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    Senior Member ShockedinCalifornia's Avatar
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    Sen. Schumer's Security Report Card

    Senator Chuck Schumer's 9/11 Security Report Card

    Updated: Sep 11, 2008 08:23 AM PDT

    Senator Chuck Schumer's 9/11 Security Report Card


    Border Security- C-

    Border Security- Weak border security, both on the Northern and Southern Border, have left a serious hole in our ability to prevent terrorists from smuggling weapons, bombs, or even nuclear materials into the country. Security experts have said that one of the most likely terrorist attack scenarios is one where a terrorist smuggles in a small nuclear device, not by air or through our ports, but across one of our land borders. Long existing staffing shortages at checkpoints and over budget and underperforming scanning and detection device programs have hampered our ability to prevent that terrible scenario from becoming a reality.

    Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) is facing substantial staffing shortages due to substantial officer attrition. According to the GAO, these shortages are affecting the agency's ability to effectively execute anti-terrorism programs and significantly lowering officer moral. In an effort to bolster recruitment and stabilize attrition, Congress recently authorized law enforcement officer retirement benefits to CBP officers; unfortunately, DHS failed to include these vital benefits in its most recent budget proposal (Government Accountability Office, "Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry," 11/5/2007, GAO-08-219).
    While Congress has granted more than $2.7 billion for the Secure Border Initiative to secure our borders and reduce illegal immigration, the Department of Homeland Security has continually failed to submit properly detailed plans to Congress. DHS not only fails to justify its expenditures, but also fails to report the program's progress, fails to demonstrate whether these allocated funds work in tandem with the DHS Secure Border Strategy, and fails to provide assurance that funding is going to highest priority requirements (Government Accountability Office, "Secure Border Initiative Fiscal Year 2008 Expenditure Plan Shows Improvement, but Deficiencies Limit Congressional Oversight and DHS Accountability," 6/26/2008, GAO-08-739R).

    Customs and Border Patrol estimates several thousand inadmissible immigrants enter the country yearly due to weaknesses in inspections procedures. Even as procedures are developed to correct these vulnerabilities, CBP has not institutionalized an internal mechanism to ensure that new procedures are consistently implemented, nor developed measures that gauge CBP effectiveness apprehending inadmissible immigrants. (Government Accountability Office, "Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry," 11/5/2007, GAO-08-219).

    Port Security- D

    Port Security-No effective testing device for cargo containers in transit has been completed, despite a promise last year to do so. While 2012 is the target date to scan all cargo coming into the United States, the ports are vulnerable now. Also, completion of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential has been pushed back again.

    Despite last year's promise to "move quickly" on testing devices to secure cargo containers in transit, DHS has not yet completed its review of such devices. (Remarks by Customs & Border Protection Commissioner W. Ralph Basham at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/11/07) Even if DHS approves an effective device, DHS has consistently left open the possibility that the use of container security devices may be voluntary rather than required - even for the highest-risk containers.

    The Transportation Security Agency remains far behind schedule in its pilot testing of the new Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), which is being launched at seaports before expanding to other transportation facilities. DHS has already pushed back its final compliance date for port workers by seven months, to April 15, 2009.

    All cargo containers bound for the United States must be scanned for nuclear and radiological devices by 2012, under a law passed by this Congress to implement remaining 9/11 Commission recommendations. Earlier this year, DHS successfully concluded a pilot project to scan 100% of U.S.-bound containers from several foreign ports. However, DHS continues to emphasize the challenges of overseas container scanning and has yet to step forward with a plan for meeting the statutory deadline that is now only four years away. (Statement of Deputy Customs & Border Protection Commissioner Jayson Ahearn before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 6/12/0

    Mass Transit & Truck Security- D

    Mass Transit & Truck Security- Mass transit systems continue to remain highly vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. Rail, trucks and buses continue to remain vulnerable to terrorism as local law enforcement agencies have been forced to tackle this critical issue with little or no support from the federal government. The TSA has only 100 surface transportation inspectors charged with covering over 300,000 miles of freight rail lines and 10,000 miles of commuter rail lines. In addition, plans for advanced chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detectors able to be deployed at stations and in cars remain years away from being widely available.

    TSA has only 100 surface transportation inspectors charged with covering more than 300,000 miles of freight rail lines and 10,000 miles of commuter and subway rail lines, and has not requested 2009 funding for any additional inspectors. Additionally, TSA does not have a clear plan to ensure that inspectors will meet required security and inspection qualifications.

    TSA has cut grant important programs, like the retrofitting of transit fleets with chemical and biological detection equipment.

    TSA has not created security standards for all surface transportation modes, such as commercial vehicle and highway infrastructure.

    Aviation Security- C

    Aviation Security- Despite major improvements to beef up air passenger screeners, plans to upgrade the screening of cargo, both on commercial and cargo flights, has been absolutely stagnant and starved of required funding. In addition, efforts to revaluate security systems put in place immediately after the 9/11 attacks and needed security re-assessments have been years delayed.

    As of April 2008, TSA has only conducted vulnerability assessments at 5 of our nation's airports. Experts believe that cargo is a serious target for terrorists and that vulnerability assessments are critical to determining the security weaknesses in air cargo that could be exploited by terrorists.

    TSA does not have a plan to screen air cargo inbound to the U.S. from overseas on foreign carriers, despite efforts to screen 50% of cargo shipped out of the U.S. by February of 2009.

    TSA has only 325 cargo-specialists to conduct inspections of screening practices at 100 airports.
    TSA has done very little to ensure that foreign airports are complying with international security standards, and has made a mediocre effort to coordinate with foreign governments. Currently, TSA only has 21 inspectors stationed abroad in 14 countries as security coordinators and points-of-contact for foreign government officials.

    Energy Security - C+

    Energy Security - In addition to a national focus on the rising cost of energy, the security of the facilities and infrastructure that produce and deliver the now very expensive energy we depend on have been left dangerously vulnerable to attack. Our nation's precarious and dangerous dependence on foreign oil is only made worse in the event of a domestic attack on a major energy facility. From nuclear plants, to natural gas and other power installations, the Administration has done far too little to keep our nations energy infrastructure safe.

    Nuclear Power Facility Security. The Administration has failed to address deficiencies in basic nuclear facility security. After video recordings of inattentive security officers at the Peach Bottom nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania were aired on local television, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection in September 2007 confirmed that there had been multiple occasions on which multiple security officers were inattentive. The entirety of the Administration response on this issue has been an NRC bulletin in December 2007 that required all nuclear power plants to provide written descriptions of "managerial controls to deter and address inattentiveness and complicity among licensee security personnel." Despite congressional hearings, the NRC has not yet undertaken remedial action, with its staff merely continuing to evaluate responses to the December 2007 bulletin. [Reference RL34331 and update conversation with Mark Holt (CRS)].

    Electric Grid Reliability. Notwithstanding the lessons of the 2003 and 2006 blackouts, the Administration has failed to take meaningful actions to promote grid reliability. New Yorkers know first-hand how sabotage, weather, and operational errors have caused losses of electrical power that are very expensive and disrupt business, health care delivery, travel, government services, and daily life. Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, which supports the modernization of the electric transmission and distribution system to maintain reliability and infrastructure protection. But the Administration has failed to buttress our power distribution and delivery systems even as they creak and groan under demand across the country. [Reference RL34288].

    Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) security and citing. The Administration has failed to develop a coherent approach to locating and protecting LNG facilities that will help meet energy needs and reduce oil dependence without creating undue hazard to our communities. In March of this year, the Administration approved plans to build an LNG terminal on Long Island Sound, where the neighboring population density would have made it an inviting terrorist target, as well as an environmentally-hazardous eyesore. Senator Schumer's three years of opposition helped defeat the project when New York State put a stop to the plan. A 2007 report by the Government Accountability Office states that, "the ship-based supply chain for energy commodities," specifically including LNG, "remains threatened and vulnerable and appropriate security throughout the chain is essential to ensure safe and efficient delivery." The Administration has not only failed to remediate existing vulnerabilities, but used its regulatory powers to permit unwarranted new risk. [Reference RL32205, GAO-08-141].

    Pipeline Security. The Administration has failed to effectively implement laws promoting safety and security of the nearly half a million oil and gas transmission pipelines that crisscross the United States. According to the Department of Transportation, there were 283 significant oil pipeline and gas transmission accidents in 2007. New Yorkers know this risk well: In June 2007, federal officials arrested members of a terrorist group planning to attack jet fuel pipelines and storage tanks at the John F. Kennedy International Airport. While professional law enforcement officers deserve praise for such operations, the Administration more broadly has failed to implement important provisions of the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (PL 110-53) and other laws. In 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) implemented a Corporate Security Review (CSR) program to determine compliance with federal security regulations, but it had completed just 73 CSR reviews by February 2008. In 2006, Congress responded to major pipeline incidents, such as the BP oil pipeline spill in March 2006 that caused a partial shutdown of the Prudhoe Bay area oil field in Alaska, by enacting the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006 ("PIPES Act"). The PIPES Act set rulemaking deadlines in important areas-such as for pipeline integrity management, for low-stress hazardous liquid pipelines affecting Unusually Sensitive Areas (such as the BP pipeline that caused the Prudhoe Bay incident), and for pipeline control systems-that the Administration failed to meet.

    Chemical Security- C+

    Chemical Plant Security-There are 15,000 hazardous facilities in the United States, over a hundred of which, if attacked, would threaten more than one million people. Some progress has been made towards securing chemical facilities, but the weaknesses that remain continue to be targets for terrorists. The Bush Administration has taken the approach of letting most chemical plants upgrade "voluntarily" and has not placed strict requirements on some of the most vulnerable plants to make security upgrades.

    The Department of Homeland Security recently released an interim final rule regarding the security of chemical facilities. The regulations require chemical facilities in possession of certain amounts and types of chemical substances considered hazardous by the DHS Secretary to notify DHS. However, only a small subset of chemical facilities that are deemed "high-risk" by the DHS Secretary are required to meet security standards, leaving most facilities vulnerable to attack (CRS Report for Congress, "Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress," 1/10/2008, RL33847).

    While DHS has the primary mission to develop, test, and certify chemical detection equipment it does not independently validate detection sensitivities of commercially available equipment. Moreover, DHS has required few performance standards for chemical detection equipment, falling behind the pace set in the marketplace. According to DHS, currently used chemical detection equipment is inadequate in identifying the presence of chemical agents at less than lethal but still harmful levels (Government Accountability Office, "First Responders' Ability to Detect and Model Hazardous Releases in Urban Areas Is Significantly Limited," 6/27/08, GAO-08-180).
    Comprehensive regulations are still lacking concerning the security of drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities that house hazardous chemicals (such as chlorine gas). Security of these facilities has been deemed a responsibility of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by President Bush. Nonetheless, DHS and the EPA have yet to enter into the comprehensive memorandum of understanding defining the relationship and responsibilities of the two agencies with regard to securing critical infrastructure directed by Congress in 2005 (CRS Report for Congress, "Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure Sector," 7/28/2008, RL32189).

    Nuclear Security- B-

    Nuclear Security-The threat of terrorism still looms at nuclear facilities in the United States. It is imperative that the United States protect these plants by securing radioactive sources and sites and by deploying accurate detectors at ports of entry within the country. Improved security is far behind schedule and security contractors are performing poorly.

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is lagging far behind on responding to the threat of terrorism. Improved licensing and tracking systems for radioactive materials are years behind schedule, and the NRC has made poor progress on strengthening the licensing process to ensure that dangerous substances do not enter the wrong hands. (Government Accountability Office, "NRC and DHS Need to Take Additional Steps to Better Track and Detect Radioactive Materials," 6/19/08, GAO-08-59

    Nuclear power plant security is another outstanding concern, due to poor performances by security contractors and the NRC's continuing failure to require plants to be secured against aircraft attacks. (Congressional Research Service, "Nuclear Power Plant Security and Vulnerabilities," 1/18/0

    At our borders and ports, development of the next generation of radiation portal monitors remains bogged down and over budget. (Washington Post, "Radiation Detector Plan Falls Short," 9/4/0 Moreover, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents lack needed detection equipment and are not properly trained regarding rules on radioactive materials entering the country. In fact, an independent study found that CBP admitted large shipments of radioactive sources into the country without license verification, in violation of current rules. (Government Accountability Office, "NRC and DHS Need to Take Additional Steps to Better Track and Detect Radioactive Materials," 6/19/08, GAO-08-59

    GRANTS FUNDING- D

    Grants Funding- Though DHS has remained consistent in the amount of homeland security grant funding it awards to high-risk municipalities like New York City, it has never been able to both cover the costs associated with keeping our cities security and recouping years of cuts.

    The Administration continued to woefully underfund crucial state and local homeland security programs. For FY2009, the Administration proposed drastic funding cuts to these programs, gutting 11 of the 16 major state and local homeland security assistance programs. The cuts represent over a $1 billion reduction from FY2008 funding levels to critical programs. For example, the State Homeland Security Grant Program was cut by $690 million, Public Transportation Security Assistance and Railroad Security Assistance was cut by $225 million and Port Security Grants were cut by $190 million.

    In FY2008, while funding for the Urban Area Security Initiative did not decrease, New York City still only received 18% of the total pot, compared to the 25% it received in 2005.

    Improvements Expected in the Next Year:

    Congress has taken steps to restore funding cuts made by the Administration to state and local programs in the Department of Homeland Security. In June, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved an FY2009 DHS appropriation of $3.03 billion for state and local programs, which is $1.13 billion more than the President's budget request of $1.90 billion.

    For the upcoming year, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended increasing the overall UASI appropriation for FY2009 to $825 million, just below the FY2005 amount of $833 million. This is a great improvement over the last three years, demonstrating again the Democrats' commitment to homeland security.

    http://www.wivb.com/Global/story.asp?S=8991653
    -------------------------

    This is a great improvement over the last three years, demonstrating again the Democrats' commitment to homeland security.
    BALONEY!!! TO THE DEMOCRATS AND CONGRESS AND BUSH:
    OUR PORTS AND BORDERS REMAIN WIDE OPEN! THANKS TO A THEIR INEPTITUDE AND A "DO NOTHING CONGRESS" WE HAVE VERY SLOW PROGRESS IN NATIONAL SECURITY. ADD NEAR BANKRUPTCY OF THIS COUNTRY ON TOP OF IT AND YOU SEE WHAT LOUSEY LEADERSHIP WE HAVE ELECTED INTO OFFICE.

  2. #2
    working4change
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    What an impressive report?!

  3. #3
    Senior Member vmonkey56's Avatar
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    Protecting American jobs from legal immigration "F" -

    Hire Americans First Bill needed
    Join our efforts to Secure America's Borders and End Illegal Immigration by Joining ALIPAC's E-Mail Alerts network (CLICK HERE)

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