Turkey runs hot and cold


By Andrew Novo
Asia Times
Nov 10, 2009


Autumn has proved a busy season for Turkey as the nation of more than 76 million continues to establish itself as a regional hegemon while pursuing a policy of "no problems with neighbors". While the process of reconciling with neighbors - a tenuous agreement with Armenia, de-mining the border with Syria, a new energy deal with Russia and open amity with Iran - is yielding results, "no problems with neighbors" may mean new problems with old friends.

Turkish foreign affairs have made recent headlines: on October 10, Turkey signed an agreement normalizing relations with Armenia. The border between the two countries, closed since 1993, was opened. Two days later, Turkey canceled a joint air force exercise with Israel. A few days after that, the European Union released its annual report on the progress made by countries aspiring to EU membership.

Naturally, Turkey figured prominently in the report, which many commentators saw as a balancing act, pitting Turkey's progress - improvements in relations with Armenia and Syria abroad, and more rights for Kurds and improved civil-military relations at home - against its shortcomings: a lack of progress on the Cyprus issue and the recent ruling and fine against the Dogan Media Group.

The dichotomy inherent in the EU report mirrors larger questions not only about Turkish politics and society but also about the country's diplomatic posture. Turkey is familiar with occupying a unique position in world affairs. As recently as the early 20th century, it was a polyglot Muslim empire with deep roots in Europe. In the time-worn but geographically accurate phrase, it is the bridge between Europe and Asia.

Since 1952, it has been the easternmost member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is also the only Muslim state that is part of the alliance. Turkey contributed to winning the Cold War but has been lukewarm about the fight against fundamentalist Islam and opposed the 2003 war in Iraq. In fact, the Turkish government famously refused a request from the American government to use eastern Turkish provinces as a launching pad to create a second front in northern Iraq. Turkey came under fire from high-ranking American policymakers who blamed this for the strength of the Ba'athist insurgency as late as 2005. More recently, Turkey has not been shy about sending air units and even ground troops to combat what it describes as Kurdish terrorists in northern Iraq.

Turkey's uncompromising attitude toward the "terrorism" of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) should, in theory, generate support for similar Israeli policies and actions against groups in Gaza and Lebanon. This is no longer the case. In January this year, at Davos in Switzerland, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made headlines when he directed a high-tempered attack on Israeli policy in Gaza toward President Shimon Peres. Since then, Israeli-Turkish relations have suffered more substantive setbacks. The above-mentioned cancellation of joint air exercises being only one example. Turkey continues to improve its relations with Syria and, most significantly, is now courting favor with Iran. This new relationship is of genuine concern.

In an interview with British newspaper The Guardian published on October 26, the prime minister made several controversial statements. He called Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad a "friend". He claimed that Turkey had no problems with Iran and its peaceful nuclear ambitions, and that Western nations were being unfair in calling for restrictions and transparency that would prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Erdogan went so far as to say that even if Iran wanted a nuclear deterrent, countries like the United States, Britain or France, as nuclear powers themselves, had no right to protest. Erdogan followed his Guardian interview with a visit to Iran and seems intent on strengthening relations between the two countries even further.

The current administration in Turkey markets itself as a bridging force. It claims that it will serve as the EU's bridge to its Muslim neighbors and Muslims already within the EU. In 2008-09, it served as mediator for backchannel negotiations between Syria and Israel. Turkey has claimed to use its unique position to bridge the divide between NATO and Iran. Sadly, both for these challenges and for Turkey's image, these bridges have not yet proved passable.

The motives behind such acts are not entirely clear. The current Turkish administration is somewhat promiscuous in its international affairs. On the one hand it professes love for the European Union, seeks EU membership and is "Westernizing" in line with the EU's blueprint. On the other hand, Turkey continues its war against the PKK, is pursuing its own energy policy in relation to Russia and is flirting with Iran. The government in Ankara still refused to recognize the government of the Republic of Cyprus, even though Cyprus is a full EU member.

The case of Cyprus should not be forgotten because it holds an important history lesson. In 1974, Turkey, in spite of its membership in NATO and the Cold War, invaded the island to prevent its unification with Greece. Greece was a NATO ally, governed at the time by an anti-communist military junta. Nevertheless, Turkey was willing to invade and risk splitting NATO. War with Greece was even a possibility. As recently as 1996, Greece and Turkey have come close to war stemming from disputes over territory in the Aegean. Such examples are important. They demonstrate that in matters of national security, Turkey will not defer to traditional alliances; it will choose the path along which it feels most secure.

Unfortunately for the West, this path seems to be taking Turkey away from the United States, the European Union and the NATO alliance. The current Turkish administration is making decisions that may determine Turkey's alliances for years to come. If the present course is not reversed, the effect may be to burn the very bridges that, for years, Turkey sought to build.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KK10Ak01.html