Thread: 2 Billion Dollar Loss By JP Morgan A Preview Of Collapse Of The Derivatives Market

The 2 Billion Dollar Loss By JP Morgan Is Just A Preview Of The Coming Collapse Of The Derivatives Market

May 11th, 2012
12 comments


When news broke of a 2 billion dollar trading loss by JP Morgan, much of the financial world was absolutely stunned.

But the truth is that this is just the beginning.

This is just a very small preview of what is going to happen when we see the collapse of the worldwide derivatives market.

When most Americans think of Wall Street, they think of a bunch of stuffy bankers trading stocks and bonds. But over the past couple of decades it has evolved into much more than that.

Today, Wall Street is the biggest casino in the entire world.

When the "too big to fail" banks make good bets, they can make a lot of money.

When they make bad bets, they can lose a lot of money, and that is exactly what just happened to JP Morgan.

Their Chief Investment Office made a series of trades which turned out horribly, and it resulted in a loss of over 2 billion dollars over the past 40 days. But 2 billion dollars is small potatoes compared to the vast size of the global derivatives market.

It has been estimated that the the notional value of all the derivatives in the world is somewhere between 600 trillion dollars and 1.5 quadrillion dollars. Nobody really knows the real amount, but when this derivatives bubble finally bursts there is not going to be nearly enough money on the entire planet to fix things.

Sadly, a lot of mainstream news reports are not even using the word "derivatives" when they discuss what just happened at JP Morgan. This morning I listened carefully as one reporter described the 2 billion dollar loss as simply a "bad bet".

And perhaps that is easier for the American people to understand. JP Morgan made a series of really bad bets and during a conference call last night CEO Jamie Dimon admitted that the strategy was "flawed, complex, poorly reviewed, poorly executed and poorly monitored".

The funny thing is that JP Morgan is considered to be much more "risk averse" than most other major Wall Street financial institutions are.

So if this kind of stuff is happening at JP Morgan, then what in the world is going on at some of these other places?

That is a really good question.

For those interested in the technical details of the 2 billion dollar loss, an article posted on CNBC described exactly how this loss happened....

The failed hedge likely involved a bet on the flattening of a credit derivative curve, part of the CDX family of investment grade credit indices, said two sources with knowledge of the industry, but not directly involved in the matter. JPMorgan was then caught by sharp moves at the long end of the bet, they said. The CDX index gives traders exposure to credit risk across a range of assets, and gets its value from a basket of individual credit derivatives.

In essence, JP Morgan made a series of bets which turned out very, very badly. This loss was so huge that it even caused members of Congress to take note. The following is from a statement that U.S. Senator Carl Levin issued a few hours after this news first broke....

"The enormous loss JPMorgan announced today is just the latest evidence that what banks call 'hedges' are often risky bets that so-called 'too big to fail' banks have no business making."

Unfortunately, the losses from this trade may not be over yet. In fact, if things go very, very badly the losses could end up being much larger as a recent Zero Hedge article detailed....

Simple: because it knew with 100% certainty that if things turn out very, very badly, that the taxpayer, via the Fed, would come to its rescue. Luckily, things turned out only 80% bad. Although it is not over yet: if credit spreads soar, assuming at $200 million DV01, and a 100 bps move, JPM could suffer a $20 billion loss when all is said and done. But hey: at least "net" is not "gross" and we know, just know, that the SEC will get involved and make sure something like this never happens again.

And yes, the SEC has announced an "investigation" into this 2 billion dollar loss. But we all know that the SEC is basically useless. In recent years SEC employees have become known more for watching pornography in their Washington D.C. offices than for regulating Wall Street.

But what has become abundantly clear is that Wall Street is completely incapable of policing itself. This point was underscored in a recent commentary by Henry Blodget of Business Insider....

Wall Street can't be trusted to manage—or even correctly assess—its own risks.

This is in part because, time and again, Wall Street has demonstrated that it doesn't even KNOW what risks it is taking.

In short, Wall Street bankers are just a bunch of kids playing with dynamite.

There are two reasons for this, neither of which boil down to "stupidity."

• The first reason is that the gambling instruments the banks now use are mind-bogglingly complicated. Warren Buffett once described derivatives as "weapons of mass destruction." And those weapons have gotten a lot more complex in the past few years.

• The second reason is that Wall Street's incentive structure is fundamentally flawed: Bankers get all of the upside for winning bets, and someone else—the government or shareholders—covers the downside.

The second reason is particularly insidious. The worst thing that can happen to a trader who blows a huge bet and demolishes his firm—literally the worst thing—is that he will get fired. Then he will immediately go get a job at a hedge fund and make more than he was making before he blew up the firm.

We never learned one of the basic lessons that we should have learned from the financial crisis of 2008.

Wall Street bankers take huge risks because the risk/reward ratio is all messed up.

If the bankers make huge bets and they win, then they win big.

If the bankers make huge bets and they lose, then the federal government uses taxpayer money to clean up the mess.

Under those kind of conditions, why not bet the farm?


Sadly, most Americans do not even know what derivatives are.
Most Americans have no idea that we are rapidly approaching a horrific derivatives crisis that is going to make 2008 look like a Sunday picnic.

According to the Comptroller of the Currency, the "too big to fail" banks have exposure to derivatives that is absolutely mind blowing. Just check out the following numbers from an official U.S. government report....

JPMorgan Chase - $70.1 Trillion
Citibank - $52.1 Trillion
Bank of America - $50.1 Trillion
Goldman Sachs - $44.2 Trillion

So a 2 billion dollar loss for JP Morgan is nothing compared to their total exposure of over 70 trillion dollars.
Overall, the 9 largest U.S. banks have a total of more than 200 trillion dollars of exposure to derivatives. That is approximately 3 times the size of the entire global economy.

It is hard for the average person on the street to begin to comprehend how immense this derivatives bubble is.

So let's not make too much out of this 2 billion dollar loss by JP Morgan.

This is just chicken feed.

This is just a preview of coming attractions.

Soon enough the real problems with derivatives will begin, and when that happens it will shake the entire global financial system to the core.




Help Make A Difference By Sharing These Articles On Facebook, Twitter And Elsewhere

The 2 Billion Dollar Loss By JP Morgan Is Just A Preview Of The Coming Collapse Of The Derivatives Market

JP Morgan Suffers ‘Massive’ Losses: $4.2 Billion Probable; May Spread to Entire Sector


JPMorgan Woes Signal Trouble for Banks, Market: Fast Pros


Published: Thursday, 10 May 2012 | 5:38 PM ET
By: Lee Brodie

In the wake of a stunning after-hours announcement from JPMorgan Chase, the Fast Money traders say you may need to re-evaluate everything.

In an unexpected after-hours call with investors, CEO Jamie Dimon saidJPMorgan [JPM 36.96 -3.78 (-9.28%) ] was facing massive losses — losses of $4.2 billion were reasonably possible, he said — with trading losses totaling $800 million in the second quarter.

Dimon also said it could take until the end of the year to restructure the portfolio.

Although information was still coming together at the time of writing, the Fast Money traders say developments look like they’re a game changer.

“This is the last thing the financials [XLF 14.81 -0.17 (-1.13%) ] need,” said trader Steve Grasso.

(JPM) 36.96 -3.78 (-9.28%%) NYSE

“It’s going to raise questions — not only at JPMorgan, but across the entire industry,” added Joe Terranova. “It makes me wonder if there are other portfolios that need to be marked to market. Money pros will ask, what is the impact? And how far does it extend? Who else holds what appears to be lousy paper?”

And in this kind of environment, money pros tend to sell first and ask questions later.

“I will dump my (Bank of America) [BAC 7.55 -0.15 (-1.95%) ] on this news,” Terranova said.

“I can almost guarantee it’s not just JPMorgan,” added trader Guy Adami.

“JPMorgan looks like it’s going to bring down the entire space,” said Steve Grasso.

In other words, all the traders are expecting financials to selloff broadly on Friday.

(XLF) 14.81 -0.17 (-1.13%%) NYSE Arca

“The sector hasn’t been doing well anyway,” explained Steve Grasso. “The group has been breaking down. This feels like it could be a nail in the coffin.”

And it's not just these developments that will likely weigh on banks stocks.

Trader Keith McCullough pointed to another big risk in the space. “Chatter on the Street says Morgan Stanley [MS 14.95 -0.65 (-4.17%) ] is looking at a rating downgrade,” he said. That certainly doesn’t help.

If the financials do plunge on Friday, because the market is already nervous, Guy Adami cautioned that the ripple from this development could take the entire market down.

The level “1340 is now the bogie in the S&P 500 [.SPX 1353.39 -4.60 (-0.34%) ] — if the S&P breaks that level, you should revaluate everything you own,” Adami said.

Terranova agreed: “The revelation of this news in a market that’s already teetering on a breakdown is a big problem.”

If you’re very short-term, trader Jon Najarian sees a trade. He’s a buyer of JPMorgan on the decline against a short position in Goldman Sachs [GS 102.13 -4.19 (-3.94%) ] .” (NOTE: This is a trade.)

If you’re a retail investor pro trader, Steve Grasso said stay away. "Retail investors can't move as quickly as DocJ."
If you're a buy and hold investor, Keith McCullough said the decline is not an opportunity. “It’s cheap, but value will not be a catalyst here,” he said.

— Posted by CNBC’s Lee Brodie

News Headlines

So... another $2.1 billion just got Corzined?

Fitch Downgrades JPM To A+, Watch Negative

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 05/11/2012 16:30 -040

Update: now S&P is also one month behind Egan Jones: JPMorgan Chase & Co. Outlook to Negative From Stable by S&P. Only NRSRO in pristinely good standing is Moodys, and then the $2.1 billion margin call will be complete.
So it begins, even as it explains why the Dimon announcement was on Thursday - why to give the rating agencies the benefit of the Friday 5 o'clock bomb of course:

• JPMorgan Cut by Fitch to A+/F1; L-T IDR on Watch Negative

What was the one notch collateral call again? And when is the Morgan Stanley 3 notch cut coming? Ah yes:



So... another $2.1 billion just got Corzined? Little by little, these are adding up.



Oh and guess who it was that downgraded JPM exactly a month ago. Who else but SEC public enemy number one: Egan-Jones:

Synopsis: Reliance on prop trading and inv bkg income remain. LLR declines (down $1.7B QoQ and $3.87B YoY) offset DVA losses in the investment bank. Wholesale loans were up 23% YoY and 2% QoQ. Middle Mkt, Cmml Term, Corp Client and Cmml Real Estate lending increased by 9%, 2%, 16% and 19% YoY. Middle Mkt and Corp lending was up 2% and 3% QoQ respectively, while Cmml Term, and Cmml Real Estate lending were down 2%, and 9% respectively. Card and consumer loans were down 2% and 5% YoY respectively (down 5% and 1% QoQ respectively). Non accruals are up 14% QoQ due to weakness in JPM's student loan portfolio. Reserve coverage is good and capital is adequate. We believe JPM will experience further weakness in its retail portfolio due to a softening economy. We are downgrading.

Full Fitch "analysis":
FITCH DOWNGRADES JPMORGAN TO 'A+/F1'; L-T IDR ON WATCH NEGATIVE

Fitch Ratings-New York-11 May 2012: Fitch Ratings has downgraded JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s (JPM) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'A+' from 'AA-' and its Short-term IDR to 'F1' from 'F1+'. Fitch has placed all parent and subsidiary long-term ratings on Rating Watch Negative.

Fitch has also downgraded JPM's viability rating (VR) to 'a+' from 'aa-' and placed it on Rating Watch Negative. In addition, Fitch affirmed JPM's '1'
support rating and 'A' support rating floor. A full list of rating actions follows at the end of this release.

The rating actions follow JPM's disclosure yesterday of a $2 billion trading loss on its synthetic credit positions in its Chief Investment Office (CIO). The positions were intended to hedge JPM's overall credit exposure, particularly during periods of credit stress.

Fitch views the size of loss as manageable. That said, the magnitude of the loss and ongoing nature of these positions implies a lack of liquidity. It also raises questions regarding JPM's risk appetite, risk management framework, practices and oversight; all key credit factors. Fitch believes the potential reputational risk and risk governance issues raised at JPM are no longer consistent with an 'AA-' rating.

Still, at the 'A+' level JPM's ratings continue to reflect its dominant domestic franchise as well as its solid and growing international franchise in investment banking and commercial banking. Capital remains sound and compares well with global peers, providing the bank with sufficient cushion to absorb a material idiosyncratic loss event. Fitch believes JPM continues to be well prepared to meet the minimum standards under Basel III.


Like other global trading and universal banks (GTUBs), the complexity of JPM's operations makes it difficult to fully assess the risk exposure. This trading loss is precisely the kind of risk factor inherent in the GTUB business model.
Fitch believes JPM, like other GTUBs, is in a highly confidence sensitive business and the longer-term implications for the firm's reputation are not yet known. As a result, Fitch believes JPM's ratings remain at heightened risk for downgrade until the firm's risk governance practices, appetite, oversight and reputational impact can be further reviewed.

In addition, ongoing volatility and further losses are likely to arise from these positions as the firm unwinds them, creating some uncertainty. The firm's Value at Risk (VaR) methodology was also changed in first-quarter 2012 (1Q'12) but subsequently reverted back to the original methodology. This resulted in a near doubling of VaR to $170 million, from 4Q'11 VaR of $88 million. The variance emanated from the CIO VaR and a negative $47 million diversification benefit. Fitch believes this also highlights some problems with modeling related to this portfolio.

Resolution of the Rating Watch Negative will conclude upon a further review of how JPM has addressed what Fitch views to be risk management and oversight deficiencies that allowed such a loss to occur. Fitch will also attempt to assess the future earnings and capital impact from these exposures. Fitch will also review the potential implications for market confidence in JPMand reputational damage as a result of this loss on both its liquidity profile and counterparty and dealings.

Fitch believes the Rating Watch resolution could result in a further downgrade of one notch if the risks are not appropriately sized and addressed. The complexity and opacity of these positions may also result in lingering concerns around the firm.

A return to a Stable Outlook will be dependent upon Fitch's ability to gain comfort with the risk management concerns, potential ongoing nature of these synthetic credit positions and volatility they may create, as well as the reputation issues raised.

Fitch has placed all of the ratings below (with the exception of the short-term and commercial paper ratings) on Rating Watch Negative.

Fitch Downgrades JPM To A+, Watch Negative | ZeroHedge

Is JPM Staring At Another $3 Billion Loss?



Submitted by Tyler Durden on 05/10/2012 21:08 -0400

"[The trading loss] plays right into the hands of a whole bunch of pundits.... - Jamie Dimon

There are a lot of moving parts in the Dismal tale of Dimon's demise. The starting point is that Bruno Iksil in the JPMorgan CIO Office, under the premise of hedging the bank's credit portfolio's tail risk had placed various tranche trades (levered credit positions with various risk profiles) in the only liquid tranche market that still exists - CDX Series 9 (an 'orrible portfolio of credits with an initial maturity at the end of 2012). These positions were low cost (steepeners or equity-mezz) but needed a certain amount of day to day care and maintenance (adjusting hedges and so on). As the market rallied, the positions required increasing amounts of protection be sold to maintain hedges (akin to buying into a rally more and more as it rises). His large size in the market left a mark however that hedge funds tried to fix - that was his index trading was making the index extremely rich (expensive) relative to intrinsics (fair-value).
This is the 10Y IG9 credit index (dark blue) and its fair-value (light blue) and the difference or skew (orange). What is clear is that the index remained massively rich to its fair-value through this period (red oval) and it was not until the last two months or so that the skew (red arrow) began to compress as perhaps Iksil got the nod and more and more people realized the arb...(or understood from where the technical pressure was coming in the index rallying)...



Hedge funds began to try to arb this position and got frustrated at the lack of convergence - and this is how we initially got to hear about Bruno Iksil - the London Whale - since those funds suggested someone was 'cornering' the index market in credit.

Critically - this is akin to looking at the 500 names in the S&P 500 - weighting them and seeing the S&P 500 index should trade at 1200 but it is trading at 1400 so you sell the index 'knowing' that the index is mispriced - (this never occurs in stocks since they are instantly and everywhere arbed between the index and its components - but can occur in credit because of illiquidity or in this case flow - what we call 'technicals').

This was very evident when one looks at the net notional being soaked up by the Whale and this 'hedge' position had clearly grown extremely large as it became a momentum trade not a hedge (at which time we suspect Iksil started to lose control). In early April, as news of this broke across the market, the credit and equity markets were beginning to quiver again at European contagion and US macro data and as a proxy for the volatility JPM must have been feeling we can see very significant (2-3 sigma) swings in the credit index they held. This would more than likely have triggered a risk manager to come along and look over the trader's shoulder - suggesting humbly that he exit/hedge/don't panic.

This is IG9 10Y spreads (upper pane) and their rate of change (lower pane) - (h/t @swaptions for idea) and as is clear the 3-sigma multiple day move likely scared a few risk managers (and Iksil) into fessing up...



Evidence from the HY market suggests that the trader used more liquid on-the-run indices to hedge as the spread of the HY18 credit index blew notably wider relative to intrinsics and net notionals dropped modestly. The market calmed down a little and it appeared from net notionals and the index skews that he tried again last week to unwind some more of the huge position that had clearly tripped various risk limits and VaR controls. This is where we find ourselves now - the net notionals remain huge (and implicitly on JPM's shooulders), his lack of selling has left the credit index maybe 20bps rich to where it might trade given its rough correlation with the S&P 500 and this would imply at least $3bn of losses already in addition at fair-value.

As is evident, IG9 credit index and the S&P 500 have moved in a very correlated manner - and IG9 net notionals (the amount outstanding in IG9 CDS) has risen alongside these moves as JPM built a bigger and bigger longer and longer credit position. The red vertical arrow shows the current dislocation if one assumes the cessation of Iksil's unwind efforts stalled IG9's selloff - which is the $3bn loss that remains to be seen and the black dotted line is an indication of the kind of notional unwind that would occur - which with a market moving as it is - would be highly disjointing.



Of course, the situation is far worse because 1) any efforts to unwind such a huge position will lead to the market yawning wide and swallowing him in illiquid bid-ask spreads; and 2) the rest of the world knows their position - so why would the hedge funds not push their position. Perhaps this explains why JPMorgan's CDS has remained relatively wide while its exuberant stock price shot up on stress-test ebullience - only to plummet back to CDS reality this evening. Critically, JPM will need to use whatever method they can to hedge this now over-hedged and over-long position - which likely means credit instruments such as JNK, HYG, HY18, and IG18 will all get their share of strange attraction as the trader mispriced not just the basis risk (the volatility between the hedge and its underlying) but the attraction of running with a trend when you have a bottomless pit of money to cover it - until now.

It is already evident in the on-the-run liquid indices - HY18 for instance has exploded wider twice now - in line with the net notional reduction and hedging moves from JPM's IG9 position...



This chart somewhat relates to the IG9 skew chart above in that it represents how far above 'fair' the spread of the index trades relative to the underlying names - the spikes show that there was huge technical demand for the index protection relative to the underlying risk of the portfolio.
and perhaps there was already concern in the market with regard JPM's counterparty risk or exposure from hedgies' trades as CDS has been far less exuberant than stocks...



Of course noone knows for sure what exact positions Iksil had on - though it is clear what hedging he needed to do to manage his hedges. As Peter Tchir ( @TFMkts ) noted this evening - perhaps this mark-to-model irregularity is what the Fed discovered and gathered all the banks last week to ascertain just who has what exposure to whom? As we tweeted earlier, perhaps Iksil just got carried away - and please understand that while CDS do indeed provide leverage, so do many other financial instruments - it is not the instrument that caused this - it is the trader as "you don't hedge risk when you bet on momentum continuing you idiot!"

Addendum - VaR is almost entirely useless as a risk statistic in regard to the kind of highly non-linear positions that we are talking about here and so the doubling of JPM's VaR suggests the tail-risk (or conditional VaR) is considerably larger.

Is JPM Staring At Another $3 Billion Loss? | ZeroHedge

What Was The Ultimate Cause Of JP Morgan's Big Derivative Bust? The Shocker - Ben Bernanke!!!


Submitted by Reggie Middleton on 05/14/2012 06:56 -0400

S&P and Fitch finally downgrade JP Morgan, 3 years after my initial multimedia warnings (see Listen Carefully... for the details). Unfortunately, despite threats and ruminations, these rating agencies again act in retrospect, failing to do anything but remind stakeholders of the losses they have already taken rather than assisting them in avoiding losses.
So, what are the rating agencies missing? They're missing the fact that nearly all of the big money center banks are doing exactly what JPM was doing and they have no one to rely upon but themselves when things go awry from a counterparty perspective. Bennie Bernanke has instituted perpetual ZIRP, and as such has basically broken the banking business in his attempt to save it. Through ZIRP, banks simply cannot make money doing things that traditional banks do, ex. profit from lending. As such, they reach for yield, and that's just the conservative ones. The big boys take baseball bats swinging for home runs, either consciously or subconsciously sanguine in the protection of the Bernanke flavored taxpayer put under their respective businesses. With such protection, already historically proven, bank managers are getting progressively more aggressive and increasingly less aware of the term "RISK adjusted reward" as they simply seek rewards. Alas, I'm getting ahead of myself, let me explain...
The JPM prop desk that held the losses which generated headlines earlier this week was marketed as a hedging operation when we all know it was anything but. What it was was a concerted grasp for yield and profit in a ZIRP environment where JPM (one of the world's largest congregations of interest bearing assets) was bearing effectively no interest.


Banks need to make money too, hence when there's no money to be made in traditional FI yields, the banks start reaching, and they tend to start reaching farther as desperation to make the next quarter mounts in the face of BoomBustBlog reading investors who may be able to see past earnings stuffing stemming from less than prudent reserve releases consistent underprovisioning.
The BoomBustBlog subscriber document JPM Q1 2011 Review & Analysis illustrates the point of JPM's waning ability to make money by making loans and holding debt with perfect clarity, and did so a year in advance....So, what do you do if you're a bank but you can't make money lending? You gamble, that's what you do! It's not like JPM hasn't gambled before, and it's not like they haven't lost money gambling...I put out what I consider to be some of the best predictive research available. I also put an inordinate amount of info out for absolutely free, particularly in the case of those big names as in the employer of Voldemort. For those who have not read my seminal piece on Dimon's house of Morgan, JPM Public Excerpt of Forensic Analysis Subscription published nearly three years ago, allow me to take the liberty to excerpt it for you...Hmmm... Tell me if you get stuff like this from the rating agencies.... This is a good time to bring up that Interesting Documentary on the Power of Rating Agencies, with Reggie Middleton Excerpts
Continuing my rant on the effectiveness (not) of the ratings agencies, I bring to you an interesting documentary on the rating agencies' effect on the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, produced by VPRO Tegenlicht out of Amsterdam. You can see the full video here, but only about half of it is in English. I appear in the following spots: 4:00, 22:30, 40:00... Reggie Middleton Discussing the Rating Agencies effect on Sovereign Europe

The next post on this topic will outline and illustrate several banks whom the agencies need to downgrade NOW, as in RIGHT NOW. These banks are, of course, JPM counterparties. In the meantime and in between time, follow me:

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 

Here's a subscription dump of our archives for JPM to placate the insatiable thirst of the BoomBustBlog paid subscriber:JPM Q1 2011 Review & Analysis

JPM 3Q 2010 Forensic Update
JPM Public Excerpt of Forensic Analysis Subscription
JPM Restricted Stock scheme
JPM 2Q10 review
JPM 1Q 2010 Valuation Review
JPM 4Q09 review
JPM Report (092209) Final - Professional09/24/2009
JPM Forensic Report (092209) Final- Retail
JPM Option Analysis


What Was The Ultimate Cause Of JP Morgan's Big Derivative Bust? The Shocker - Ben Bernanke!!! | ZeroHedge