Thread: Constitutional Law Conversation .... Alberto Gonzales ;)

Originally Posted by CrocketsGhost

[1] Strother, you are as redundant as you are inaccurate. Generally speaking, published case law in commerce DOES NOT include cases tossed out on jurisdictional grounds. Since you are so demanding of a precedent, why don't YOU provide an example of commercial case law in which a case was tossed out purely on jurisdictional grounds related to subject matter jurisdiction?

[2] You also ignore that it is not uncommon for certain cases that do not go to open trial to be sealed. This has happened in a number of cases in which an associate of mine in Ohio has acted as legal counsel. The rules are much different under the commercial jurisdiction than they were under our old system of substantive due process which, for example, why judges in such courts have been known to threaten contempt of court if the process of jury nullification is mentioned to a jury. It is also why jury nullification is precluded in the jury instructions in most of our courts today.

[3] Your counterclaim in item [3] is entirely presumptive, and you even admit that you have no idea of the circumstance of the ruling. Nevertheless, the FACT of the ruling and its effect are clear. Once one has entered a plea he has accepted jurisdiction of the court in question. What's more, you call it an "ancient" case as if temporal proximity has anything to do with validity. Ah, but then if you were aware of the fact that the creation of the domestic commercial jurisdiction obviated many of the common law decisions before 1937, then and only then would your comment make sense. But if that is the case, then your entire harangue is disingenuous because that would mean that you KNOW that a new jurisdiction not bound by earlier federal court precedent (before FDR's Federal Rules Act) exists. And of course we have established this many times in the past.

If you want to continue the discussion, then do so via PM. I am not going to further hijack or disrupt this thread, whose subject is Alberto Gonzales.

Did you just call me "Strother"?

Onward. You now attempt to bail from my correction of you, wanting to hide in PMs, claiming that my need to correct you would be a disruption of the thread which is about Alberto Gonzales.

The thing is, it was you who initiated this bizarre, unfactual, but humorous UCC tangent, whereby you sought explain Gonzales's "real" motivation, and how the UCC thus allegedly erodes the Bill of Rights, bears on matters pertaining to habeas corpus, and results in the application of the Bill of Rights to only select Americans.

I am your correction. I am trying to get the topic back to what was initially raised in the inaugural post about Alberto Gonzales, and, by correcting you, away from your conspiracy theories which you can support by precisely NO CITES to any legal authority, whatsoever.

[1] Are you kidding me? You're obviously not a lawyer or even a law student. Judicial dockets and the case law are RIFE with commercial cases tossed on jurisdictional grounds, both personal and subject matter. You asked me for an example of such a commercial case, tossed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and, to show you how easy it is, I spent all of 1 minute finding this one, which I randomly picked from the seemingly countless available.

Here, Lockheed's manufacture of the F-22 Raptor involved a series of subcontracts: one to Curtis Wright for the construction of bay doors and one between Curtis Right and Woodward Governor Company for the making of stand testers. A dispute ensued. In relevant and/or interesting part, the 2nd Circuit stated as follows:

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/script...nd/987910.html

WOODWARD GOVERNOR CO v CURTISS-WRIGHT (2nd Cir. 199

"The sole issue is whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. We review the factual findings of the district court on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for clear error, while we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo . See Wake v. United States , 89 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1996). We conclude that Curtiss-Wright is correct, and federal common law does not apply in this breach of contract suit. Because there is no other basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm Judge Covello's dismissal of the complaint."

"In addition, Woodward's argument lacks merit because, ironically, application of state law in this case might actually further the federal interest in uniformity. This breach of contract action, which relates to a contract for the production and sale of goods worth more than $500, would be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). See N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 12A:2-101 et seq . (1997). As its name suggests, the Uniform Commercial Code provides uniform rules of decision in contract cases. [BEHOLD THIS IMMEDIATELY ANTECEDENT LANGUAGE, GHOST. DIDN'T YOU SAY, WITHOUT CITATION OF COURSE, THAT THE UCC WAS NOT DESIGNED TO MAKE UNIFORM THE CONTRACT LAWS OF THE STATES? OF COURSE YOU DID. CONSIDER YOURSELF CORRECTED. AGAIN.] Thus, even if the federal interest in uniformity could support the application of federal common law, New Jersey law does not conflict with, and, indeed, actually promotes, that interest. See I E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 1.9, at 35 (noting that U.C.C. provisions on sales have been adopted in every state but Louisiana)."

There, I met your challenge and provided a cite completely rebutting the point you'd hoped to make in issuance of the challenge. Now. Would kindly attend to the cites I've requested of you? Better yet, just confess that they do not exist. For they don't.

[2] Darn the luck, huh. I stated you could meet the challenge by providing not just a single case cite, but, if you prefer, a reference to a law review article or to one of the treatises, like CJS, AmJur or the ALRs. But would you look at that? You addressed only the case cite aspect of the challenge and, by golly, darn the luck, you suggest they're all "sealed". Hogwash. The sealing of cases is exceptionally, exceedingly rare -- and practically non-existent when it comes to mere commercial disputes. This sentence of yours, "The rules are much different under the commercial jurisdiction than they were under our old system of substantive due process," actually produced laughter in my office. It is just nonsense. Absolute nonsense.

[3] The case you cite, Girty v. Logan, 6 Bush KY 8, was decided no latter than the very early 1800s, I'm guessing, as informed by the style of the designation you give it. And the particular language you quoted is almost certainly in support of the very proposition I've ascribed to it. For it was black letter law back in the day, and, with a twist, in some peculiar circumstances, still viable at present.

But here's what's interesting.

After an admittedly quick examination, I found no instances where the the Kentucky Supreme Court or any of its appellate circuits or any trial court ever cited your case, Girty v. Logan. And I could find no law review articles or legal treatise addressing it.

You know who does address it? Plug the case name, Girty v. Logan, into Google or Findlaw's search function.

Up comes a bunch of conspiracy theory sites, none of them credible or reputable -- just fullofbull.

People who think, for example, that the hidden jurisdiction of the court can be ascertained by looking for any gold fringe on the American flag in the courtroom.

I'm not making this up!

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=%2 ... .+logan%22

http://lawcrawler.findlaw.com/scripts/l ... &sites=all

http://lawcrawler.findlaw.com/scripts/l ... tes=wlegal

http://www.google.com/search?q=%226+Bus ... art=0&sa=N

And that's what distinguishes me from you, Ghost!

You could change all that if you'd just provide one single cite from any legal treatise, law review article, or court of any kind. Which is to say, of course, that you can't change any of it.

Why don't you just admit it, rather than disingenuously contort yourself by typing nonsense.

I mean, we can all see that you have no authority. Nothing. So just admit it.

The balance of your "stuff" in section 3 is indisputably meritless, and, as with your other claims here, without anchor in anything real, in anything demonstrable.

Originally Posted by Bamajdphd

Originally Posted by CrocketsGhost

[1] Strother, you are as redundant as you are inaccurate. Generally speaking, published case law in commerce DOES NOT include cases tossed out on jurisdictional grounds. Since you are so demanding of a precedent, why don't YOU provide an example of commercial case law in which a case was tossed out purely on jurisdictional grounds related to subject matter jurisdiction?

[2] You also ignore that it is not uncommon for certain cases that do not go to open trial to be sealed. This has happened in a number of cases in which an associate of mine in Ohio has acted as legal counsel. The rules are much different under the commercial jurisdiction than they were under our old system of substantive due process which, for example, why judges in such courts have been known to threaten contempt of court if the process of jury nullification is mentioned to a jury. It is also why jury nullification is precluded in the jury instructions in most of our courts today.

[3] Your counterclaim in item [3] is entirely presumptive, and you even admit that you have no idea of the circumstance of the ruling. Nevertheless, the FACT of the ruling and its effect are clear. Once one has entered a plea he has accepted jurisdiction of the court in question. What's more, you call it an "ancient" case as if temporal proximity has anything to do with validity. Ah, but then if you were aware of the fact that the creation of the domestic commercial jurisdiction obviated many of the common law decisions before 1937, then and only then would your comment make sense. But if that is the case, then your entire harangue is disingenuous because that would mean that you KNOW that a new jurisdiction not bound by earlier federal court precedent (before FDR's Federal Rules Act) exists. And of course we have established this many times in the past.

If you want to continue the discussion, then do so via PM. I am not going to further hijack or disrupt this thread, whose subject is Alberto Gonzales.

Did you just call me "Strother"?

Onward. You now attempt to bail from my correction of you, wanting to hide in PMs, claiming that my need to correct you would be a disruption of the thread which is about Alberto Gonzales.

The thing is, it was you who initiated this bizarre, unfactual, but humorous UCC tangent, whereby you sought explain Gonzales's "real" motivation, and how the UCC thus allegedly erodes the Bill of Rights, bears on matters pertaining to habeas corpus, and results in the application of the Bill of Rights to only select Americans.

I am your correction. I am trying to get the topic back to what was initially raised in the inaugural post about Alberto Gonzales, and, by correcting you, away from your conspiracy theories which you can support by precisely NO CITES to any legal authority, whatsoever.

[1] Are you kidding me? You're obviously not a lawyer or even a law student. Judicial dockets and the case law are RIFE with commercial cases tossed on jurisdictional grounds, both personal and subject matter. You asked me for an example of such a commercial case, tossed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and, to show you how easy it is, I spent all of 1 minute finding this one, which I randomly picked from the seemingly countless available.

Here, Lockheed's manufacture of the F-22 Raptor involved a series of subcontracts: one to Curtis Wright for the construction of bay doors and one between Curtis Right and Woodward Governor Company for the making of stand testers. A dispute ensued. In relevant and/or interesting part, the 2nd Circuit stated as follows:

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/script...nd/987910.html

WOODWARD GOVERNOR CO v CURTISS-WRIGHT (2nd Cir. 199

"The sole issue is whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. We review the factual findings of the district court on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for clear error, while we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo . See Wake v. United States , 89 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1996). We conclude that Curtiss-Wright is correct, and federal common law does not apply in this breach of contract suit. Because there is no other basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm Judge Covello's dismissal of the complaint."

"In addition, Woodward's argument lacks merit because, ironically, application of state law in this case might actually further the federal interest in uniformity. This breach of contract action, which relates to a contract for the production and sale of goods worth more than $500, would be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). See N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 12A:2-101 et seq . (1997). As its name suggests, the Uniform Commercial Code provides uniform rules of decision in contract cases. [BEHOLD THIS IMMEDIATELY ANTECEDENT LANGUAGE, GHOST. DIDN'T YOU SAY, WITHOUT CITATION OF COURSE, THAT THE UCC WAS NOT DESIGNED TO MAKE UNIFORM THE CONTRACT LAWS OF THE STATES? OF COURSE YOU DID. CONSIDER YOURSELF CORRECTED. AGAIN.] Thus, even if the federal interest in uniformity could support the application of federal common law, New Jersey law does not conflict with, and, indeed, actually promotes, that interest. See I E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 1.9, at 35 (noting that U.C.C. provisions on sales have been adopted in every state but Louisiana)."

There, I met your challenge and provided a cite completely rebutting the point you'd hoped to make in issuance of the challenge. Now. Would kindly attend to the cites I've requested of you? Better yet, just confess that they do not exist. For they don't.

[2] Darn the luck, huh. I stated you could meet the challenge by providing not just a single case cite, but, if you prefer, a reference to a law review article or to one of the treatises, like CJS, AmJur or the ALRs. But would you look at that? You addressed only the case cite aspect of the challenge and, by golly, darn the luck, you suggest they're all "sealed". Hogwash. The sealing of cases is exceptionally, exceedingly rare -- and practically non-existent when it comes to mere commercial disputes. This sentence of yours, "The rules are much different under the commercial jurisdiction than they were under our old system of substantive due process," actually produced laughter in my office. It is just nonsense. Absolute nonsense.

[3] The case you cite, Girty v. Logan, 6 Bush KY 8, was decided no latter than the very early 1800s, I'm guessing, as informed by the style of the designation you give it. And the particular language you quoted is almost certainly in support of the very proposition I've ascribed to it. For it was black letter law back in the day, and, with a twist, in some peculiar circumstances, still viable at present.

But here's what's interesting.

After an admittedly quick examination, I found no instances where the the Kentucky Supreme Court or any of its appellate circuits or any trial court ever cited your case, Girty v. Logan. And I could find no law review articles or legal treatise addressing it.

You know who does address it? Plug the case name, Girty v. Logan, into Google or Findlaw's search function.

Up comes a bunch of conspiracy theory sites, none of them credible or reputable -- just fullofbull.

People who think, for example, that the hidden jurisdiction of the court can be ascertained by looking for any gold fringe on the American flag in the courtroom.

I'm not making this up!

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=%2 ... .+logan%22

http://lawcrawler.findlaw.com/scripts/l ... &sites=all

http://lawcrawler.findlaw.com/scripts/l ... tes=wlegal

http://www.google.com/search?q=%226+Bus ... art=0&sa=N

And that's what distinguishes me from you, Ghost!

You could change all that if you'd just provide one single cite from any legal treatise, law review article, or court of any kind. Which is to say, of course, that you can't change any of it.

Why don't you just admit it, rather than disingenuously contort yourself by typing nonsense.

I mean, we can all see that you have no authority. Nothing. So just admit it.

The balance of your "stuff" in section 3 is indisputably meritless, and, as with your other claims here, without anchor in anything real, in anything demonstrable.

That cite is exactly the OPPOSITE of what I requested, Strother. It was a case deciding to keep a case in administrative court, which means that there was an administrative plea. What I have been addressing is the case in which an administrative or commercial court does not have venue.

What's hilarious is that you are confused because a case tried in common law (like many rendered before 1937 that are still on the books) is not traceable in an internet search. Many such cases are not indexed in FindLaw because they are not applicable to today's common jurisdictions. Using an old US common law case in a lex mercatorum court is like trying to invoke the COnstitution in an admiralty court, but then you already know that.

Nice try, Strother, and please don't feign ignorance of the username. We know about you, and you failed to mask your identity this time. How cold is it in SD right now?

Here's the question at hand; Does the constitution guarantee the "right" of Habeus Corpus?

Here's my question; At what point did a "privilege" become a "right".
See section 1.9.2 of the constitution. "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."

The Bill of rights (#6) does not address the Writ of Habeas Corpus; as some have argued. See definition of Habeas Corpus.

If it were a "right", would it not have been expressed that way? Or, not addressed at all?

It appears is that we have a question of interpretation; What is perceived and what is actually written. So could it not be that both sides are correct and we will need to see what the SC says about the issue?

Main Entry: 1priv·i·lege
Pronunciation: 'priv-lij, 'pri-v&-
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English, from Anglo-French, from Latin privilegium law for or against a private person, from privus private + leg-, lex law
: a right or immunity granted as a peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor :

http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?va=privilege

Originally Posted by Bogey

Here's the question at hand; Does the constitution guarantee the "right" of Habeus Corpus?

Here's my question; At what point did a "privilege" become a "right".
See section 1.9.2 of the constitution. "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."

The Bill of rights (#6) does not address the Writ of Habeas Corpus; as some have argued. See definition of Habeas Corpus.

If it were a "right", would it not have been expressed that way? Or, not addressed at all?

It appears is that we have a question of interpretation; What is perceived and what is actually written. So could it not be that both sides are correct and we will need to see what the SC says about the issue?

Well, the thing that must be understood is that the Writ of Habeas Corpus is a court order. There is never a right to obtain a court order, which is issued at the discretion of the court. However, under the common law adopted by the United States of America at its inception, the ability to petition for a Writ has largely been construed as one of the unenumerated rights.

In other words, the fact that a given thing is not enumerated in the Bill of Rights does not mean that it is not a common right, nor does the fact of its exercise being constitutionally limited under martial law preclude its being a common right. The issue of its being referred to as a privilege is almost certainly related to the fact that its enjoyment is and always has been predicated on its issuance by a judge or monarch. A right is a thing that may be directly exercised by a citizen (such as the right to petition a judge for a Writ of Habeas Corpus). Anything that is contingent upon the voluntary act of another cannot, by definition, be among the common rights, but rather is a privilege (because it can be blocked by the decision of the other party not to act).

Originally Posted by CrocketsGhost

Originally Posted by Bamajdphd

Originally Posted by CrocketsGhost

[1] Strother, you are as redundant as you are inaccurate. Generally speaking, published case law in commerce DOES NOT include cases tossed out on jurisdictional grounds. Since you are so demanding of a precedent, why don't YOU provide an example of commercial case law in which a case was tossed out purely on jurisdictional grounds related to subject matter jurisdiction?

[2] You also ignore that it is not uncommon for certain cases that do not go to open trial to be sealed. This has happened in a number of cases in which an associate of mine in Ohio has acted as legal counsel. The rules are much different under the commercial jurisdiction than they were under our old system of substantive due process which, for example, why judges in such courts have been known to threaten contempt of court if the process of jury nullification is mentioned to a jury. It is also why jury nullification is precluded in the jury instructions in most of our courts today.

[3] Your counterclaim in item [3] is entirely presumptive, and you even admit that you have no idea of the circumstance of the ruling. Nevertheless, the FACT of the ruling and its effect are clear. Once one has entered a plea he has accepted jurisdiction of the court in question. What's more, you call it an "ancient" case as if temporal proximity has anything to do with validity. Ah, but then if you were aware of the fact that the creation of the domestic commercial jurisdiction obviated many of the common law decisions before 1937, then and only then would your comment make sense. But if that is the case, then your entire harangue is disingenuous because that would mean that you KNOW that a new jurisdiction not bound by earlier federal court precedent (before FDR's Federal Rules Act) exists. And of course we have established this many times in the past.

If you want to continue the discussion, then do so via PM. I am not going to further hijack or disrupt this thread, whose subject is Alberto Gonzales.

Did you just call me "Strother"?

Onward. You now attempt to bail from my correction of you, wanting to hide in PMs, claiming that my need to correct you would be a disruption of the thread which is about Alberto Gonzales.

The thing is, it was you who initiated this bizarre, unfactual, but humorous UCC tangent, whereby you sought explain Gonzales's "real" motivation, and how the UCC thus allegedly erodes the Bill of Rights, bears on matters pertaining to habeas corpus, and results in the application of the Bill of Rights to only select Americans.

I am your correction. I am trying to get the topic back to what was initially raised in the inaugural post about Alberto Gonzales, and, by correcting you, away from your conspiracy theories which you can support by precisely NO CITES to any legal authority, whatsoever.

[1] Are you kidding me? You're obviously not a lawyer or even a law student. Judicial dockets and the case law are RIFE with commercial cases tossed on jurisdictional grounds, both personal and subject matter. You asked me for an example of such a commercial case, tossed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and, to show you how easy it is, I spent all of 1 minute finding this one, which I randomly picked from the seemingly countless available.

Here, Lockheed's manufacture of the F-22 Raptor involved a series of subcontracts: one to Curtis Wright for the construction of bay doors and one between Curtis Right and Woodward Governor Company for the making of stand testers. A dispute ensued. In relevant and/or interesting part, the 2nd Circuit stated as follows:

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/script...nd/987910.html

WOODWARD GOVERNOR CO v CURTISS-WRIGHT (2nd Cir. 199

"The sole issue is whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. We review the factual findings of the district court on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for clear error, while we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo . See Wake v. United States , 89 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1996). We conclude that Curtiss-Wright is correct, and federal common law does not apply in this breach of contract suit. Because there is no other basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm Judge Covello's dismissal of the complaint."

"In addition, Woodward's argument lacks merit because, ironically, application of state law in this case might actually further the federal interest in uniformity. This breach of contract action, which relates to a contract for the production and sale of goods worth more than $500, would be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). See N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 12A:2-101 et seq . (1997). As its name suggests, the Uniform Commercial Code provides uniform rules of decision in contract cases. [BEHOLD THIS IMMEDIATELY ANTECEDENT LANGUAGE, GHOST. DIDN'T YOU SAY, WITHOUT CITATION OF COURSE, THAT THE UCC WAS NOT DESIGNED TO MAKE UNIFORM THE CONTRACT LAWS OF THE STATES? OF COURSE YOU DID. CONSIDER YOURSELF CORRECTED. AGAIN.] Thus, even if the federal interest in uniformity could support the application of federal common law, New Jersey law does not conflict with, and, indeed, actually promotes, that interest. See I E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 1.9, at 35 (noting that U.C.C. provisions on sales have been adopted in every state but Louisiana)."

There, I met your challenge and provided a cite completely rebutting the point you'd hoped to make in issuance of the challenge. Now. Would kindly attend to the cites I've requested of you? Better yet, just confess that they do not exist. For they don't.

[2] Darn the luck, huh. I stated you could meet the challenge by providing not just a single case cite, but, if you prefer, a reference to a law review article or to one of the treatises, like CJS, AmJur or the ALRs. But would you look at that? You addressed only the case cite aspect of the challenge and, by golly, darn the luck, you suggest they're all "sealed". Hogwash. The sealing of cases is exceptionally, exceedingly rare -- and practically non-existent when it comes to mere commercial disputes. This sentence of yours, "The rules are much different under the commercial jurisdiction than they were under our old system of substantive due process," actually produced laughter in my office. It is just nonsense. Absolute nonsense.

[3] The case you cite, Girty v. Logan, 6 Bush KY 8, was decided no latter than the very early 1800s, I'm guessing, as informed by the style of the designation you give it. And the particular language you quoted is almost certainly in support of the very proposition I've ascribed to it. For it was black letter law back in the day, and, with a twist, in some peculiar circumstances, still viable at present.

But here's what's interesting.

After an admittedly quick examination, I found no instances where the the Kentucky Supreme Court or any of its appellate circuits or any trial court ever cited your case, Girty v. Logan. And I could find no law review articles or legal treatise addressing it.

You know who does address it? Plug the case name, Girty v. Logan, into Google or Findlaw's search function.

Up comes a bunch of conspiracy theory sites, none of them credible or reputable -- just fullofbull.

People who think, for example, that the hidden jurisdiction of the court can be ascertained by looking for any gold fringe on the American flag in the courtroom.

I'm not making this up!

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=%2 ... .+logan%22

http://lawcrawler.findlaw.com/scripts/l ... &sites=all

http://lawcrawler.findlaw.com/scripts/l ... tes=wlegal

http://www.google.com/search?q=%226+Bus ... art=0&sa=N

And that's what distinguishes me from you, Ghost!

You could change all that if you'd just provide one single cite from any legal treatise, law review article, or court of any kind. Which is to say, of course, that you can't change any of it.

Why don't you just admit it, rather than disingenuously contort yourself by typing nonsense.

I mean, we can all see that you have no authority. Nothing. So just admit it.

The balance of your "stuff" in section 3 is indisputably meritless, and, as with your other claims here, without anchor in anything real, in anything demonstrable.

[1] That cite is exactly the OPPOSITE of what I requested, Strother. It was a case deciding to keep a case in administrative court, which means that there was an administrative plea. What I have been addressing is the case in which an administrative or commercial court does not have venue.

[2] What's hilarious is that you are confused because a case tried in common law (like many rendered before 1937 that are still on the books) is not traceable in an internet search. Many such cases are not indexed in FindLaw because they are not applicable to today's common jurisdictions. Using an old US common law case in a lex mercatorum court is like trying to invoke the COnstitution in an admiralty court, but then you already know that.

[3] Nice try, Strother, and please don't feign ignorance of the username. We know about you, and you failed to mask your identity this time. How cold is it in SD right now?

You've still not cited a single case, law review article, whether casenote or comment, or anything from the legal treatises, such as CJS, AmJur, or ALR, nor anything from a respected jurist anywhere. Reason: Because your theory is unshared by anyone who knows what they're talking about.

Onward and tally ho!

[1] There's so much so wrong in this section it's difficult to know where to begin. But first, my case is precisely what you'd requested: you wanted to see a commercial law case that had been thrown out of court based solely on subject matter jurisdiction. And, within a minute, I produced a commercial law case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Second, the disposition of the case I cited was NOT that it was "kept in adminsitrative court." You obviously know nothing about this. For an administrative court was present nowhere in this litigation. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals is not an adminstrative court, it's an Article III court, as spelled out in the constitution. Nor is the district court an administrative court; it, too is an Article III court. Administrative courts are those courts run by ALJs (administrative law judges) for settling of various disputes within and among federal departments. State governmental departments also will employ an administrative court for issues involving the state to various degrees. But a contract dispute such as presented here -- and most anywhere -- is not the stuff of a governmental administrative court. Your claim of "administrative plea" is just bizarre. The word "administrative court" and "administrative plea" appear nowhere in the case. And I don't even need to actually do a word search to know that.

Third, you state, "What I have been addressing is the case in which an administrative or commercial court does not have VENUE." You don't even know what venue is. You think it's the same as jurisdiction. It's not. When "venue" comes into issue, "jurisdiction" is generally assumed. The question becomes not whether the court in question has the power to hear this case, but whether it should -- whether it's a suitable venue given the location of witnesses, where the contract was made, all sorts of things. Put it this way, when a motion to change venue is granted, the court itself may even move to another location -- setting up shop elsewhere, for this limited purpose, this one case, so that the case subject to the granted motion for change of venue may be heard elsewhere. Or, try this: as between two courts with jurisdiction over the same matter, one court may be a more suitable place (venue) to hear the matter than the other court. But here they both have jurisdiction, for if they didn't, there'd be just the "one venue" to entertain.

Fourth, there's no such thing as a "commercial court". So what you say you've "been addressing" are things that don't exist. Which has been my point all along. You're making progress!

[2] What are you saying? Where do you get this nonsense? The reporters are chock full of cases even stemming back to before the founding of this country, with 1 U.S. 1, "IN RE ANONYMOUS", a statute of frauds case (which means, commercial law) heard before this country even officially existed. The reason Findlaw hasn't indexed a lot of cases, for example, Kentucky's go back to only about 1998, is because it takes time and money to get them online. Nobody is going to wholesale-ly deem decades, indeed centuries of caselaw, inapplicable, at all, much less by sheer dint of when they were heard, and not put them online for that reason.

[3] Why do you keep calling me "Strother"? I've googled it and pretty much get just the name of an old character actor, who's dead, and the name of a Democratic campaign handling firm.

As for the "SD" I don't appreciate your attempt to place personal information on the Internet. It's more than just bad form, Ghost.

In close, why don't you just confess that you have no cites from any source to back up anything you say on this bizarre theory of yours, where you claim that Alberto Gonzales believes, like you, that somehow the UCC impacts habeas practice and erodes the Bill of Rights and renders inapplicable the Bill of Rights to all but select Americans?

Everyone knows you haven't the foggiest clue.

And it'd be the honest thing to do.

No point trying to hide your identity. You probably thought that no one here would be on the lookout for you and you got sloppy. I will not further entertain one of the most notorious trolls on the internet. The sort of verbal acrobatics you demonstrate here is typical of your empty and endless challenges, and anyone who understands the issue can see right through your rhetoric. My ego is not sufficiently inflated to necessitate a perpetuation of your contentious nonsense. G'bye.

If any of the long-standing members of this forum have serious questions about the subject matter, feel free to PM me.

I have no idea what you're trying to say. Am I supposed to know you?

But, especially on the heels of your serial failures to meet the challenge of simply supporting your bizarre theories with something that exists outside your own mind, I will take your final response as the equivalent of your confession that you have no cite to any authority whatsoever.

Not to a single case, in any court of the land, federal or state.

Not to a single law review comment or casenote in any of the thousands upon thousands of volumes generated by the 175 or so ABA-accredited law schools, each year -- sometimes as much as three times each year, each!

And not to a single legal treatise or hornbook anywhere, including CJS, AmJur, the ALRs, nothing.

There's a causal reason for your failure to so cite. Nothing of the sort exists. Because your UCC-madness is grounded in nothing real.

What I've said's been amply supported. Because what I say reflects reality. And doesn't contort it beyond recognition.

I don't think anyone changed my mind on Alberto...he is a tapeworm..and only a segment of a tapeworm

Originally Posted by redbadger

I don't think anyone changed my mind on Alberto...he is a tapeworm..and only a segment of a tapeworm

Agreed.