REP. ROBERT B. ADERHOLT HOLDS A HEARING ON SOUTHWEST BORDER ENFORCEMENT BUDGET

Political Transcript Wire
March 18, 2011

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOLDS HEARING ON THE BUDGET FOR SOUTHWEST BORDER ENFORCEMENT

SPEAKERS: REP. ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, R-ALA. CHAIRMAN REP. JOHN CARTER, R-TEXAS REP. JOHN CULBERSON, R-TEXAS REP. RODNEY FRELINGHUYSEN, R-N.J. REP. TOM LATHAM, R-IOWA REP. ANDER CRENSHAW, R-FLA. REP. CHARLIE DENT, R-PA. REP. HAROLD ROGERS, R-KY. EX OFFICIO

REP. DAVID E. PRICE, D-N.C. RANKING MEMBER REP. NITA M. LOWEY, D-N.Y. REP. LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, D-CALIF. REP. JOHN W. OLVER, D-MASS. REP. NORM DICKS, D-WASH. EX OFFICIO

WITNESSES: ASSISTANT CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION COMMISSIONER THOMAS WINKOWSKI

U.S. BORDER PATROL CHIEF MICHAEL FISHER

JAMES DINKINS, EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

REAR ADMIRAL PAUL ZUKUNFT (USCG)

ADERHOLT: The hearing is called to order.

Good morning. This morning we welcome witnesses from the Department of Homeland Security to talk about our progress in securing the Southwest border.

They are Chief Michael Fisher, US Customs and Border Protection, Office of Border Patrol; Assistant Commissioner Thomas Winkowski, CBP, Office of Field Operations; Associate Director Jim Dinkins, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations; and Rear Admiral Paul Zukunft, commander of U.S. Coast Guard 11th District.

Gentlemen, we thank you for being here today and thank you for your service. Each of you represents officers and agents who risk their lives every day in the interest of our nation's safety and security.

And all of your agency have experienced losses in the line of duty over the past year and let me express our condolences for you who have lost the lives in your particular agencies and our sincere gratitude for all of you who carry on.

With the 5,500 miles of border with Canada, the 1,993 miles of border with Mexico and the 2,627 miles of shorelines securing the borders of the United States is a daunting task. Since its inception this subcommittee has closely examined security efforts and conditions along our borders particularly along the Southwest border. Our focus today is not merely to recite where we have been. We all -- we know well the significant resources and dramatic strives that have been made since 2003. Rather we want to talk about the goals for increased border security.

We want to hear three things directly from you, the officers and agents who work on the frontlines.

Number one, what's the current assessment of border security?

Number two, when will the border be secure? What does that mean, what resources are needed.

And number three, how do we measure progress for a secure and economically vibrant border?

Let me elaborate on each of these points.

First, what is the current assessment of border security?

After investing billions of dollars in Southwest border security efforts in the past eight years where are we in relation to where we need to go?

On the U.S. side of the border we have invested in federal stay in local -- law enforcement personnel and capabilities. We have built 649 miles of physical fencing and tactical infrastructure to enhance detection and deterrence, and deployed and tested a variety of technologies.

We have also invested in bringing the fight to the cartels, stepping up interdiction efforts away from the border using air and marine time assets to support investigations in Latin America and in Mexico.

At the same time, despite our efforts, conditions in Mexico remain dire. Drug production is up and meeting demand. And drug- related violence has resulted in 35,000 deaths since the year 2005.

With the end of President Calderon's term coming to an end in just a year, how much progress do we expect to make.

Second, the most important, how much further do we have to go? What are the end goals and how much will it cost to reach them.

Commissioner Bersin gave us some insight before the subcommittee into what he thinks the end goals are in his appearance last week. The standard being that, if you try to come in illegally you will be detected and you will be arrested.

It means reducing the flow of illegal traffic in the United States from Mexico to a point that both assures public safety and is perceived by the people who live on the border and the people who live in Arizona are being safe and secure.

I want to dig in to the Commissioners comments. How will we achieve the level of detection and interdiction? What resources will it take? How long will it take?

Last we do need to measure progress. How do we measure progress along the way?

The administration has touted the decrease in the apprehensions along the Southwest border as an indication of fewer illegal crossings and therefore successful deterrence.

How do we really know that is the case? For the entire history the so-called denominator has been evasive.

We know how many we detect and interdict. The core question is, how many illegal aliens actually successfully cross the -- into the United States and with what volume of contraband and drugs. How are we seeking to measure that?

Director Morton and Admiral Papp indicated that their roles in part were to interdict individuals and drugs away from the land border to reduce the pressure on our borders. How has that contribution been measured?

This is truly a daunting task as I mentioned and you face significant challenges everyday and meet our nation's border security needs.

I appreciate you appearing before us today and thank you in advance for your candor and for your insight on the Southwest border security operations.

At this point I would like to recognize the ranking member of this subcommittee, Mr. Price from North Carolina.

PRICE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want, first, to join the chairman in welcoming this multiagency panel here today and thanking all of you for your service and the guidance you afford to those who are working in your agencies.

Mexico and the United States are friends and allies of long- standing with deep historical and cultural and political ties.

Consider also the economic ties. The United States is Mexico's largest trading partner. We're about 85 percent of Mexican exports. Mexico also buys large quantities of U.S. goods and services, surpassed only by Canada and China.

So it behooves each of our countries to facilitate commerce across the Southwest border. Commerce that is responsible for many American and Mexican jobs.

However, the same border also experiences a substantial amount of illegal trade crossing between the two countries with narcotics and illegal immigrants coming north and money and weapons headed south. Mexican drug cartels now dominate the wholesale illicit drug market in the United States earning from $13.6 billion to $48.4 billion annually.

Since President Calderon took office in 2006 and began directly confronting the drug cartels, Mexico and its border regions have been racked by violence.

The cartels control a large swash of Mexican territory and dozens of municipalities. And they're waging violent turf battles over control of key smuggling corridors from Nuevo Laredo to San Diego.

Over the past four years the death toll in Mexico has exceeded 35,000 with each year setting a record higher than the previous one.

The United States has been aggressively working with Mexico to stop this violence because what happens south of the border is more than just Mexico's problem. Recognizing our shared responsibility has led to enhanced cooperation between our governments.

The DHS agencies before us today have had unprecedented cooperation with Mexican law enforcement and the military on information sharing, joint training, cross-border communications and the exchange of personnel.

You've also implemented unprecedented initiatives to interdict illicit shipments flowing north and south across the border.

We're going to hear today about those efforts and the funding for the Southwest border initiative.

But as we take stock of the challenges we face related to the Mexican cartels, it's also important for us to step back and consider all of the forces that play in the drug trade. I've often thought and said that the strength and security of our country are not just about the budget accounts explicitly labeled Homeland Security and Defense.

Success or failure in the war on cartels is no different. We can't expect to solve our drug problems if we put more and more resources into interdiction at the border while doing very little to curtail the demand for drugs on our own streets or even worse, if we actually diminish our demand-side efforts.

But I'm afraid that's exactly what we're confronting in this current year budget discussion.

The House majority's funding bill for the remainder of fiscal 2011, HR 1 takes a serious bite out of our efforts to prevent and treat drug abuse and thereby reduce demands for the -- demand for the cartels poisonous commodities.

HR 1 would implement a massive $581 million cut to state and local law enforcement assistance funds which include a variety of programs linked to drug abuse treatment like Bryne grants, the residential substance abuse treatment program, drug courts and second chance reentry programs for ex-offenders. HR 1 also takes $191 million from juvenile justice grants which are also used to treat drug abuse among youth and our communities.

HR 1 takes an indiscriminate $229 million cut from the substance abuse and mental health services administration at the Department of HHS.

It cuts the Office of National Drug Control Policy by nearly $70 million and completely eliminates an initiative to get ex-offenders into the legitimate workforce.

To put it simply, HR 1 would set our national drug control efforts back by over $1 billion. It would rob Peter to pay Paul.

Cutting programs that reduce the demand for drugs while maintaining those targeted at the supply of drugs, that simply does not make sense.

Now, I realize that none of our witnesses here today can address the programs that fall outside the Department of Homeland Security and I'm not going to ask you to do so. But I think it's important to raise this issue.

Extremely important to raise this issue because the work we do on this subcommittee does not occur in a vacuum and neither does the work that your agencies do along our borders and coastlines occur in a vacuum. Your agencies objectives are significantly affected by forces related to the drug trade that are outside your direct control.

So I -- I believe it's important for all of us with responsibilities in this area to bear in mind, bear in mind the full scope of the problem and the full scope of the likely remedies as we continue to grapple with our fiscal challenges trying to preserve the strength and security of our country.

So, gentlemen, I look forward to your testimony here today and to a frank discussion.

Men and women under your leadership should be commended for all their hard work, their record seizures to date, the great sacrifices they make on behalf of the safety and security of the American people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADERHOLT: Thank you, Mr. Price.

And let me just say that certainly demand aspect does -- does need to be -- needs to be considered and we should never look it -- overlook that as a contributor but also the supply side of the drugs coming to this nation is really what our focus is today and certainly these individual before us can help us make an assessment of that. So, again, thank you for your opening comments as well.

The -- what I'd like to do at this point is to start with our -- the panel open it up. What I'll do is open it up to questions to all of the -- what's that? Yes. I stand corrected. Let me start with your opening statements before I start in to my question. So, if -- what I'll do is recognize Chief Fisher and then we will go down the table with Assistant Commissioner Winkowski, Dinkins and Zukunft.

So, Chief Fisher?

FISHER: Thank you.

Chairman Aderholt and Ranking Member Price, distinguished members of the committee, it's a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to share with you the efforts being undertaken by U.S. Customs and Border Protection to secure our borders generally and in particular the Southwest border.

I also look forward to the opportunity to discuss our current assessment of the border, when in a the timelines of our security efforts and resources dedicated to that, and certainly metrics and measures and the extent to which we are going to measure that throughout the next few years.

By way of current status we are on pace to higher train and deploy 21,370 border patrol agents by September of this year.

We have completed more than 649 of the 550 miles of fencing and added significantly more technology including infrared and seismic sensors, video surveillance and mobile systems. We have added aerial platforms to include unmanned aerial systems which complement our ground effort.

Further more, we have gained a greater appreciation for the differentiation between mere collaboration and operational integration with our federal, state, local, tribal and international partners moving forward in realizing the strength of joint planning and implementation in a targeted and focused manner.

As we have realized increased capacity and capability over the last few years attributed in large part to the increase in resources, we have seen a transformation along our Southwest border.

Activity levels are down to historic levels across the Southwest, staffing levels at our high risk sectors are up and we're becoming more proficient with technology to respond to all threats.

But in similar cases when law enforcement agencies learn to prioritize and focus their efforts and mitigate crime, the criminal element also learns and adjusts as we are currently witnessing transnational criminal organizations change their techniques, tactics and procedures. They no longer try to overwhelm our agents in the urban environments, choosing instead to operate predominately in extremely remote locations.

In some cases violence against our agents has increased as the transnational criminal organizations try to intimidate our agents and attempt to influence our forward deployments away from areas previously exploited. And in most cases the cost of doing business for the transnational criminal organizations continues to increase shrinking their profits.

Over the past year we have reviewed our strategy in light of the changing border environment. Our way forward in the strategy that will be applied will be risk-based.

Accordingly, we will increasingly depend on information and intelligence to describe the intent and capability of our adversaries, thus defining the threat while continuously assessing our border vulnerabilities. And in doing so we must be more mobile, agile, and flexible than our adversaries.

Finally, we will define the doctrine through nontraditional and unconventional approaches heretofore unexplored.

I have witnessed the evolution of the border over the past 24 years as a border patrol agent both in terms of additional resources applied against the threat, as well as the change and the adversary's ability to exploit border vulnerabilities. Although we have seen positive indicators of a secure border, our work continues and will not end as long as there are those who seek to enter this country illegally.

In closing, I want to again thank you for this opportunity to testify today.

I remain committed to the mission and confident in our collective ability to secure our borders, due in large part to the brave men and women of CBP who each and every day provide a level of security to our citizens who deserve no less. I am proud of our agents and officers dedication to duty and commitment to excellence.

I also want to acknowledge and thank all of you on the committee for your support. As you were well aware the border is a dynamic environment and we will continue to strive to meet the demand of today as well as the challenges of tomorrow.

Thank you, again, we look forward to your questions.

ADERHOLT: Thank you, Chief Fisher.

Assistant Commissioner Winkowski?

WINKOWSKI: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Price and members of the subcommittee.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today and continue our ongoing dialogue regarding border enforcement on the Southwest border.

Without your full support and partnership we would not have been able to accomplish the many successes that we've had to date. However, we still have many, many challenges.

I want to assure the subcommittee that everybody on this panel, we work very closely with Chief Fisher, being my counterpart in customs and border protection. And working between the ports of entry and field operations at the ports of entry we have integrated, I think, a great strategic plan from the standpoint of bringing the skill sets that our customs and border protection office has bring as well as the border patrol agents.

Certainly from the standpoint of ICE, our investigative -- the executive director James Dinkins here to my left, there's a true partnership taking seizures, taking arrest and having a seamless transition from field operations over to the investigators.

And, certainly, with Admiral Paul Zukunft from the Coast Guard in working on the homeland security enterprise on our borders particularly in the area of small boats and things of that nature.

Given the limited time that I have I thought I'd just take a few minutes to talk about some of the work that we've been able to do.

In the area of outbound operations, at the direction of Secretary Napolitano and Commissioner Bersin, CBP has reengaged in outbound operations over the past two years and had success.

We've seen an increase in our currency seizures across the Southwest border when you look at fiscal year '09 and '10. We've implemented 100 percent rail inspection along the eight crossings on the Southwest border using our technology that you all have supported for us over the years.

And by the end of the year we're going to have handheld license plate reader capability at the 111 outbound lanes along the Southwest border with the plan of putting fixed site license plate readers in our outbound lanes in the out years.

And further more as we create new facilities we are keenly aware of the need to ensure the capability of outbound inspections in our design and construction. Many of our facilities are old. Don't have -- either don't have a footprint for outbound inspections or have a very limited footprint.

Another important initiative has been the alliance to combat the transnational threats or what we call ACTT in Arizona.

Since ACTT began on September 5, 2009 we have made significant enforcement actions at our Arizona ports of entry. Seized more than $13 million in outbound currency, over 129,000 pounds of marijuana, 3,600 pounds of cocaine.

Our success can be measured in many ways. Numbers tell us something, but the smugglers reactions help validate our activities.

And since we've increased our efforts and continue to evolve our methods, the cartels continue to move to a more unique and deeper conceal their methods which makes it much more difficult for our CBP officers to detect ranging from -- in transmissions, in manifolds of automobiles, gas tanks, the use of commercial buses, co-mingling drugs in legitimate produce.

You know, critically important to our mission and related to the violent scene on the Mexican side of the border is our effort to give our officers the training and resources they need to ensure the security of our -- of the ports.

You know, we have conducted a very, very comprehensive infrastructure surveys to improve the physical security of our ports. We've surveyed every single port and have made security enhancements in order to harden our ports of entry.

We continue to deploy our tactical enforcement officers on our Southwest border, at our ports of entry. These are especially-trained officers that are -- have the long guns and have correct body armor.

We also have -- continue to enhance our special response team program.

I'd also like to mention the much-needed infrastructure projects we have undertaken and continue to pursue on the Southwest border.

Over the past year we've opened two new ports of entry in Texas -- Anzalduas and Donna. And I've had the opportunity to go to each one of those ports. And those ports -- the designs of hose ports have taken into consideration the situation that we have down the Southwest border from the standpoint of making sure that our ports are hard and have a comprehensive outbound footprint for our offices to conduct outbound inspections.

Just recently I was in San Isidro and have the opportunity to break ground on the new facility in San Isidro and that facility also at the cost of $600 million not only enhances our inbound capability. Going from 24 lanes to 63 lanes inbound but also has an outbound footprint and enhancements that we'll make in San Luis.

And with the help of this committee, the GSA and other partnerships, these are just a few examples in needed facility improvements that will require additional resources.

Also, as you know, our FY '12 budget, the request contains money for 300 CBPOs for new and existing infrastructure. And I look forward to work with the committee to ensure that we have the essential personnel and resources going forward and not to mention the 250 officers that we received last year in supplemental for the -- for the Southwest border and those officers are coming on board.

So I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.

ADERHOLT: Thank you.

Associate Director Dinkins? Thank you for being here today.

DINKINS: Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Price, and members of this subcommittee.

I'm here before you today to discuss ICE's role on securing our Southwest border and specifically the efforts that we've made in recent years. I'd like to begin by thank you for noting the recent unprovoked attack against our special agents in Mexico. Our prayers remain with the Zapata family for their loss and for special agent Avila's speedy recovery.

Out of this tragedy I'm reminded first and foremost of the great courage our special agents and fellow law enforcement partners demonstrate each and every day combating the activities of transnational criminal organizations and the challenges we face along the Southwest border.

We're the second largest investigative agents in the federal government. ICE special agents focus our investigative activities to identify, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations and the illicit pathways that exploit unlawful movement of people, contraband, weapons and money across our international borders.

This reoccurring global cycle of criminal activity known as the criminal continuum is a threat to our security not only to the border but our communities. This investigative effort of ICE is nearly 7,000 special agent aimed to attack the entire continuum.

First we have ICE attaches located in 46 countries. We work with our foreign law enforcement partners to push our borders out and address the threats before they arrive in the U.S.

Second, at the border we work in partnership with CBP and the Coast Guard to detect narcotics and contraband, prevent the unlawful entry of individuals into the country and deter the illegal exportation on weapons and currency from the United States.

And third, we have 200 offices located throughout the U.S.

ICE engages in proactive investigations with our federal state, local and tribal law enforcement partners. We investigate transnational criminal organizations operating or residing within our communities. Here, these individuals often engage in the most profitable stage of transnational crime, notably, the distribution and sale of illegal narcotics and the trafficking of aliens and contraband.

In turn, these criminal organizations generate huge profits that are then smuggled out of the U.S. to fuel their ongoing criminal enterprises.

I can assure you combating this criminal organizations and attacking their financial infrastructure is a priority for ICE as well as the department. We have taken significant steps to do so.

And as we move forward we must continue to push our borders out and adjust the greatest national security and public safety threats before they arrive in the U.S. When they do arrive we must be prepared to interdict, investigate and prosecute the criminals for their actions.

And finally, if we are going to be successful we have to continue to pursue the transnational criminal organization members who reside in big and small cities throughout the United States.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and discuss some very important issue with you.

ADERHOLT: Thank you.

Admiral Zukunft?

ZUKUNFT: Good morning Chairman Aderholt and Ranking Member Price. It's my pleasure to be here before this distinguished committee as a member of the Coast Guard.

And I will just say I'm the assistant commandant for maritime security safety and stewardship here in Washington, D.C. and certainly the Southwest border is very first and foremost on my mind.

As a lead U.S. agency from maritime security, the Coast Guard employees have three layer of maritime approach to the Southwest border. And that begins at the departure and transit zones, well south of Mexico and then reaches into the approaches of Mexico and finally culminates in our customs waters along our U.S./Mexico maritime border.

To complement the strategy the Coast Guard leverages its role within the national intelligence community to bolster situation awareness as well as our inner service in our agency and international partnerships to advance the interdiction continuum against drug trafficking organizations. That is, intelligence drives interdictions.

To follow on (ph), forensics and prosecutions are working through the interagency process such as Panama Express leads to more interdictions and then it just perpetuates that intelligence interdiction cycle. But we do it internationally and certainly with our DHS partners here at the table.

Our ambiguous goal is to meet these threats far from the U.S. border and the first layer of attack is in these transit and sore zones where transnational criminal organizations are most vulnerable.

To this time our Coast Guard air commanders work with Northcom and Southcom and with the joint interagency task force itself to detect, monitor and interject and apprehend threats well beyond our U.S. waters both in the Caribbean and in the Eastern Pacific.

Coat guard cutters and aircraft provide the necessary range, speed, command and control in authorities to effect success in this transit zone. And in addition to that our Coast Guard law enforcement detachments that are employed on allied ships and our U.S. naval platforms are able to leverage our 37 bilateral agreements with signatory nations from these source and transit zone countries that it had a market impact on drug trafficking destined for the United States.

During 2010 the Coast Guard removed over 200,000 pounds of cocaine and over 36,000 pounds of marijuana bound for the United States. This represents 45 percent of the national drug control strategies annual target or 2010 which is a 30 percent removal rate and equates to 445,000 pounds of cocaine.

Our second layer of attack is the approach to Mexican coastal waters where the Coast Guard works with the Mexican Navy and other interagency partners from Mexico and through our North American Maritime Security Initiative or NAMSI we've established tactical operation center to operations center agreements and information sharing with C-MAR in Mexico that has also had a marked effect on trafficking.

Since this inception of NAMSI in 2008 we've had 21 cases totaling 47,000 pounds of contraband seized as the result of this relationship. Fairly nascent with that with our counterparts in Mexico.

The final and third layer of our attack is in the U.S. customs waters to include our maritime border with Mexico. And to that end we work very closely with CBP, ICE or state and local partners.

And you need not look any further than our Joint Harbor Operations Command which is an interagency operations center in San Diego where we have 20 representative agencies including DOD that monitor at the tactical level activity approaching our Southwest border. And since the standup of this center we have interdicted just in last year alone over 800 migrants at sea. And that's twice the number that we've seen in previous years.

So we are seeing an increasing trend in migrant trafficking by sea via the Southwest border.

Finally I will mention we do search operations on Falcon Lake and Lake Amistad. Even though it's not sea water it is a maritime border with Mexico and certainly events in the last year had drawn increased attention to that particular threats so we do transport on a quarterly basis forces that do interdiction operations there as well. At present it is more of a presence right now that will hopefully deter further activity in that region.

Chairman Aderholt, Ranking Member Price, we are proud to be -- to take great strives with the department to enhance security on our Southwest border. The United States Coast Guard has a clear strategy of layered attack that leverages joint services, interagency and international partnerships. We are actively pursuing acquisition strategies that will deliver more capable and operational assets in systems for the Coast Guard in the years to come.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I am pleased to entertain your questions.

Thank you.

ADERHOLT: Thank you, Admiral.

The administration has noted time and again that the border is secure at is -- as it has ever been. The question today is, how do we measure the level of security we have achieved. Let me walk you through the measures we have frequently heard.

Border patrol apprehensions of illegal aliens are down 36 percent in the past two years and are less than one-third of what they were at their peak. And a decrease -- is a decrease in apprehension truly an indication that fewer illegal's are crossing or there are fewer job seekers or fewer drug mules or both?

2010 saw more than 15,000 drug-related deaths in Mexico. Is an increase in the violence an indication of greater pressure on the cartels or just more examples of their brazen and brutal tactics?

While seizures of drugs both cash and other contraband are up that can probably be attributed largely to having more officers and agents on the front lines.

What aren't we -- what are we not -- what aren't we catching? Have our efforts actually squeezed and reduced the flow northbound into the United States or southbound in Mexico?

Have drug use availability, purity and street value been affected at all as a result of our investments?

And lastly, I would like each of you to tell to the subcommittee from your agency's perspective what are the best measures of the effectiveness of the Southwest border operations, where are we today, where do we need to go and what tools and resources are needed to get there.

And I'll start with you, Chief Fisher.

FISHER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think in posing those series of questions, interestingly enough myself and the staff and then -- and others within CBP have been looking at this really hardly over the last few years.

And in particular over this last year what we realized as part of our strategy in the method by which we had recently been reporting out in terms of security. Really were in fact as we did described as operational control levels really for the deployments of those resources over the years and how we would measure those, how we would ask the field commanders, to what extent has those -- that level of resources, then a benefit added value to your operations and from a cost standpoint did that actually work.

And as we've been having the discussions with the field commanders it became clear to a lot of us that levels of operational control measured in a linear fashion do not translate into border security because border security is much broader than linear miles of operational control even under our own limited definitions.

For instance, where do we start looking a year ago at not just the line in the sand if you will?

The juridical one that separates the jurisdictions between the United States and Mexico, we've been looking at the border in terms of corridors. And those corridors, as we start looking along, for instance, the Southwest border, what is it that the criminal organizations, smuggling organizations, transnational criminal organizations, anybody seeking entry into this country, what do they require to do that?

And so, when I mentioned earlier about the information and intelligence being a key indicator to identify the intent and capability defining the threat, that's exactly what we're trying to do.

Just because we have an area along the Southwest border for instance that's extremely remote -- absent any fence, absent periodic deployments of water patrol agents -- that may be in and of itself vulnerable because of the lack of those resources. It doesn't necessarily indicate that that's an area of high risk.

Let me give you a quick example.

In some of the areas -- in the Big Bend National Park, for instance, vast expanse, don't have a lot of resources there. But in those particular areas criminal organizations in order to bring narcotics and people through need the same things that local populations need to be able to bring in through a country into another country and immediately into the interior of the United States. That requires infrastructure in terms of road systems, transportation systems to easily do that.

Now, in some of the other remote areas where they do operate where it takes from two to three days, they do that at a higher risk not necessarily because of the terrain, but because of their exposure to our detection and interdiction efforts are higher.

And so when we look at the border and we want to focus those resources in those areas, we want to do it in a smart fashion. In the absence of infrastructure and technology in some of those extremely remote areas, what we are moving towards is identifying other technologies. And I'll give you a quick example.

Some of the intelligence community -- and our UAS' for instance -- we don't want to just automatically assume because the infrastructure does not exist that therefore the risk will always be low. The risk is going to be dependent again on the threat. And if they decide to move for whatever reason, then we want to be able to know about it, have that situational awareness and be able to detect, identify and classify that threat. Are they just people? Are they people coming in with narcotics? Are they armed? Are they not armed?

We also have the requirement to defend, be able to respond to it either on the ground or in the air and ultimately be able to make in effect the arrest.

We had mentioned the denominator. What we need to be able to do in a broad definition of border security is not just the apprehensions. And I would agree with you.

More importantly, it is the proportion of individuals that we arrest subsequent to the detected entry.

And so then the question is, well, in those areas where we don't have persistent detection capability, what is the answer?

There's a few things. We would use the UAS and another national resources to be able to do periodic flyovers in utilizing change detection capability to then go back and periodically check and see if in fact there's any change of the terrain.

If in fact we identify and the analyst dictate that something is moving through there we would send reconnaissance patrols out there. We would sign a cut and we would identify what is coming through that area.

If it is determined to be individuals we can then start putting sensor arrays, we can put mobile technology there to figure out what that threat is to be able to mitigate it so it doesn't become entrenched in some of these places that we've seen across the Southwest border.

ADERHOLT: OK. Thank you, Chief.

And just -- what we'll do is we'll try to keep maybe to -- answer just -- as brief as possible, but of course as -- the time that you need, but we'll try to keep mindful of the time and I know the other members here want to try to get some questions as well.

So, Commissioner Winkowski?

WINKOWSKI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just to kind of build-off of what The Chief just testified to.

In the aerial ports of entry unlike between the ports of entry, we got this dual responsibility. You know, we have a responsibility to make sure that dangerous people and dangerous things don't come in to the country. But we also have a responsibility to make sure that we're doing everything possible to facilitate the legitimate trade in travel.

So, we've got this dual mission that is very, very complicated that is very, very time sensitive.

We have been fortunate in many respects from the standpoint of support from this committee in putting out detection equipment, what we call nonintrusive inspection equipment that we have throughout the -- throughout the Southwest border.

And that's given us the ability to focus in and target high risk shipments, for example. And do quick inspections in making determination and find contraband or to actually release the freight.

So our measures are a number of things. Certainly, one measure is the activity, the illegal activity that we have coming through the ports. And for example inadmissible aliens, when you look at -- percent has changed from fiscal year '09 and fiscal year '10 were up 4 percent, false claims up 15 percent and fraudulent documents up 11 percent.

So the question starts becoming -- what The Chief and I talk about oftentimes is, as border patrol continues to harden between the ports of entry with technology and fence, the impact on the ports of entries. So if you can't come -- if it's more difficult to come through between the ports of entry the next, I think, natural point is at our points of entry. And we've seen some increase in that regard.

The other measure we have is applying consequences. You know, we have gotten away from just doing simple voluntary returns. From the standpoint if someone comes in, doesn't have the proper documents, fraudulent, at times we would give a voluntary return.

Today, we take -- we give larger consequences coming in as well as going out. And I think that's an important point here. I testified about our outbound strategy and I talked a little bit about currency.

But as we focus in on the outbound side, the number of illegal undocumented aliens going back into Mexico, we didn't focus in on that over the years. And we have focused in on it and have been able to apply consequences.

So you have individuals particularly in the pedestrian lane walking into Mexico and part of our outbound ConOps is -- is detecting those individuals and applying -- applying consequences. So, you know, recidivism rates are something that we measure.

I agree they're just finding more -- more drugs. Day in and day out is not just the only measure. It's how you're changing -- how you're changing behavior.

How will you -- you know, we saw -- we see in Arizona with ACTT putting in 163 TDY officers, an increase in enforcement activities.

ADERHOLT: Thank you.

Mr. Dinkins?

DINKINS: Just to carry on.

And some of the indicators and specific things that we noticed that really are indicators that were making a difference with our collective efforts here.

And I'll keep it short. Is the number of stash houses, for example, in Arizona that we're finding that illegal aliens are fewer. The number of aliens in those stash houses are down as well as the number of hostage situations where they've taken hostages -- aliens in the men-in hire fees. Those are also down last year.

And I think that we've seen the re-shift in the pressure that we're putting on these organizations from alien smuggling fees going up specifically in Arizona over the last year, as well as we're seeing them now because they can't get to the ports of entry. They can't make it through between the ports of entry. They're forcing to resort to more sophisticated costly measures. The big tunnels which could take months and we've seen a number of tunnels that we've been able to interdict going up over the last year drastically from previous years.

So I think it really has changed. We change their pattern and we forced them to do things differently, more costly and it's making a difference.

Now, as far as the investigations goes, our -- one of our key performance measures that we're using which will start in FY '12 which really has changed the way that we focus away from just specifically arrest, indictments and convictions and the number of seizures is the disruptions and dismantlement's of transnational criminal organizations. Because when you disrupt them you're, you know, setting them back more than just necessarily taking their drugs or money away from them. And when you actually disrupt them and dismantle them now you're actually eliminating that threat for that organization opposed to the ongoing criminal and smuggling activity they're involved in.

ADERHOLT: Thanks.

Admiral?

ZUKUNFT: OK.

I'll probably start a little more strategic. And when I look at my current assessment it really first starts with the relationships, then it's awareness and then it's authorities.

I've been in this business for 34 years chasing drugs, commanded three ships. I've directed a Joint Interagency Task Force and also dealt with this border problem and I was the commander of the 11th Coast Guard District.

Our relationships on an international scale are paramount. United States cannot do this along. Within our interagency relationships we do not have Goldwater-Nichols. Our department of homeland security, were eight years old, but I'm here to say, you know, the law enforcement officers joining me here at the table, this is a one team, one fight and it is very focused and it sis strategic.

So the relationships both internationally, interagency and joint are better than I've seen at any point in my career.

When you look at awareness, this really comes down to information. Eighty percent of our interdictions were driven by intelligence.

So we have that information. There's a good likelihood at sea we are going to interdict.

Now, as we're getting better systems for awareness it's also imperative that we have the platforms to go out and do the interdictions so those two really need to be held and balanced. But we did see a net reduction last year of about 40 percent of cocaine moving by sea. At the same time, we're seeing different modes of conveyance. First it was semi-submersible vessels and now we're seeing fully submersible vessels.

And then, in the go-fast the vessels transiting cocaine, they're breaking these loads down in smaller volumes. In the past our average interdiction was about five metric tons. Now we're looking at about just under 1 metric ton.

So the bad guys are spreading the risk. And the fact that they have not returned fire against our interdiction forces tell me that this is a risk that they can take, a business expense they can write- off because there's still more coming.

So that would be my assessment there, at least, on the awareness piece.

And then finally, it's the authorities.

We do have a number of bilateral agreements and then our relationships with Mexico.

I've been down to meet with the commander of the 2nd Naval Zone. We -- initially we talked about oil pollution -- oil pollution protocols and we said, let's look at the real threat. You know, it is the violence on the border.

And we were able to take that. We're now -- if we've seeing event off Mexico, our operation center in Alameda calls theirs immediately. And we've actually done exercises and interdictions with Mexico which was really -- would be unheard of 10 years ago.

So I see the trend in our relationships, awareness and our authorities all moving in the right direction.

ADERHOLT: Thanks, Admiral.

Mr. Price?

PRICE: Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I'd also like to address the question to the entire panel to respond as you perceive relevant in what I'm asking which has to do with the effects of not having at this moment long-term funding in place for Southwest border and drug interdiction activities.

Yesterday the House passed yet another short-term continuing resolution. This one to keep the government operating for three weeks, until April 8.

I've said repeatedly, many others have as well, this is no way to run a government. We need once and for all to finish funding what remains of fiscal year 2011. I think that was quite evident in December, it certainly is evident now. Now, I recognize the CRs have given you some flexibility. They have given some of your agencies the ability to shift money around to cover 2011 needs not funded in 2010.

HR 1 for that matter provided additional resources specifically for Southwest border and drug interdiction activities.

However, we're almost halfway through the fiscal year and I question whether these flexibilities alone will cover your needs. And in any case I want to ask the question.

I'd like for each of you to highlight what's been -- what have been the impacts of living under short term CRs for an extended period of time, the impact specifically on Southwest border and drug interdiction activities, when does his type of funding stream truly affect your ability to operate effectively in these areas. And then, finally, what kind of adjustments are you going to need as we finally, hopefully, pass a full year CR and/or the 2012 bill.

What kind of adjustments are going to be required by virtue of the funding under which -- the funding arrangement under which you've live (ph) thus far?

FISHER: Mr. Price, one specific area that is an impact is our inability to project and continue deployments in high risk areas not knowing what the allocation is going to be so that we can physically...

(UNKNOWN): You could pull the mic a little closer. It's not picking up...

FISHER: I'm sorry.

It's the -- the current deployments that we have right now in high risk areas -- in particular Tucson and Arizona -- our inability to know between now and the end of fiscal year what the appropriation -- what that dollar amount would be to be able to scale that. Either surge it up and move it within that area because of the CR right now that's -- right, probably the first and foremost operational impact that we're seeing.

WINKOWSKI: From field operations standpoint, you know, 37 percent of my staff, CBPOs of which I have 22,000, 37 percent are funded by user fees. So, we have a little different situation there.

But from the standpoint of staffing the ports of entry and paying the bills we have not seen any impact in that regard. And in fact we are hiring the 250 officers that were approved on the supplemental as well as some additional officers.

You know, to your point, Mr. Price, I mean, it does make it difficult from the standpoint of that long term planning, but nevertheless not to the point that we had to step back from our responsibilities of protecting -- excuse me, protecting the home and whether it's the Southwest border or Northern border, air ports or sea ports. PRICE: Well, just to -- this touches base something I want to talk about later this morning, but as to the new physicians I -- I understand that as of February 1 none of these new border patrol agents are onboard. And 46 of the new CBP officers are onboard that were funder through the supplemental.

Now, that may or may not be related to -- that seems slow to put it bluntly and that may or may not be related to the uncertainties connected with staff-get (ph) funding

Do you have any quick observation on that? I so want to return to it in more detail.

(UNKNOWN): Yes, sir.

Yes, sir.

I don't know specifically about the supplemental funding as it relates to the authorized levels for border patrol agents.

We are currently writing out over 20,000 border patrol agents and we're on pace. We've been hiring border patrol agents since October 1, the beginning of the fiscal year both in terms of getting us to that 21,370 level at the end which includes the 1,000 additional border patrol agents included in the summer supplemental. It also includes attrition to keep us at that current level.

WINKOWSKI: And from the standpoint of the CBPOs it was -- we got our academy dates. We have two classes down there now that are bringing onboard the 250 and we have other classes scheduled.

PRICE: So quickly, if we could move to the other agencies on the staff getting funding question.

DINKINS: Yes, sir.

It is -- I admit it's a challenge from a management perspective. Fortunately it's been in a level which we've been able to continue on with our hiring as needed.

It's -- the long term effect is this, we don't actually get annualization of the funding for the people that we're bringing on which will -- the out - years will have the challenge versus -- right the now we are carrying on and doing our hiring. We have classes running continuously to bring on the special agents that we need to do the job and that's been funded.

ZUKUNFT: For the Coast Guard we don't like support.

We can maintain the status quo, but we don't operate in a status quo environment. As a federal on-scene coordinator for the BP oil spill where we surged 3,000 people, 22 cutters from as far away as Alaska and Hawaii, so God forbid we have a disaster of that magnitude, but -- where that really hits us is if we had that requirement to surge. In addition, we're keeping a watchful eye on the price of fuel which is the one discretionary item we have in our budget. But as those dollars go up, you know, when the final budget comes in that may be an area we have to reconcile by diminishing operations. We're not there yet, but it will say it does put us on life support.

PRICE: That's a pretty alarming term, Admiral.

Let me just in the time I have remaining ask you to elaborate. Are we talking here about the impact of the -- the mere fact of staff- get (ph) funding and the uncertainty that that carrier with it or are we talking about some adjustments of that -- whatever the full -- your CR eventually looks like and maybe even look -- the 2012 Bill looks like. Some adjustments they're going to be required to get the Coast Guard where it needs to be.

ZUKUNFT: You know, well certainly in the past we looked at supplemental measures to offset some of our surge requirements, but certainly we would like that to be more predictive because, you know, we looked at last year. We got Haiti and we also had the BP oil spill.

We're entering into what could be a devastating hurricane season. Still unknown, but it really is -- becomes more of a readiness issue. And that is the posture, the Coast Guard has to be always ready. And so, maybe it is melodramatic to say, like support, but it's not the posture where the Coast Guard normally stands squarely on its two feet.

PRICE: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADERHOLT: Let me just add to that, you know, I think the question you asked is important and on resources we need to maintain operations.

This subcommittee has a major priority for operations both in the HR 1 and now the short term CRs, and supplementals are of course available to continue powering if needed. So, I just want to make that point.

And I'll turn to Mr. Carter.

CARTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have an awful lot of questions, but first I'd like to point out that failure of the Democratic party to state the budget last year and failure to appropriate any money last year, we've been on a four month CR created by the Democrats and a five-week CR -- two five-week CRs. Republicans, it is time for all of us to come to the table and star getting the same thing done.

Now, let's go to -- I've got some questions that I'm very concerned about and I think you have before you something Mr. Culberson prepared. I'm going to start with this.

We've got a -- looking at that document you have there and look at '07 and it' gotten better in the Tucson sector, but the Tucson sector looks like to me a superhighway. It's just -- it starts at 800,000 in '07 and comes down to 207,000 today and I believe that there is a reason for that and that is that the border patrol is forbidden from going on several government lands -- U.S. government lands that happen to dominate the Tucson sector.

It's my understanding from talking to members of the Rob Bishop & Resources Committee that many of the vehicle barricades that we created with some of the money we did on the Southwest border were to keep the border patrol out of certain areas of conservation land and other things that are on the border.

Is that a major factor in the fact of the Tucson corridor with all of its public lands that border on Mexico prevents you to use vehicular traffic to change down these people inside these U.S. lands?

And there is a House Bill that's being proposed in which I am a co-sponsor. HR 5016 which would resolve that matter to allow the border patrol to pursue into those areas. Would that be something that would help you?

(UNKNOWN): Well from my understanding -- and I actually had an opportunity about a months or so ago to go down into the Tucson area along with representatives from Department of Interior and others.

We currently have and have had for the last few years a memorandum of understanding which allows us to go on to public lands in situations where we have to effect an arrest. So to my knowledge, and even in that particular area, the organ pipe for those vehicle barriers were put up over the years.

Department of Interior told me at that time it has drastically reduced the amount of vehicle entries that were coming through there.

There's a whole host of factors that we believe contributed to the high numbers in Arizona over the last 10 years or so. And I'll be more than welcome to talk about those in particular.

CARTER: Well, I'm going to take the worst case scenario here. In '07 800,000 crossed -- I believe that's Tucson sector and the next high is 152,000, San Diego.

(UNKNOWN): (OFF-MIKE)

CARTER: ...and you turned out 98 -- turned lose 98.60 percent of the people that were apprehended -- the 800,000 apprehended. So, there's something pretty badly wrong in Tucson, in the Tucson sector. As it compares to the rest of the border Southwest border it's like the 800-pound gorilla in the room.

If his -- if it's not the fact this is public land, if we're wrong on that, then I'd like to know what it is. (UNKNOWN): Yes, sir.

And again, there is -- there are many factors. One thing in particular with our strategy, that affect -- the commissioner talks about Tucson in particular, that sector and that state is being the last stand for the smugglers.

It is so because over -- since 1993 when we started in El Paso we saw the majority of traffic there in El Paso. And then we moved it over to San Diego back in the 90s where they were seeing an increase of over 500,000 apprehensions during that time. And it moved over -- head a little bit in South Texas, but it stayed in Arizona for the last 10 years.

When I was there, the high water mark for instance, of the 1.6 million apprehensions United States border patrol agents made that year, 616,000 were in that sector. Last year it was 212,000.

There's two factors predominately why they're still there.

One is because there's very few other areas with that legitimate infrastructure I talked about that they can go back to. They can't go back to the San Diego, they tried in 2007 and 2008. They tried going back in El Paso in small numbers.

The other thing is because of what's happening in Mexico. The lateral movement in Mexico between the smuggling organizations is not what it used to be. It used to be they can move across in Mexico, pay the Plaza, get their people and the narcotics through and do business that way.

Until that settles, a lot of times they're not able to move out of those areas.

CARTER: So, you're saying to me that a Bill that will open up the -- those public lands would be no benefit to you at all?

(UNKNOWN): I think when we look at our current MOU and some of the changes that we're working with Department of the Interior would include positioning mobile technology, not permanently necessarily, but in areas. Because the current MOU right now suggest that we are able to go in on what's called hot pursuit. When we make a detection and we're trying to go through public lands it do include going in this area. That allows for us to be able to do that.

What the current MOU does not at this point allow for is for us to go in and move, for instance, in mobile surveillance system. And we're currently working that with DOI in specific areas to be able to do so.

CARTER: I think I got time for one more question.

It's reported to me that in Arizona an ambush was set up -- I don't know what sector it was in -- was in.

CULBERSON: Tucson. CARTER: In the Tucson sector I've been told. And that one of our agents was armed with a weapon firing bean bags. And when the fighting started he was shooting bean bags and they were shooting live ammunition, AK-47s and he got killed.

Now, what in the world are we sending a border patrol out for an ambush with a bean bag gun.

CULBERSON: It was a SWAT.

CARTER: SWAT Team I'm told by Mr. Culberson.

CULBERSON: SWAT Team.

(UNKNOWN): Yes, sir.

I believe you're referring to the incident back in mid-December that involved the tragic death of Agent Brian Terry who was a member of the Border Patrol Tactical Unit. That occurred in the mountains west of Nogales, Arizona.

What I can tell you, sir, is because it's still an ongoing investigation, all the border patrol agents that were deployed in there had deadly force.

CARTER: Except him.

(UNKNOWN): No, sir. He did have deadly force.

CARTER: Well, the report is, the gun was sort of a bean bag. That's not deadly force, isn't it?

(UNKNOWN): Well the team is deployed with a variety of weapons, sir. And...

(CROSSTALK)

CARTER: And he just grabbed the wrong gun?

(UNKNOWN): No, sir. That's not the case.

CARTER: You're investigating that?

(UNKNOWN): Actually the FBI is the lead investigative agency and the United States Attorney's Office in Arizona is still working that case, sir. So I can't go into further levels of detail. I think you would understand that.

CULBERSON: (OFF-MIKE).

CARTER: Well, I'll let you ask that question.

CULBERSON: Yes. Forgive me, John.

ADERHOLT: Times up.

Mr. Dent.

DENT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just a few quick questions. Chief Fisher and Commissioner Winkowski, we understand that CBP has been establishing a unified command structure for the Southwest border, similar to efforts undertaken by the Coast Guard. In addition, we know DHS has been looking at a more unified interagency approach to border security looking to models such as the Joint Interagency Task Force --South I should say -- Joint -- that they combat narcotics, as you know from South America, the Caribbean.

What progress has been made in implementing this unified approach at CBP and what difference does it make and if any at all?

FISHER: Sir, I can tell you at the beginning of December in Arizona CBP stood up what's called the Joint Field Command. And we're just starting to set here in Washington D.C. the Joint Operations Directorate.

As most joint commands go it was an area, one, as the lines to combat transnational threats started up in September of 2009. As that matured we started with a unified effort. We moved towards unified command and now we're matured to a joint command construct.

It's still relatively early to ascertain the extent to which it has increased. But I can tell you and I'll certainly ask Mr. Winkowski to comment as well, if he so chooses, that having one person that speaks for the commissioner from a strategic level in the field, be able to look at border patrol operations, look at field operations because they aren't separate as Mr. Winkowski indicated at and between the ports of entry.

And we have currently invested over 6,000 border patrol agents and officers in that state. Having a joint command helps us set a construct to be able to make sure that the implementation of that strategy is reaching the objectives and goals as previously stipulated.

WINKOWSKI: Congressman, that the only thing I have to add is, you know, prior to -- prior to the creation of DHS down in -- for example, at port of entry you had really three government agencies running the port of entry. You had the customs service where I came from under the treasury department. You had immigration, naturalization service under the justice department and you had USDA under the Department of Agriculture.

We made it work. The creation of DHS and CBP eight years ago this month brought a whole new level of one agency owning one department, owning -- the borders. Us being, you know, CBP owning, you know, the ports of entry, between the ports of entry and the air and marine side.

And we've matured in eight years. And I think we have matured to a point where we needed to look at, is there a better way from the standpoint of managing our mission. And we've done a -- we did a lot of research on this and took a lot of pieces from the Department of Defense with Goldwater-Nichols.

I've had the opportunity that Chief Fisher has to spend a lot of time down in Tucson. And having a one commander that is responsible for what's happening in that particular sector to me makes a great deal of sense.

And what that means to my position for that particular area is to continue to grow and that -- that I'm going to be going into organized training equip versus the operational side because the commander is responsible for the operational side.

So, as The Chief indicated we have ways to go. It's maturing. You know, we have in this particular case a border patrol agent that is in charge of the joint command, but as the deputy. The joint commander is a field operations leader.

So, I think it's a good thing. It's innovative. I think we've matured to a point where we need to begin the process of relooking how we manage the borders.

DENT: What are your results and goals of the joint unified efforts and what are the cost savings?

WINKOWSKI: From the standpoint of the joint field command we're not there yet. I could not see here and give you a dollars -- dollar savings.

From the standpoint of streamlining the process I think, again, having one individual in charge of that particular sector which includes the ports of entry and between the ports of entry certainly streamlines the management and the re-management reporting because he commander reports directly to the deputy commissioner of CBP.

DENT: Through this consolidate -- through the consolidation do you see a better use of existing resources?

WINKOWSKI: Yes. I believe so. And, again, time will tell here, but that commander has a full authority of shuffling resources so that particular commander wanted to take positions from the customs and border protection officer position and place them someplace else in that particular AOR. He's got the full authority to do that.

Typically what would happen is, in order to do things like that there's, you know, there's a reporting process that the director would have to come through in the headquarters. We've streamlined that.

So, for example, we see on the Southwest border with our outbound operations at the ports of entry, we see border patrol agents at the ports of entry working outbound operations with our border protection officers. We see border protection officers up in checkpoints which traditionally was just handled by border patrol.

So, you know, we're seeing this knitting, we're seeing this integration of personnel. As I mentioned in my oral reply (ph) that we all bring different skill sets to the table -- field operations and border patrol. Now it's time. We've done a great job merging. Now it's really time to really integrate.

DENT: And if I can just quickly go to the Admiral.

Just to talk about your aviation assets and capabilities for a moment. The Coast Guard