Gates closed out of China
By Peter J Brown

Just a few days after United States Navy Admiral Robert Willard, commander of the US Pacific Command, departed from Beijing in late May after a face-to-face meeting with Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) general staff, China waved off a visit by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

China announced that this was not a "convenient time" for Gates to visit. Willard's talks with Ma in Beijing were part of the second round of the ongoing China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Willard was there as part of the huge US delegation that was headed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Immediately prior to the dialogue, China had been contemplating two very different expressions of the current state of US-China relations under the Barack Obama administration. The president's 52-page US National Security Strategy (NSS) issued in early May, for example, was an engagement-centric, restrained and diplomatic overview. The NSS spoke of US relations with China using carefully crafted words such as "we will encourage China to make choices that contribute to peace, stability and prosperity as its influence rises". The NSS did not rock the boat and was really not a formal strategy, unless repeating the word "engagement' more than three dozen times is acceptable as such.

A few days after the NSS was unveiled, however, "AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept" (ASB) was presented by four analysts from the Washington DC-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). It was almost a polar opposite of the NSS in its treatment of China.

The ASB, which was 123 pages long and fell just short of being an actual blueprint for an armed confrontation between the countries, made a case for "offsetting actions" on the basis that "the strategic balance in the Western Pacific will become unfavorable and unstable". Missions involving US Navy ships, submarines and the US Air Force (USAF) "in the early days of a war", were examined. [1]

ASB has taken years to evolve, and among other things, ASB is an indicator of the CSBA's growing influence in Gates' inner circle. US Navy Under Secretary Robert Work, a former US Marine Corps artillery colonel, is a former CSBA analyst. A participant on Obama's Pentagon transition team in 2008, Work became the navy's second-highest-ranking civilian in May 2009. He was recently described by Defense News as "a deeply experienced military strategist and wargamer".

Earlier this year, Work described ASB as "focused on one thing and one thing only. Joint operations in an anti-access environment against a high-end competitor who has achieved parity or near-parity in guided weapons warfare and battle networks. So it's very much how the air force and the navy would operate in such an environment to prevail and gain dominance over the opposing battle network."

It could be a regional power who has gotten all sorts of high-end systems from another power," said Work as he put Iran on notice, too. "Air-Sea Battle was secretary-directed to the Air Force and the Navy to say, think about it, how would you go about this problem? And don't come up with separate service solutions, I want you two services to work together like the army and air force did in the 1980s on air-land battle." [2]

Besides working on ASB, CSBA has produced several monographs known as the so-called "Strategy for the Long Haul" series. And in 2008, Work was part of a team that put together one entitled "The Challenge to US National Security" in which chapter two - "Hedging Against a Hostile China" - sets a tone that is all about a form of US engagement with China that is downplayed considerably in the new NSS.

Work's other recent monographs for CSBA include "The US Navy: Charting a Course For Tomorrow's Fleet" that speaks of a "US grand strategy seeking to avoid/deter war with other great powers, and to defeat them if deterrence fails".

"Only the most powerful states, such as China or perhaps Russia, will be able to build battle networks on a scale comparable with the United States," said Work. "Moreover, many of their supporting capabilities will be arrayed throughout the depth and breadth of their large territories.

The navy and the joint force must therefore be prepared to conduct counter-network operations over continent-size landmasses. At the moment, the pacing threat for this preparation is the burgeoning maritime reconnaissance-strike network that China is building in the Western Pacific." [pg 55]

CSBA has always contended that China poses a unique challenge to US forces, something quite "unlike those posed by other US adversaries within the post-Cold War context". CSBA spells out the threat of China's so-called anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and the fact that China will never challenge the US military symmetrically.

This has meant that the US must constantly adapt to successfully deal with China's often novel approach to military power. In mid-2010, CSBA justified ASB by stating, "The US military today faces an emerging major operational challenge, particularly in the Western Pacific Theater of Operations. The PLA's ongoing efforts to field robust A2/AD capabilities are threatening to make US power projection increasingly risky and, in some cases and contexts, prohibitively costly."

"Hence the US's strategic choice: to risk a loss of military access to areas vital to its security - and those of key allies and partners to whom it is committed by treaty or law - or to explore options that can preserve the stable military balance that has seen the region enjoy a period of unparalleled peace and prosperity," said CSBA.

Is the CSBA pushing the PLA in one direction or another in the process? Or is the PLA simply taking all of this in stride?

"This is not to suggest that the United States seeks a confrontation with China, let alone a war. Indeed, even during the period of unparalleled US military dominance following the Cold War, the US sought to engage China, not attack or coerce it," said the CSBA. "A 'roll-back' of the PLA's military power is not the objective here. Nor is containment of China proposed. Rather, we advocate simply offsetting the PLA's unprovoked and unwarranted military buildup."

There is no doubt that "offsetting" and "prevail and gain dominance" mean two different things entirely to the Chinese. The difference in meaning here is especially relevant as the mood inside the White House itself shifts.

United States military officers have recently painted a very compelling picture of what is now underway in Obama's camp. Obama's top advisors are reaching out to the Pentagon in an urgent effort to assemble a collection of covert strike plans that take things a step further than anything allowable under the previous administration.

While this planning is strictly intended for "Special Operations" purposes only - well away from Chinese territory thus far - Obama is perceived as far more receptive today to a "much more aggressive" stance across the board, and he has a very open mind when it comes to a wide range of offensive options. [3]

The US defense secretary who stood in front of photographers and shook hands with General Ma in Singapore in early June at the opening of the latest so-called Shangri-La Dialogue that is an annual Asian military summit held in Singapore, had recently entered a pivotal period in his career, and Gates was viewed by many as a more disruptive force as well, both at home and abroad.

In 2010, Gates expected the top-heavy Pentagon to reduce the number of senior US military officers - too many generals and admirals are under his command - while he grappled with the enormous budgetary constraints created by the US economic downturn that has exerted considerable pressure on the Pentagon's procurement list. Gates also faced another significant problem in the form of a growing number of junior officers in combat zones who are deciding after multiple tours of duty not to continue onto command assignments.

These things weighed heavily on Gates as he signaled his displeasure with China's announcement not to invite him. Only a few minutes before he and Ma posed for photographers, Major General Zhu Chenghu, director general at China's National Defense University, rose to challenge Gates just after he had concluded his speech to the summit. Zhu accused the US of seeing China only as its enemy, in stark contrast to China's preference to see the US as a partner.

Gates vehemently denied that the US considered China as its enemy, but then drew attention to the poor state of military-to-military relations between the two countries. Gates later criticized China for holding up progress in these exchanges over Taiwan or what is in effect "old news".

Ma put the best possible spin on what transpired by describing the closed door in Beijing for Gates as a "temporary" situation. [4] And yet, at the same time, as a report circulated of the pending deployment of a US aircraft carrier to the Yellow Sea - both before and long after Gates was in Singapore - China warned of "the severe consequences such a move would bring".

Gates in turn blamed the PLA leadership alone for being responsible for souring military-to-military relations between the US and China. The unfolding situation with China today is a far cry from the US relationship with Russia that was sustained consistently and in far more volatile circumstances, Gates argued.
"I am disappointed that the PLA leadership has not seen the same potential benefits from this kind of a military-to-military relationship as their own leadership and the US seem to think would be of benefit," said Gates. "The reality is these arms sales [to Taiwan] go back to the beginning of the relationship, and were one of the conditions that came through the congress as part of the normalization process. My opinion [is] that the PLA is significantly less interested in developing this relationship than the political leadership in the country." [5]

Senior Chinese military officers have been eager to criticize Gates, and cannot accept the logic behind his criticism of the PLA. They asked why Gates thought that China should not be offended when the US kept on selling arms to Taiwan, as it has done for 30 years. As far as these officers are concerned, no matter how many times the US keeps repeating or engaging in this activity, China's response has always been consistent and immediate in the form of suspended military-to-military relations.

This exchange raised questions about Willard's trip to Beijing in late May. Did the Chinese Communist Party leadership elect not to block Willard's visit because China did not want to upset and offend the large US delegation prior to the dialogue process?

After all, during his testimony before a US House Armed Services Committee in March on "US Pacific Command Posture", Willard's comments should have caused the Chinese to think twice before allowing him to go to Beijing in the first place, especially as the highest-ranking US military officer to visit Beijing after a long suspension of such visits.

"Reconciling the apparent gap between the PRC's [People's Republic of China's] statements and its observed military capabilities serves to underscore the importance of maintaining open channels of communication and of building toward a continuous dialogue with China's armed forces based on open and substantive discussion of strategic issues," said Willard. "However, that type of frank and candid discussion requires a stable and reliable US-China military-to-military relationship - a relationship that does not yet exist with the PLA."

Willard went on to talk frankly about the US commitment to Taiwan.

"Beijing remains committed to eventual unification with Taiwan, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve that goal. The PLA's continued military advancements sustain a trend of shifting the cross-strait military balance in Beijing's favor," said Willard. "The Taiwan Relations Act provides that it is US policy to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and to maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. At the US Pacific Command, we fulfill these obligations on a daily basis."

Although Willard's staff at Pacific Command headquarters in Pearl Harbor spend about 30% of their time dealing with China, nothing was said by Willard about ASB in his prepared remarks, despite the fact that ASB is focused on Willard's area of command - "[ASB] must address high-end military operations in the Western Pacific Theater of Operations," declared CSBA. Nevertheless, Willard is known as a realist and has said that "it would be a mistake to talk about China as an enemy. We need to manage our relations with them."[6]

Gates may have been blocked for some other reason.

Shortly after the 200-strong American "dialogue" delegation bid farewell to Beijing, the US conducted its most recent, short but successful hypersonic flight test, this time involving the X-51A. This test flight followed the release of a new RAND Corp monograph entitled "Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space - A Preliminary Assessment" that was issued in mid-May.

This study was undertaken after the USAF Space Command had asked the following questions: "Can future enemies be deterred from attacking US space systems? To what degree is deterrence reliable, and under what circumstances might it fail? What can the US do to fashion the most robust space deterrence regime and strengthen first-strike stability in space?"

So, was Gates prepared to arrive in Beijing and explain to his hosts. First, what was the NSS-ASB disconnect all about? Is the US gearing up to be a more diplomatic player as hinted at in the NSS or a more agile and innovative applicator of military force via ASB or both? Second, what exactly were the intentions of the US, given its stance in regards to "First-Strike Stability in Space" in light of the uptick in US hypersonic vehicle testing? Perhaps finally, why was he really heading to Central Asia after his quick visit to China?

If Gates was not prepared to delve into these things, why would Chinese government officials spend the time politely listening to a rehash of what Willard presented just a few days earlier when they could win a few points with the PLA by flashing a red light at Gates?

Besides, the Communist Party was mindful that Gates might say something spontaneous in Beijing, especially following his meetings with the Vietnamese and others in Singapore, that might spark already restless and vocal PLA officers. [7]

Some other impractical considerations are worth mentioning. Perhaps China did not want to risk having Gates fly into a sudden sandstorm once he departed Beijing and headed for Baku. Or maybe they did not want any US military planes flying out of their airspace over their far western border. A fear of having Gates on the ground in Beijing if North Korea suddenly decided to engage in a provocative act also cannot be ruled out.

Add these all up and the reasons why this was not a "convenient time" for the Chinese to welcome Gates are easier to grasp. The impact of this rebuff may dissolve swiftly anyway. In the meantime, the PLA smiled as Gates turned his attention to the US war in Afghanistan, bypassing Beijing and flying directly to Azerbaijan.

Notes
1. AirSea Battle, CSBA. 2. Interview: US Navy Under Secretary Robert Work, Defense News, Feb 4, 2010. 3. U.S. 'secret war' expands globally as Special Operations forces take larger role, Washington Post, Jun 4, 2010. 4. U.S. appeals to China to restore military ties, Reuters, Jun 5, 2010. 5. Gates: U.S.-China Military-to-Military Ties Need Work, Global Security, Jun 3, 2010. 6. China Turns Up the Heat, Airforce-Magazine, April, 2010. 7. The PLA raises its voice, Asia Times Online, Mar 9, 2010.

Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from Maine USA.

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