Thread: JESUIT JOE BIDEN 1992 CONGRESS FLOOR "NWO" SPEACH

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THE THRESHOLD OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE WILSONIAN VISION AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1990'S AND BEYOND (Senate - June 29,
1992)
[Page: S9098]
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will this week, on three separate occasions,
seek the
indulgence of the Senate to speak for the better part of an hour
on each occasion.
The
reason is that I believe we are on the threshold of a
new world order, and the
present
administration is not sure what the order is.
But I would like to suggest
how we might
begin to reorganize our foreign policy
in order to realize the
full potential embodied in
the phrase `new world order.'
Two years ago, an act of aggression by an Arab despot against a tiny Arab
sheikdom
led the President of the United States to invoke a magisterial phrase.
He spoke, in rare visionary terms, of a `new world order' in which wrongs
would
be
put right through collective action.
My purpose today is to examine that phrase and to elaborate on the immense
potential--and still more, the imperative--I believe it holds for American
foreign
policy in
the 1990's and beyond.
AN UNCERTAIN BEGINNING
Although President Bush called the new world order a `big idea,' circumstances
surrounding his proclamation of this august concept were less than auspicious.
Indeed the crisis that occasioned the President's use of the phrase resulted from
a
sustained act of appeasement constituting a colossal foreign policy blunder--
Having propped up Saddam Hussein with loans;
Having disregarded evidence that Saddam illegally used American aid to buy arms;
Having ignored Saddam's genocidal slaughter of his own Kurdish citizens;
Having fostered trade with Iraq even as Saddam provided safe haven for the
world's
most infamous terrorists;
Having overlooked Saddam's manifest quest for chemical and nuclear weapons;
Having supplied Saddam with military intelligence almost until the eve of his
invasion;
and
After first responding that the United States contemplated no military action--
The Bush administration suddenly summoned itself to assemble a multinational
coalition under U.N. auspices to evict Saddam from Kuwait and restore the
Kuwaiti
Emir to his royal throne.
Unfortunately, as it basked in the heroic light cast by men and women of the
American
Armed Forces, who performed the assigned task with gallantry and pride,
The administration failed to realize the fruits of their brave endeavor in two
critical
respects.
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Support for these broadcasts will place us where we belong:
On the right side of history, and unequivocally on the side of those Chinese democrats
who will ultimately accede to power and with whom we must hope to cooperate in the
building of a new world order.
Although we cannot cement the foundation of a new world order until democracy is
secure in both China and the former Soviet Empire, we need not wait in beginning to
shape the structure that will rest atop that foundation.
For even as they struggle to consolidate democracy, Russia and its neighbors have
demonstrated a genuine interest in upgrading and mobilizing the institutions of the
United Nations system.
Within the United Nations, the center of gravity has shifted dramatically in favor of
cooperation.
For its part, as the sole remaining nondemocracy on the Security Council, China seems
disinclined to highlight its status by acts of conspicuous obstructionism--and,
where it is obstructionist, China should be challenged.
We therefore have both incentive and latitude to advance both incentive and latitude
to advance now on the three other parts of our new world order agenda.
[Page: S9177]
FORGING A NEW STRATEGY OF CONTAINMENT
In the military realm, our agenda for a new world order is twofold:
To impose strict worldwide constraints on the transfer of weapons of mass destruction
and to regularize the kind of collective military action the United Nations achieved ad
hoc against Saddam Hussein.
Both items on this agenda--more effective prevention and more effective response--
are rendered feasible by the close of the cold war.
The end of the expansionist Soviet threat enables us to refocus our energies on
forging a new strategy of containment.
Directed not against a particular Nation or ideology, but against a more diffuse and
intensifying danger--the danger that nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and
ballistic missiles to propel them, could pass into the hands of rogue-states or
terrorists.
At the same time, Moscow's reincarnation as the capital of a democratic Russia raises
the prospect of systematic big-power cooperation, under United Nations auspices, in
deterring and defeating threats to world peace.
In short, the kind of expanded commitment to collective security envisaged by the
United Nations' founders but blocked heretofore by cold war polarization.
Our pursuit of the first of these goals--a new strategy of containment--must begin with
a concerted effort to be rid of the enormous nuclear arsenals the cold war begot.
Soviet nuclear warheads are perhaps best understand as more than 10,000 potential
Hiroshimas.
Until they are safely dismantled or placed under new controls, the risk that civil strife in
the former Soviet Union could lead to a diversion or misuse of even a few of these
devices will pose a severe hazard to the world.
Acting boldly to cope with this risk can yield dual benefit.
By joining with Moscow to demonstrate a post
-
cold war will to curtail our own immense
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By joining with Moscow to demonstrate a post-cold war will to curtail our own immense
armaments.
The United States can acquire added moral authority to lead others to accept the
unprecedented constraints that a new strategy of containment will entail.
For both reasons--to reduce the threat that still inheres in the Soviet arsenal and to
set an example that enhances the stature of American leadership in arms control
worldwide--we must act decisively.
Curtailing existing arsenals of devastation must underpin a containment strategy
aimed at preempting the menace of new arsenals.
The framework for this effort is the START Treaty, on which the Bush administration has
for several months been engaged in clarifying obligations of the former Soviet
Republics where nuclear weapons are currently deployed: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan.
The outcome of these discussions--embodied in the so-called Lisbon protocol--has
been satisfactory, assuming it can be implemented:
Russia will become the only nuclear power of the four Republics, and the other three
are pledged to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and thereby forswear nuclear
weapons acquisition.
The question, then, is how Russia and America will handle their cold war nuclear
arsenals.
As both sides recognize, the START Treaty is only what this acronym connotes,
for the
treaty's ceiling, limited each side to some 7,000-9,000 nuclear warheads,
are as
obsolete today as a statue of Lenin on a square in St. Petersburg,
Budapest, or
Prague.
Over recent weeks, both Russia and the United States called for further reduction,
with
the Bush administration proposing common ceilings of 4,700 and Moscow
offering
2,500.
At the Yeltsin-Bush summit this month, the two Presidents compromised by
agreeing to
a second START Treaty. This new treaty--START II--would lower the
two arsenals to
levels of some 3,000-3,500 by the year 2003.
This step was constructive and, on the American side, much-heralded, since
President
Yeltsin agreed to ban land-based ICBM's with multiple warheads.
These missiles, the heart of the Soviet arsenal, have long been regarded as
highly
destabilizing because they combine extreme lethality with vulnerability
to preemptive
attack.
But the compelling issue is whether this scope of reduction--and this pace of
reduction-
-are adequate.
Is it wise, in the post-cold-war era, to maintain this level of nuclear armament?
And is
it wise to set an entire decade as a timetable for reduction?
By placing ourselves now on this positive but modest path of reduction, are we
incurring an avoidable danger and surrendering the opportunity for much more
dramatic and valuable progress in curtailing the worldwide nuclear threat?
On the question of timing, it is true that the task of nuclear reduction is
complicated by
sheer technical difficulty.
Massive nuclear dismantlement has never before been on our agenda, and we
lack the
technology to accomplish it quickly.
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But the principal barrier to deep cuts--the ideological animosity and distrust that
characterized the cold war--has disappeared, yielding virtually unlimited opportunity if
we will seize it.
For their part, Russian leaders seem willing to negotiate far deeper reductions than
the President has yet been willing to contemplate.
They, more than the Bush administration, appear open to the kind of drastic cuts that
would represent a fundamental reorientation away from excessive military expenditure
and away from an illusory concept of power--a reorientation by which Moscow and
Washington could together lead the world toward a more rational focus on mankind's
truly menacing problems.
Unfortunately, the Bush Pentagon appears driven by an unreconstructed desire for
unilateral advantage and a conviction that--even in a post-cold war world and
regardless of whether others are willing to cut--the United States will have good use
for literally thousands of nuclear weaheads.
As a consequence, the new obstacle we face in achieving truly deep cuts in the Soviet
nuclear arsenal, and containing the growth of other arsensals, is the Pentagon's rigid
attachment to its own.
While this phenomenon was perhaps predictable, we cannot afford complacency while
Pentagon planners develop new post-cold war rationales for maintaining what they
will undoubtedly call a `robust U.S. nuclear arsenal for the 21st century.'
Instead, our actions should be as revolutionary as the circumstances in which we find
ourselves.
Seen from this perspective, the agreement to cut the START levels to a combined total
of 7,000 warheads within a decade seems more a defense of existing arsenals than a
radical change: The creation of a high floor rather than a low ceiling.
Our goals, I submit, should be far more ambitious:
We should seek a steady, mutual drawdown to a common ceiling of no higher than
500 warheads, a goal we should waste no time in announcing.
We should propose the elimination not just of ICBM's with multiple warheads but most
or all ballistic missiles, based on land and sea.
We should cut the gordian knot of difficult dismantlement by acting immediately to
sequester all warheads to be eliminated.
We should act promptly to include Britain, France, and China in negotiations directed
toward codification, under U.N. auspices, of a multilateral treaty stipulating limits and
obligations for all nuclear states.
And we should announce our willingness to join in a comprehensive test ban treaty
and a global ban on the production of weapons-grade fissile material.
As to the size and composition of the American and Russian arsenals, neither side
should now hesitate to embrace the concept of minimum deterrence--that is,
maintaining only the nuclear forces necessary to inflict a devastating retaliatory strike
on any nation that might use weapons of mass destruction.
One of the saddest and costliest truths of the past half-century has been the
systematic exaggeration of the utility of nuclear weapons. How else can one explain to
a child the size of our current Armageddon arsenals?
American possession of a nuclear monopoly could not prevent the Soviet takeover of
Eastern Europe in the 1940's, and nuclear weapons proved of no avail through our
long agony in the Korean and Vietnam wars.
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long agony in the Korean and Vietnam wars.
In the Cuban missile crisis, we prevailed not due to our so-called nuclear superiority,
but because we held the upper hand in conventional force in our own hemisphere.
The definitive demonstration of nuclear impotence was the collapse of the
Soviet
Union.
Veritably brimming with missiles and warheads, the Soviet Army could not
prevent the
total dissolution of the very nation that had generated the world's
most extravagant
nuclear arsenal.
Indeed, it was the grand distortion of priorities embodied in that arsenal,
as much as
the inherent inefficiencies of the Communist economic system,
that hastened the
break-up of the Soviet empire.
Weapons that were presumed to confer strength instead contributed to fatal
national
weakness.
Ultimately, nuclear arms have a single value: Deterrence. But, for both
America and
Russia, this legitimate function clearly requires far fewer weapons
than the vast
arsenals we have accumulated.
Many of our nuclear theologians will be quick to denounce the notion of
only 500
nuclear warheads on each side as a capitulation to naive thinking.
But I am not prepared to concede that the capacity to create 500 Hiroshimas
in a
single day is inadequate for retaliation.
What, I might ask, would they have us do on the second day, if we had more?
The elimination of most or all ballistic missiles would support the move to
minimum
deterrence, depriving both sides of a lightning-strike offensive capability
but depriving
neither side of the ability to retaliate using advanced aircraft.
In the past, the major rationale for a very large number of warheads was
the danger
that ballistic missile attack could preempt many of our missiles and
aircraft before
launch or takeoff.
Sharply reducing the role of ballistic missiles would enable each side to be
confident of
its retaliatory capacity--and accomplish the aim of minimum
deterrence--at even lower
warhead levels.
Full elimination of ballistic missiles would almost surely require a multilateral
treaty and
global compliance.
But if the question is whether the United States would be better off in a world
with no
ballistic missiles capable of reaching our shores--the cost being the
elimination of our
own--surely the answer in principle is a resounding `Yes.'
The safe sequestering of Russian and American warheads in special repositories
could
speed the arms reduction process.
This isolation of nuclear warheads could be accomplished by designating
special
sites
on Russian and American territory, sponsored by the United Nations
and
guarded by
U.N. forces including troops from both Russia and the United States.
The creation of these neutral holding points for weapons slated for dismantlement
would not mean endangering sensitive technology.
These sites could be designed to give the host country full control over access
to its
own weapons during the dismantlement process.
Nor would it mean acting on trust. U.N. inspectors would join Russian and American
ins
p
ectors in monitorin
g
the
p
ace of dismantlement
,
and U.N. troo
p
s would
j
oin
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