijan, has been an annoying thorn in Iranian-Azerbaijani relations. Iran has thus exerted great effort to force the Azerbaijani government to affirm its neutrality toward the movement.

Third, conflict resolution and enhancement of regional stability. Guided by peaceful resolution of conflicts as a priority in its regional policy, Iran has played a responsible role in trying to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. When the conflict erupted into a large-scale war, Iran’s fear of an ethnic Azeri uprising at home in solidarity with Azerbaijan prompted it to contain Azerbaijan in support of the Armenians. However, when Armenian military advances threatened to spill the fighting over into Iranian territory, Tehran voiced its criticism of the Armenians. This duality suggests that Iran is in favor of neither a strong Azerbaijan, nor a strong Armenia. Rather, Iran is interested in keeping both nations in equilibrium by means of occasional pressure on the stronger side. Although Iran’s mediation efforts did not bring a settlement, they did lead to brief cease-fires and contributed to international efforts to stabilize the region, a fact that was recognized even by the U.S. From Tehran’s perspective, involvement in the conflict has given Iran leverage to curtail Turkey’s and subsequently, NATO influence in the region. In taking advantage of its ability to maintain steady relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as of Armenia’s mistrust towards Turkey’s mediation, Iran has become the only regional actor that had both motivation and opportunity to play a reasonably impartial mediating role in the conflict.

Fourth, avoidance of overall geopolitical isolation. International isolation has prompted Iran to search for regional partners, which it has found mainly in Russia and Armenia. The major incentive for Iran’s cooperation with these two countries was a strategic response to Washington’s emphasis on expanding influence in the region through its partnership with Turkey and Azerbaijan. This “alignment of powersâ€