Quote:
Originally Posted by MinutemanCDC_SC
Just brainstorming here, or maybe brainfogging, as I don't know where this train of thought will arrive... so don't ask me where I'm going with this. It should apply to something else besides the intimidation of Judge Carter. Maybe this unethical idea will lead to an ethical plan of action. To catch a crook may require "to think like a crook."
Even if a judge (not Judge Carter, specifically) were to adamantly oppose any local magistrate granting a warrant (and the judge would, if there were intimidation or coercion or nationwide deception), might the following apply to evidence gained as the result of a "misinformed" law enforcement officer's "Good Faith" belief that such a warrant exists?
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How Far Does Police "Good Faith" Go? The Supreme Court Creates Another Exception to The Exclusionary Rule
By SHERRY F. COLB
Wednesday, Jan. 21, 2009
Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of United States v. Herring. Herring addressed the question whether police officers may rely in "good faith" on erroneous information (inaccurately alleging the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant against a suspect) without compromising the resulting evidence, when the source of the error is another law enforcement agency.
The Court held that the answer is yes, provided the error is not sufficiently deliberate and culpable to justify suppression of the evidence. In this column, I will examine the question and conclude that the Court erred in further extending the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule of evidence.
What "Good Faith" Means in Fourth Amendment Law
The first thing to note about good faith in the Fourth Amendment context is that, despite the connotations of the phrase in everyday life, it has nothing to do with a police officer's subjective motives or intentions. The Supreme Court has instead used the phrase to refer to the objective reasonableness of a police officer's belief in the validity or existence of a warrant that is, in fact, invalid or nonexistent.
The second important fact about the "good faith exception" is that it is not an exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement that all searches and seizures be "reasonable." It is, instead, an exception to the rule that says that when police violate the Fourth Amendment, the resulting evidence is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution of the victim of that unlawful search or seizure. Accordingly, the only time a "good faith" exception becomes necessary is when police have already violated the Fourth Amendment but a prosecutor still hopes to offer the evidence resulting from that violation in criminal court against the victim of the violation.
These two points are significant because they demonstrate why "good faith" is a necessary consideration only when police rely on a warrant (or similar independent legal authorization) as a basis for a search or seizure.
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When police violate the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, with or without a warrant, the ordinary consequence is that a judge suppresses any evidence unearthed as a result of the violation. This means that the jury will not be able to consider tainted evidence in assessing the guilt or innocence of the defendant who experienced the Fourth Amendment violation.
Evidence resulting from unconstitutional conduct is not, however, always suppressed. The Supreme Court has indicated that unlike the Fourth Amendment itself, the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally-compelled but is merely an instrument for motivating conduct in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court has applied the exclusionary rule selectively to those contexts in which its deterrent value will be greatest.
One exception to the exclusionary rule first emerged in United States v. Leon. The Supreme Court there held that if a police officer relied in objective "good faith" on a warrant that turned out to be invalid, then the evidence obtained would be admissible at a subsequent criminal trial – despite the presumed invalidity of the warrant. The Court explained that because the exclusionary rule serves to deter police misconduct (by suppressing the fruits of that misconduct), it would make little sense to suppress evidence resulting from a magistrate's error in issuing a warrant. The magistrate is specifically not an arm of law enforcement, and is therefore: (1) not the target of the exclusionary rule's deterrent objective; (2) not likely to try to subvert the Fourth Amendment (and therefore not in need of deterrence); and (3) not responsive to the suppression of evidence, given the magistrate's lack of a stake in the outcome of an eventual criminal prosecution.
In Arizona v. Evans, the Court extended the good faith exception to a case in which there actually was no warrant, but the Office of the Clerk of Court had made an error in its record-keeping and reported that such a warrant for the suspect's arrest was outstanding. A police officer, relying on the erroneous record, carried out an arrest, and the issue of suppression arose. The Court held that despite the absence of a warrant, the evidence found as a result of the arrest would not be excluded at the suspect's criminal trial. Because the police officer had relied in objective good faith on the erroneous record, the Court held, it would be inappropriate to apply the exclusionary rule.
The Court reasoned that the party that had erred in this case, the Clerk of Court, was part of the judiciary and therefore – like the magistrate – not subject to the temptation to subvert the Fourth Amendment. Further, it noted that the exclusionary rule was never meant to regulate courts' conduct. And finally, it pointed out that court employees would have no stake in the outcome of criminal trials and therefore would not be deterred by the suppression of evidence.
The exclusionary rule, in other words, is meant only for – and effective only against – the police. If police are acting in reasonable reliance on independent, non-police, government actors, the Court determined, suppression would impose a high cost without providing much of a countervailing benefit...