Long range aerial defense system

Supplying Iran with S-300 Systems

By INSS
Friday, August 28, 2009

The talks between Iran and Russia over the supply of the S-300 defense systems were public knowledge already in 1998, but despite various reports over the years about a contract and the actual supply of the systems, it seems that the contract was only signed in 2006 and was announced officially by both the Iran and Russia in the course of 2007.

The S-300 is a long range aerial defense system that entered service in the USSR in the early 1980s. Over the years, the system was manufactured in many models and had a long list of upgrades, both for use by the various branches of the Russian military and for export. The system as a whole has a large number of search radar models, target illumination radar, command modules, and different missile models with ranges of 40-200 km. (The system is designed to carry a number of different missiles and to choose the most appropriate missile under the circumstances.) In the past, the system was sold to foreign customers. Two system batteries are even in service in Greece (thus the system is well known to NATO).

Based on reports, Iran has purchased the S-300-PMU-1 model, but there is no information available about the precise specifications, i.e., which radar, launcher, and missile models were ordered. The number of systems ordered and the financial scope of the deal are also unknown.

In Iran, the system is meant to replace (or reinforce) the outdated S-200 systems (NATO codename SA-5 Gammon). It was also reported that talks are already under way about a follow-up deal for the more advanced S-300-PMU-2 system and perhaps even for the newest system of all, the S-400. In light of the difficulties confronting the current deal, it seems that these reports likely reflect the hopes of the Russian military industry more than actual talks. On the other hand, there were also reports about talks between Iran and Belarus to purchase an outdated model of the S-300 P system that Belarus has had since before the breakup of the USSR. These talks, if they were indeed held, may be primarily indicative of Iran’s fears that in the end Russia will not supply the S-300.

Russia is still a superpower in the manufacture and export of armaments, and the industry represents one of its leading sources of income. Nevertheless, both during the Cold War and now, Russia relates to the export of arms as a political tool, not just an economic end. Russia is currently making great efforts to upgrade its international standing, including through demonstrations of assertive foreign policy. In this context, the export of arms is designed to enhance Russian influence in regions where Russia competes for influence, in particular with the United States. Russia’s current political and economic weakness is also decidely a factor in these considerations. Today, as during the Cold War, Russia’s arms export policy is characterized by relative emphasis on rules of caution and evenhandedness in terms of types of arms, refraining from upsetting the strategic balance, and care not to upset international stability. Among the considerations is Russia’s concern that arms from the West may upset the balance in its regions of interest in the CIS and Eastern Europe.

Clearly, all of the above is especially relevant with regard to Iran. Since the breakup of the USSR, and particularly in recent years, Iran has become one of Russia’s important partners in the international arena. The two nations have developed extensive cooperation in many fields, including defense, which involves different arms sales for the air force, navy, and ground forces. There is also cooperation on the nuclear issue, which includes building the reactor in Bushehr and turning a blind eye to the leakage of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies from Russia to Iran.

At the same time, Russia’s attitude to Iran is ambivalent, because Iran has become a challenge not only for its neighbors and the West but also for Russia itself. Today Iran leads the radical Islamic axis and exacerbates international tensions with its geopolitical ambitions and inflamed rhetoric. Along with the implementation of the nuclear program, this lowers the conflict threshold. Given this reality, the policy of arms supply takes on great importance because of its ramifications for regional and international stability, which is a sensitive priority for Russia.

Iran may be of critical importance to Russia, less in the context of their bilateral relations and more as a tool for advancing Russian goals in the international setting. In this sense, Israel’s importance for Russia is not less than Iran’s, because in the final analysis Russia’s interest lies in becoming a mediator and fair arbitrator with regard to all parties in the Middle East.

In Russia, different agencies with different and at times contradictory interests are involved in arms exports. Some of the elements pushing for arms exports are the defense industries, including nuclear industries, as well as the military. The Russian defense establishment has a clear interest in completing the S-300 deal, particularly for the prestige it would bring. By contrast, political elements, such as the presidential and governmental echelons, the Foreign Ministry, and apparently also the intelligence services and the National Security Council, are more moderate and take international realities into greater account. These differences of opinion, which existed in the past, seem to have carried over into the present.

The issue of supplying the S-300 aerial defense system to Iran has been on the table for a long time, and its repeated postponement reflects the gamut of Russian vacillations. The Russians are aware that the deal will affect regional stability. Beyond that, Russia is linking the subject to the issue of its relations with Israel as well as its complex relations with the United States, including the question of placing missile interception batteries in Eastern Europe. Russia understands that the issue of supplying the S-300 may provide it with leverage vis-Ã*-vis all sides in the Middle East, including Iran, Israel, and the United States. Russia is trying to make smart political use of the situation while conducting an effective threshold policy.

Thus it appears that we have not witnessed a final postponement of the deal, as was reported after a meeting between Presidents Peres and Medvedev. The outcome will depend on unfolding political developments in the Middle East, and it seems that both the United States and Russia are preparing for new political initiatives. In any case, if the S-300 deal is a pressure point, it is safe to assume that any Russian concession will naturally be accompanied by a political price levied from the other side.

Another question from the Israeli aspect is the extent to which the S-300 constitutes a threat. The system is fundamentally a defensive one, intended to intercept fighter planes (the advanced models also have anti surface-to-surface missile capabilities). Still, it is clear that a system capable of intercepting a plane at ranges of up to 200 km is also capable of threatening military and civilian air traffic outside its country’s borders. From Israel’s perspective, Iran’s possession of the system is of consequence only if Israel has not given up the option of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. As such, the pressure on Russia not to supply the system is of significance only in the context of leaving the military option on the table.

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