Euroland 2012-2016 (Part 3) - Excerpt GEAB N°62 (February 16, 2012) -

3rd Sequence - 2014-2016: Implementation of initiatives for the democratic legitimating of Euroland governance / Euroland and the challenge of the British shipwreck

Returning to European domestic politics, this third sequence (we repeat that in fact the processes will overlap much more) constitutes, according to our team, the most difficult and most important of the three. It’s also that on which a real uncertainty weighs, unlike the other two, which are for our team already written into the course of the events. On one hand, unlike the other two sequences, it requires that the European elite conceive and put into practice a sharing of power with their fellow-citizens, an exercise which generally the elite are always reticent to carry out. On the other, it requires a collective capacity on the part of Euroland leaders to be at the same time modest, daring, courageous and imaginative, four attributes often absent from the elite in power which tends to be arrogant, cold, timid and conformist (1). However, what is certain for our team is that the process of Euroland integration will still be developing at this period end. The big question is that of the nature of the governance which will be put in place at that time and preside over Euroland’s destiny at least until the end of this decade.

The crisis is causing an acceleration of three trends, two of which are contradictory. There is, of course, the acceleration of Euroland integration. It is obvious and lasting because it is placed in a world geopolitical context which doesn’t offer any other alternative to the European states any more. And at the same time, one notes a rapid awakening of the people, who are at the same time satisfied to see that European integration has a capacity to resist the shocks of the global crisis; but who are about to vent their anger in the face of their obvious impotence to influence decisions. These two trends are reinforced by a third, identified from 1998 by Franck Biancheri in his anticipation entitled “Europe 2009 - When the grandsons of Hitler, Pétain, Franco, Mussoloni,… come to power in Europe”, and it is the rise in strength of extreme right-wing parties and ideas in Europe, fed from the European democratic deficit and socio-economic difficulties generated by the crisis.

Contrary to the majority of the analyses on this subject, our team takes the same line as Franck Biancheri’s 1998 analysis: these extremist forces will not call European integration into question. In fact, they can even appear as political back-up useful to a Euroland whose elite would choose the status quo as regards governance, i.e., technocratic management: to technocrats, the European level where true power resides; and to the leaders of the extreme right, the appearance of power at the national political level. This trend is already at work and one will thus note everywhere in Europe that in the years to come, the parties of the extreme right will abandon their anti-Euro rhetoric, thus making themselves available for a possible alliance with the European bureaucratic machine.

Fortunately for those who think that the European project is only meaningful if it’s a step on the endless road of democratization, at this stage, the option which seems most likely to our team isn’t this one. One can regard it as the main risk weighing on the best option, namely a leap ahead as regards democratization of European governance. Because, unlike the EU, Euroland offers an opportunity for real democratization. Indeed, increased integration, the pooling of key policies and the sharing of the aims of this economic and political integration ensure the minimum of a political homogeneity in Euroland necessary for the implementation of common democratic governance. With the United Kingdom in particular, and many states only integrated into the European project very recently, the EU doesn’t allow a platform of common democratic governance to emerge, either because certain states refuse even the concept of political integration, or because in certain countries, the citizens are still very far from realizing the importance of European decisions in their daily life.

With the help of the crisis, Euroland on the contrary offers this double necessary and sufficient condition : elites aware of the fact that they have no other choice than integrate always more, and citizens aware of the fact that European decisions have a greater influence on their futures than national ones. The big meet-up between Euroland and democracy, between Euroland elites and their fellow-citizens will occur between 2014 and 2016.

The six conditions of success for this meet-up are quite simple to identify:
. a short and comprehensible by all draft treaty (about ten pages maximum (2)) defining the major principles and main procedures and institutions of Euroland governance
. a development of this treaty integrating a double process: from the elite to the people and vice-versa, thanks in particular to the Internet. The example of the development of the new Icelandic constitution via the Internet must be seriously analyzed to be able to nourish the European process (3).
. the recourse to new ideas and concepts to avoid the traditional antiquated federalist pitfalls (an example of pseudo good idea: a European president elected by the universal suffrage). Euroland can only be personified by teams, and not by individualists. Thus, European teams and not individuals must be in democratic competition.
. a referendum (4) for one district (Euroland) to avoid the chaos of national ratification as in 2005
. the “debrussellisation” of European governance because Brussels became the symbol of a bureaucracy disconnected from Europeans. To win over Europeans, the geographical organization of European governance will have to be based on a network of the major Euroland metropolises and on mobility of the elite; instead of always stacking up more technocrats and politicians in Brussels, far from where Europeans live.
. at all costs keeping the countries which don’t want to join the Euro, like the United Kingdom or Sweden, out of this process. As they do not want political integration, they would be once again opposed to any democratic advance of governance European.

Under these conditions, the European elite have no reason to be afraid of the people’s reaction, quite the opposite. If they make the bet to equip Euroland with most modern democratic governance (which also implies its development process), LEAP/E2020 is convinced that Eurolanders will be on their side at the hour of the rendezvous with history. It is, we repeat, the most probable option within the framework of this second European renaissance which is being put in place. But, the risk of a retreat by the elite against a tandem of European technocrats/national extremists remains a possibility at this stage. It would lead Euroland down the path of non-democratic regimes and would ultimately considerably reduce Europe’s potential to work towards a better world governance to exit the crisis. On the contrary, it would constitute a decisive step in the direction of an aggravation of the crisis via a confrontation between major regional blocs, a tragic scenario par excellence.

One last point concerning Great Britain. In 2016, it is likely that the Kingdom would be divided more than ever following the Scottish referendum on independence. At the same time, the current failure of the English policy of economic, financial and geopolitical “Sonderweg” or “Exceptionalism”, leads one to think that around 2015/2016 Great Britain will have entered a deep identity crisis. Having refused to offer any European solidarity, at this point in time, London will pay the price of the choices made in 2010/2011. Euroland will calmly wait until the last British illusions have flown away to consider the future stages of the Euroland/England relationship. Scotland, if it chooses independence will, from 2014, have found on the other hand a very warm reception from Euroland.


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Notes:

(1) It is in particular what led to the failure of the whole process of the European constitution project in 2003/2005.

(2) The size of the American Constitution is a good reference

(3) It’s possible to download a very good analysis of the Icelandic case from: Social Science Research Network.

(4) Which will involve a constitutional change, particularly in Germany, to allow recourse to a referendum. Euroland and the crisis will impose changes on all Euroland states.






Jeudi 2 Août 2012

LEAP/E2020

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Euroland 2012-2016 (Part 3)