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Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit, 70


70 All the powers in this section denied to the States are in Section 8 granted to the Nation. As the exercise of such power by the States had helped to wreck the Government under the Articles of Confederation, the double precaution was taken by the people of granting them to the Nation in Section 8 of this Article of the Constitution and denying them to the States in Section 10. Those things are essentially National. In several places in the Constitution this double statement of power is employed. By this section the States yielded to the Nation some powers which they had previously exercised.
Under the Articles of Confederation the worst of all the troubles, probably, sprang from the lack of National control of money and credits, and it was frequently stated in the Constitutional Convention that those evils --- what Madison called "the pestilent effects of paper money." -- must be abated forever. Nevertheless, many attempts have been made by States to issue paper money, that is to "emit bills of credit" to be passed as money. Those acts of the States have, of course, been held unconstitutional, in some instances by the courts of the issuing States -- for the Constitution provides 134 that "the judges in every State shall be bound thereby [by the National Constitution], anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." But bills of credit or certificates of indebtedness which are not intended by the State to circulate as money do not fall within the prohibition of this clause.

make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender to Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts," 71


71 The command in the preceding section, that Congress shall not enact attainders or ex post facto laws, is here repeated as to the States, with the addition that the State shall not impair the obligation of contracts. This was added when it was pointed out that the term ex post facto relates only to criminal law. The provision was accordingly framed to fit civil cases. Therefore the State may not change the legal standing of a citizen with respect either to his personal conduct or to his contracts. A contract which was permissible and valid at the time that it was entered into cannot be rendered void or be in any wise impaired by subsequent legislation by the State, or by the county or the city acting under powers received from the State. The obligation of a contract is its binding force on the party making it which the law at the time it was made would effectuate. It involves the promise of the party and the sanction of the law that the promise shall be carried out. The contracts of the State as well as those of the individual are covered by this clause. Many cases have arisen in which States have attempted to evade the obligations of contracts made by them with citizens. To Illustrate, where a state chartered a bank an profited from its operations, and the law creating the bank provided that the bills or money issued by it should be receivable in payment of debts due to the State, such as taxes, a subsequent act of the legislature repealing this provision of the Bank Act was held (1850) by the Supreme Court of the United States to violate this clause of the Constitution. When the citizen accepted the inducement of the state to use its bank's money for its benefit a contract arose under which the State was obliged to render to him the advantage which it had promised and for which it had received a consideration.
One of the purposes of the provision was to prevent States from permitting the payment of debts in paper money. Another purpose was to prevent the passage of insolvency laws and stay laws which would release debtors from their present obligation to pay. In addition to those matters, contracts of States themselves had been repudiated. "The separate legislatures have so often abused the obligation of contracts," wrote Jefferson, "that the citizens themselves chose to trust it to the general [National] rather than to their own [State] authorities." On the same subject chief Justice Marshall said "a course of legislation had prevailed in the States which weakened confidence of man in man." c24
No provision of the Constitution has received more frequent consideration by the Supreme Court of the United States and by the Supreme Courts of the States.
In 1758 the remnant of the Delaware Indians in New Jersey were given a tract of land in the State in consideration of their leaving lands which they were occupying; and it was agreed by the State that the lands to be given to the Indians aforesaid "shall not be subject to any tax, any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding." In 1801 the legislature of New Jersey attempted to revoke the tax exemption after the lands had been sold by the Indians, but the Supreme Court of the United States held (1812) that the act of revocation was void for conflict with this provision. The Court said that the privilege to be free from taxation was, by the terms which created it, annexed "to the land itself." The exemption therefore went with the land to the purchaser, who could not be deprived of it. c25
The Dartmouth College case is perhaps the most celebrated of the early cases arising under this clause. In 1769, after application to the King of England for a charter to incorporate a religious and literary institution, and upon the representation of the applicants that large contributions had been promised for the project, which would be conferred upon the corporation as soon as it was chartered, George III issued a charter. On the faith of that grant the property promised was conveyed to the corporation. Gifts of land and money were received and many rights acquired. In 1816 the legislature of New Hampshire passed "an Act to Amend the Charter and Enlarge and Improve the Corporation of Dartmouth College." The Act changed the name college to university, and the reorganization was such as to put the property and the franchise in the possession and control of another organization. The trustees of Dartmouth College refused to recognize the amended charter and brought a proceeding to see whether the acts of the legislature "are valid in law . . . or whether the same acts are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and so void." Daniel Webster, who had been educated at Dartmouth, was counsel for the college. The Supreme Court held (1819) that the legislation of New Hampshire impaired the obligation of the contract under which the college came into existence and was to continue on its course, and that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. c36
The withdrawal for a time of the remedy of a creditor by the enactment of a stay law is unconstitutional. So is any law which, under the pretense of changing the remedy, undertakes to compel a person to accept something different in the place of that for which he had contracted. Any law which gives preference in payment to one creditor to another which did not exist when the contracts were made is invalid, even though the preferred creditor is the Sate itself. This is true of any law which takes away from the creditor a substantial right which the contract assured to him, as the right to possession of mortgaged lands until the mortgage debt is paid. A law which increases the exemptions from executions issued on judgments so as to seriously impair the value of the remedy and reduce the possibilities of collection are void under this clause.
Contracts for the purchase price of slaves were enforced after Emancipation, notwithstanding the provision in the State constitution that such debts should not be paid; for the constitutional provision of the State was a "law" which impaired the obligation of a contract which was legally valid at the time it was made. c23
The contractual right of the owner of a house or an apartment to the possession of the premises upon the expiration of the term agreed upon in the tenant's lease was held (1921) by the Supreme Court of the United States not unconstitutionally impaired by a rent law of New York (1920) declaring the existence of a housing emergency and providing that in a city of a million population or more no action should be maintainable to recover possession of premises occupied as a dwelling by a tenant desiring to remain and pay a reasonable rent, except that the owner might have the dwelling for his personal possession or to tear it down for the construction of a new building. Contracts are made said the court, "subject to this exercise of the power of the State where otherwise justified", referring to the police power, which is exerted for the health, safety, and well-being of the people. c26, c96
Nor did the law operate to deprive the owner of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,173 for in many cases restrictions upon property rights for the general welfare have been upheld as warranted under the police power of the State. It has long been established, the court pointed out, that the owner of property may be restricted in his income or rental, as by laws imposing an excess profits tax, or an income tax, or by laws prohibiting usurious interest.
In the leading case on the power of the State to regulate the rates which may be charged the public for the use of private property, the Supreme Court stated (1876) the governing principle as follows:
"Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw the grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control." c89

or grant any Title of Nobility. 72


72 In the preceding section 69 the Nation is forbidden to grant titles of nobility. The repetition of the commandment as to the State shows the dislike which the Fathers had for that institution which, more than anything else, had made life for the Colonies under English rule impossible. All the repressive and burdensome plans of the Government of George III found prompt and generally unanimous support in the House of Lords, the organized expression of intolerant and intractable nobility. The Constitutional Convention was determined that this noxious thing never should be found in the United States.
Titles of nobility have been conferred by the sovereign of England upon citizens of Canada.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and control of the Congress. 73


73 Here is another recurrence to the National prerogative under the commerce clause 45 to regulate trade. Every precaution was taken to keep the State from such interferences as those which had defeated the Union under the Articles of Confederation.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. 74


74 In this sentence are four bars, none of which the State may cross without permission of Congress; it may not (1) lay any duty of tonnage (tax upon the cubical capacity of a ship), for that might work a hindrance to commerce and bring conflict with the regulatory power of the Nation under the commerce clause; it may not (2) keep troops or ships of war (the State militia, organized for discipline, and belonging to civil life, not being troops within this clause), for standing troops within a State might bring conflicts with other States or other governments, or even with the Nation; it may not (3) enter into agreements (political) with other States or with foreign powers, for thereby the National government might be embarrassed; and it may not (4) engage in war except in self defence. Each one of those powers is inherent in any independent government. For the good of the Union and themselves, the people of the States, in ratifying the Constitution, disclaimed those powers in favor of the Nation. c83